Rome, July 6, 2011
The “Kabul Intercontinental” hotel, attacked last week by insurgents, was built and inaugurated In those halcyon years preceding the end of Zahir Shah’s reign, when Afghanistan seemed like a haven of peace and Kabul was known – rather inappropriately – as “the Paris of Central Asia”.
Even then this massive structure built on a hill overlooking the city stood out and was the object of much comment, not all of it favourable. Already in those years, within the ostensibly “westernized” Kabul civil society, voices were raised which expressed disapproval and, above all, the fear that king Zahir Shah – just like one of his unfortunate predecessors, Amanullah Khan – was showing undue haste in aligning the Capital to Western models, failing to take into account the growing disapproval of the highly conservative rural population. The fact itself that this new modern hotel even had an outdoor swimming pool, open to both sexes, fuelled the growing tide of disapproval.
The significance of this recent Taliban action seems highly symbolic and therefore goes well beyond the loss of life and material damage caused. Many have been quick to point out the startling similarity of this episode to the Mumbai terrorist attacks, but a more appropriate parallel could be drawn with a similar assault on the Serena Hotel in the very heart of Kabul, some years ago.
At the time, this incident took many international observers by surprise, and did constitute a veritable turning point in the Taliban strategy, giving notice that nowhere in Afghanistan, not even the capital, could be considered even remotely safe.
No matter what the official line has repeatedly stated, events have been steadily deteriorating since then, and the erstwhile Cassandra's, those who have repeatedly stated that the war as such, is “unwinnable”, are unfortunately being proven right.
Cassandra, we know, was a tragic figure whose gift for prophesizing brought her only unhappiness and, ultimately, doom. There is, therefore, no sense of satisfaction, however grim, no hint of schadenfreude in those very few who, in the course of the past years, have been trying to steer international opinion’s attention to the impending and palpably inevitable disaster in Afghanistan.
It is undeniable that some positive points have emerged, not the least of them being the growing – albeit somewhat shaky - role of Afghan security forces in the armed struggle. It is also true that in many parts of the country, particularly the North and the West, the quality of life, especially for women, has somewhat improved, and that in some regions there is a growing taste for Civil Society’s active participation in local political life. The overall picture, however, remains bleak and desolate.
The term itself, “turning point”, employed ad nauseam on all occasions (lastly the elimination of Osama Bin Laden) is deceptive, because it seems evident that, at this stage, there really is nowhere to turn. Even if, through covert negotiations, power could be handed over to some “moderate” Taliban factions (whatever that may possibly mean), they themselves will probably experience great difficulty in controlling the more extremist elements. For their part, the NATO forces will not have the availability of a nearby haven from which to intervene and aid the new Government in its battle to control the extremists. Pakistan, in its present state of turmoil, is out of the question and the former Soviet Central Asian Republics do not offer guarantees of long term reliability. Their regimes, though apparently strong, would experience great difficulties in granting hospitality to NATO forces with the purpose of keeping an eye on Afghanistan. To what extent Drones can be used to this effect is open to question.
The situation is darkly reminiscent of the Soviet pull-out over twenty years ago: for a while, the Soviet Union was able to keep control of the Afghan skies and thus allow the survival of the Government, but the collapse of the Soviet structure fatally brought about the civil war which eventually led to the Taliban takeover.
“Staying on”, however, is out of the question, not only for the growing unpopularity of the conflict in American and European public opinion, but also because no advantage would be obtained, only the protraction of an equivocal situation which is destroying the very fabric of Afghan culture and civilization.
It seems clear that news of minor victories or setbacks on the military front have lost significance and that close attention has to be paid to the harsh messages that the Taliban have been sending not only to the NATO forces, but also to those sections of the Afghan population still inclined to welcome the presence of foreign forces and to collaborate with them. The attack on the Intercontinental, a very visible symbol of foreign presence has to be placed in this context.
It could well be too late, but perhaps attempts should be made to ensure some local autonomy in the Northern and Western provinces, granting the future Afghan government rather full power in the rest of the country. Perhaps some of the less sinister warlords, who, in some areas, still command respect and loyalty could be “rehabilitated” to this end.
The alternatives to total disaster are fast diminishing, and the time has come fundamentally to revisit Afghan policy, also, of course, in the military sector, but more particularly with an eye to civilian development.
It is almost impossible to keep track of the constantly shifting aims declared by the coalition upon invading Afghanistan and in subsequent years. The latest seems to be oriented toward leaving Afghanistan as a “neutral buffer state”, which, of course, has been its historical role for centuries. This would mean that a return to a distant past in a climate of total uncertainty will be considered sufficient to express satisfaction at the outcome of the long conflict in Afghanistan, and this is a point well worth reflecting upon.
Carlo Ungaro
giovedì 7 luglio 2011
AN "ITALIAN SPRING"? VOTERS REBELLION IN ITALY
Rome, July 5, 2011
The extent of the damage inflicted on Italy’s governing majority by recent electoral results can be measured by a recent statement uttered on public Television by one of the most austere and influential Government ministers who recalled an anecdote about Louis XVI refusing to believe that the attack on the Bastille was a “revolution”, treating it rather as a “revolt” and consequently coming to a grisly end. Giulio Tremonti, Minister of the Economy, thus publicly warned Berlusconi that what had taken place was not a “revolt”, but a real “revolution” by the Italian electorate and ought to be taken seriously.
Even a few months ago, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s hold on power seemed impregnable, largely through his vast control over private an public media.
In the course of the past four weeks, however, both Mr. Berlusconi and his only meaningful political ally, the “Northern League”, have suffered a number of unpredicted and severe setbacks as a result of what amounts to a virtual revolt by the Italian electorate which, in recent years, had seemed very passive, to the point of indifference, and readily obedient to their party’s call.
The results of recent local elections in Milan had sounded a warning, with Mr. Berlusconi being defeated in his own territory in spite of an unprecedented, totally personalised media propaganda onslaught, but the hardest and perhaps fatal blow came two weeks later as the results of four public referenda showed the electorate’s disillusionment, even hostility, to the current governing coalition.
In commenting the recent referendum results in Italy, most observers have put the accent on the massive vote (well over 90%) against the nuclear power program which had been similarly rejected by a popular referendum in 1987. The situation, however, needs to be viewed in a much more complex light and could well constitute a fundamental turning point in the Italian political scene.
According to the Italian Constitution, a referendum will be considered valid only if “50% plus 1” of the voters cast a ballot. Many previous attempts at repealing laws through the referendum process have failed because those who opposed the referendum simply abstained. In spite of an abstention campaign launched by both the majority parties, counting on the obedience of their followers, a massive 57% of the electorate chose to vote, and the vote in favour of repealing the laws subject to referendum was uniformly above 90%.
The laws thus repealed concerned the nuclear power programme, the privatisation of the water supply and – perhaps most importantly – the right of the Prime Minister and other Government officials to refuse to appear in court if subject to prosecution for crimes allegedly committed even in periods prior to their accession to office. This last law had been hastily passed with the express intention of protecting the Prime Minister from prosecution. The extremely high proportion of votes cast for its repeal therefore shows an unexpected disaffection of the electorate with Mr. Berlusconi..
A great many questions have been raised by this result, and it would be difficult to tackle them all. Some issues, however, seem of primary importance, and the first consideration that comes to mind is that the main opposition parties, though eager to board the victory bandwagon , were also taken by surprise and can be considered victims of the new political climate, which they did very little to inspire. The successful candidates in Milan and Naples actually ran against the “official” opposition candidates and therefore, until the very end, received only tepid support. Similarly, the referendum vote was considered a lost cause, and only two fringe parties campaigned in its favour: Berlusconi's unwise decision to put himself in the front line, signifying that a vote against his party was a vote against him certainly helped the winners much more than the late and ineffectual support of the main opposition parties. While it is easy to indicate who came out as the loser – and it has been an unprecedented personal defeat for Berlusconi – it is much more difficult to understand who the ultimate winner will be, and the next few, certainly hectic, weeks of Italian political activity will certainly concentrate on the solution of this conundrum..
It is also interesting to note that supporters of the winning candidates and of the referenda received very limited exposure on TV: this could be the beginning of the end of the so-called “videocracy” which has ruled Italy for the past years. The term “videocracy” was recently coined as the title of an excellent, bitter-sweet documentary about Italian politics. Television seemed to be the dominating power, and those who controlled Television controlled the nation. Perhaps the governing parties, and particularly the Prime Minister, have been guilty of over-exposure thus creating irritation instead of consensus. In the recent municipal elections, the parties least exposed to TV coverage came out on top, and this seems highly significant.
Another important concern, which has not been addressed by international observers, is the effect that these results will have on the Catholic hierarchy which, particularly in the recent past, has had a strong, and at times pernicious influence on Italian politics. It may appear specious to speak of the “Catholic vote” in an almost totally “Catholic” country. But traditionally there have always been politicians who have identified themselves as “Catholic” and have therefore received approval and backing from the Church hierarchy. The attitude of the Church towards Berlusconi has been ambiguous: he has occasionally had his knuckles lightly rapped for his behaviour, but the Church has constantly given him its support in exchange for remarkably useful favours. There were complaints, however, from the grass roots, expressed mainly through Parish Priests and the surprisingly massive turnout in a referendum which was widely regarded as for or against Berlusconi will cause some rethinking and could end up with the Church withdrawing its support with understandably negative consequences for the Government.
An early symptom of this change of attitude came very shortly after the vote, when the Italian Bishops Conference came out very strongly against some statements by a member of the Government.
One of the primary considerations, of course, concerns the effect these two “slaps in the face” (as a high ranking Northern League official put it) will have on the ruling coalition and the way in which Berlusconi will choose to react: at the moment he seems intent on the suicidal policy of urgently enacting a questionable fiscal reform, in spite of the fragile situation of the economy.
Berlusconi has been promising “tax cuts” and “Fiscal reform” ever since he first came to power in 1994, but there has been no visible decrease in taxation. He is very much of a populist leader and he has made it known that he wants urgently to enact a “fiscal reform” to alleviate taxes, obviously in the hope of regaining popular support. The type of reform he has in mind would end up increasing Italy’s public debt – one of the highest in the world – and would go against EU advice and rules. His view of fiscal reform, moreover, has always been in favour of the upper income brackets, and this would cause further dissent in a moment when the gap between rich and poor is visibly increasing. This is a risky path and an injudicious fiscal policy at this stage could reduce Italy to the conditions faced by Greece, Portugal and other “problem” Countries.
The ruling majority is in deep trouble. Some stalwart party members openly and ostentatiously disobeyed Party orders by casting their votes in the referendum, and there already have been acrimonious exchanges between the two ruling parties and also within the parties themselves. There is much uncertainty on what the future developments will be, but this has certainly all the earmarks of an important watershed moment.
The extent of the damage inflicted on Italy’s governing majority by recent electoral results can be measured by a recent statement uttered on public Television by one of the most austere and influential Government ministers who recalled an anecdote about Louis XVI refusing to believe that the attack on the Bastille was a “revolution”, treating it rather as a “revolt” and consequently coming to a grisly end. Giulio Tremonti, Minister of the Economy, thus publicly warned Berlusconi that what had taken place was not a “revolt”, but a real “revolution” by the Italian electorate and ought to be taken seriously.
Even a few months ago, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s hold on power seemed impregnable, largely through his vast control over private an public media.
In the course of the past four weeks, however, both Mr. Berlusconi and his only meaningful political ally, the “Northern League”, have suffered a number of unpredicted and severe setbacks as a result of what amounts to a virtual revolt by the Italian electorate which, in recent years, had seemed very passive, to the point of indifference, and readily obedient to their party’s call.
The results of recent local elections in Milan had sounded a warning, with Mr. Berlusconi being defeated in his own territory in spite of an unprecedented, totally personalised media propaganda onslaught, but the hardest and perhaps fatal blow came two weeks later as the results of four public referenda showed the electorate’s disillusionment, even hostility, to the current governing coalition.
In commenting the recent referendum results in Italy, most observers have put the accent on the massive vote (well over 90%) against the nuclear power program which had been similarly rejected by a popular referendum in 1987. The situation, however, needs to be viewed in a much more complex light and could well constitute a fundamental turning point in the Italian political scene.
According to the Italian Constitution, a referendum will be considered valid only if “50% plus 1” of the voters cast a ballot. Many previous attempts at repealing laws through the referendum process have failed because those who opposed the referendum simply abstained. In spite of an abstention campaign launched by both the majority parties, counting on the obedience of their followers, a massive 57% of the electorate chose to vote, and the vote in favour of repealing the laws subject to referendum was uniformly above 90%.
The laws thus repealed concerned the nuclear power programme, the privatisation of the water supply and – perhaps most importantly – the right of the Prime Minister and other Government officials to refuse to appear in court if subject to prosecution for crimes allegedly committed even in periods prior to their accession to office. This last law had been hastily passed with the express intention of protecting the Prime Minister from prosecution. The extremely high proportion of votes cast for its repeal therefore shows an unexpected disaffection of the electorate with Mr. Berlusconi..
A great many questions have been raised by this result, and it would be difficult to tackle them all. Some issues, however, seem of primary importance, and the first consideration that comes to mind is that the main opposition parties, though eager to board the victory bandwagon , were also taken by surprise and can be considered victims of the new political climate, which they did very little to inspire. The successful candidates in Milan and Naples actually ran against the “official” opposition candidates and therefore, until the very end, received only tepid support. Similarly, the referendum vote was considered a lost cause, and only two fringe parties campaigned in its favour: Berlusconi's unwise decision to put himself in the front line, signifying that a vote against his party was a vote against him certainly helped the winners much more than the late and ineffectual support of the main opposition parties. While it is easy to indicate who came out as the loser – and it has been an unprecedented personal defeat for Berlusconi – it is much more difficult to understand who the ultimate winner will be, and the next few, certainly hectic, weeks of Italian political activity will certainly concentrate on the solution of this conundrum..
It is also interesting to note that supporters of the winning candidates and of the referenda received very limited exposure on TV: this could be the beginning of the end of the so-called “videocracy” which has ruled Italy for the past years. The term “videocracy” was recently coined as the title of an excellent, bitter-sweet documentary about Italian politics. Television seemed to be the dominating power, and those who controlled Television controlled the nation. Perhaps the governing parties, and particularly the Prime Minister, have been guilty of over-exposure thus creating irritation instead of consensus. In the recent municipal elections, the parties least exposed to TV coverage came out on top, and this seems highly significant.
Another important concern, which has not been addressed by international observers, is the effect that these results will have on the Catholic hierarchy which, particularly in the recent past, has had a strong, and at times pernicious influence on Italian politics. It may appear specious to speak of the “Catholic vote” in an almost totally “Catholic” country. But traditionally there have always been politicians who have identified themselves as “Catholic” and have therefore received approval and backing from the Church hierarchy. The attitude of the Church towards Berlusconi has been ambiguous: he has occasionally had his knuckles lightly rapped for his behaviour, but the Church has constantly given him its support in exchange for remarkably useful favours. There were complaints, however, from the grass roots, expressed mainly through Parish Priests and the surprisingly massive turnout in a referendum which was widely regarded as for or against Berlusconi will cause some rethinking and could end up with the Church withdrawing its support with understandably negative consequences for the Government.
An early symptom of this change of attitude came very shortly after the vote, when the Italian Bishops Conference came out very strongly against some statements by a member of the Government.
One of the primary considerations, of course, concerns the effect these two “slaps in the face” (as a high ranking Northern League official put it) will have on the ruling coalition and the way in which Berlusconi will choose to react: at the moment he seems intent on the suicidal policy of urgently enacting a questionable fiscal reform, in spite of the fragile situation of the economy.
Berlusconi has been promising “tax cuts” and “Fiscal reform” ever since he first came to power in 1994, but there has been no visible decrease in taxation. He is very much of a populist leader and he has made it known that he wants urgently to enact a “fiscal reform” to alleviate taxes, obviously in the hope of regaining popular support. The type of reform he has in mind would end up increasing Italy’s public debt – one of the highest in the world – and would go against EU advice and rules. His view of fiscal reform, moreover, has always been in favour of the upper income brackets, and this would cause further dissent in a moment when the gap between rich and poor is visibly increasing. This is a risky path and an injudicious fiscal policy at this stage could reduce Italy to the conditions faced by Greece, Portugal and other “problem” Countries.
The ruling majority is in deep trouble. Some stalwart party members openly and ostentatiously disobeyed Party orders by casting their votes in the referendum, and there already have been acrimonious exchanges between the two ruling parties and also within the parties themselves. There is much uncertainty on what the future developments will be, but this has certainly all the earmarks of an important watershed moment.
mercoledì 2 febbraio 2011
The Catholic Church and Italian Politics
(This article was published today by OPed News)
Rome, Italy, February 2 2011
Much has been written about the tragicomic aspects of the current Italian political crisis. As so often happens, Italian politics have become embroiled in a combination of Greek Tragedy and Comic Opera: Shakespeare rewritten by Feydeau.
Last December, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi survived a Parliamentary “no confidence” motion by the scantiest of margins. As a result, his position has remained shaky, and the Italian situation appears unhealthy or, at the very least incongruous and likely to keep the country adrift on a sea of inaction where strong measures would be needed .
Few, however, have shifted the focus of their analysis on the role played by the Roman Catholic Church, embodied by the Italian Episcopal Conference (CEI), whose interference in Italian political life has become increasingly pervasive and forceful, filling, as it were, a preoccupying political and institutional void.
An overall evaluation of the Italian political situation, which, in spite of appearances, is actually neither amusing nor immune from the risk of resurgent neo-fascist nostalgia, has to take into account the extent of the permanent and mainly negative influence that the Roman Catholic Church, the Vatican and the Holy See (three very distinct realities) exert on the Italian political, cultural and social scene. The origins of this phenomenon have deep historical roots, but the effects are readily visible, as is the realisation that, with the present Pontificate, the Church’s interference has been steadily growing..
Long before becoming Pope, Joseph Ratzinger had repeatedly preached against “relativism”, viewed as a dangerous deviation from the absolute truths contained in the Teachings of the Church. He has continued on that theme also after his election as Supreme Pontiff, and it would be safe to say that “anti-relativism” constitutes one of his most cherished doctrinal points.
It could therefore appear ironic that he, of all people, should now reign at the head of one of the world’s most politically pragmatic organisations. Symbols of this pragmatism abound and are evident all over Rome: The Church, for example, has always been and still is adamantly opposed to homosexuality, and yet two self confessed homosexuals, who, while in Rome, led scandalously open love lives, are very ostentatiously buried within Saint Peter’s Basilica. I refer, of course, to Queen Christina of Sweden (1689) and Charles Edward, the last heir to the Stuart throne, known also as “Bonnie Prince Charlie” or “The Young Pretender”, who died in 1788.
This spirit of pragmatism was put to extremely good use in the first years of the Fascist regime in Italy, in the early 1920’s. In the space of about six years, Benito Mussolini, an anti-Catholic, blaspheming womanizer, and an avowed atheist, was transformed into “the man sent to us by Divine Providence” and proceeded to “normalise” the relations between the Church and the Italian state, which had been very strained at least since 1861, by signing the “Lateran Pacts”, or the “Concordat”, in February 1929.
What was shown then, and is now being repeated with chilling analogy, was the masterful way in which Catholic Church manipulates political life in Italy more than it does in other Catholic countries. The technique used then, and still used today is of disarming simplicity and is limited to meting out reprimands and rewards with the aim of bringing the erring Government to heel.
It could therefore be argued that Silvio Berlusconi, with his growingly erratic behaviour, has actually played into the hands of the Catholic Hierarchy, who, with a sagacious use of the many Catholic media outlets, have alternated sharp words of criticism with warm praise for the Government’s readiness to toe the line in matters of interest to the Catholic Church, gaining, in a moment of drastic financial cutbacks, substantial subsidies for “private” (i.e. Catholic) schools..
There is, however, a growing perception that a large part of the Catholic electorate has been profoundly shocked by the latest information on the Prime Minister’s activities, and that this sense of disquiet has filtered up, through the Parishes, to the Bishop’s Conference and, finally, to the Holy See and the Pope himself. As a result, the Supreme Pontiff and leading personalities in the Church have come up with formal statements – couched, of course, in extremely cautious and indirect terms – critical of the lack of moral sensibility on the part of “those elected to high government office”. It was interesting, almost amusing, to not the haste with which the Prime Minister’s political party assured the public that those words “are not addressed to us.”
For many years the Roman Catholic Hierarchy has been outspoken in its support for right-wing governments in Italy, particularly those formed by Berlusconi, and, therefore, bland as they were, the words spoken by high ranking prelates have to be taken into consideration. In spite of this unquestionable support, there is a strong possibility that, in the future, the Church may abandon Berlusconi and prefer sustaining a prominent Catholic political figure. On the other hand, the Church may use the occasion to increase the pressure on the Prime Minister thus bringing the Italian Government even closer to the approved Catholic ideology.
The question remains as to why Italian political leaders should be so sensitive to the pressures of the Church, considering that the Italian population is not particularly devout in its adherence to Catholicism.
This is a very interesting issue which would deserve closer scrutiny, but the paradox remains in the sense that the “immoral” behaviour of the Prime Minister and the subsequent Catholic reaction could end up further reducing Italy’s status as a secular state.
Rome, Italy, February 2 2011
Much has been written about the tragicomic aspects of the current Italian political crisis. As so often happens, Italian politics have become embroiled in a combination of Greek Tragedy and Comic Opera: Shakespeare rewritten by Feydeau.
Last December, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi survived a Parliamentary “no confidence” motion by the scantiest of margins. As a result, his position has remained shaky, and the Italian situation appears unhealthy or, at the very least incongruous and likely to keep the country adrift on a sea of inaction where strong measures would be needed .
Few, however, have shifted the focus of their analysis on the role played by the Roman Catholic Church, embodied by the Italian Episcopal Conference (CEI), whose interference in Italian political life has become increasingly pervasive and forceful, filling, as it were, a preoccupying political and institutional void.
An overall evaluation of the Italian political situation, which, in spite of appearances, is actually neither amusing nor immune from the risk of resurgent neo-fascist nostalgia, has to take into account the extent of the permanent and mainly negative influence that the Roman Catholic Church, the Vatican and the Holy See (three very distinct realities) exert on the Italian political, cultural and social scene. The origins of this phenomenon have deep historical roots, but the effects are readily visible, as is the realisation that, with the present Pontificate, the Church’s interference has been steadily growing..
Long before becoming Pope, Joseph Ratzinger had repeatedly preached against “relativism”, viewed as a dangerous deviation from the absolute truths contained in the Teachings of the Church. He has continued on that theme also after his election as Supreme Pontiff, and it would be safe to say that “anti-relativism” constitutes one of his most cherished doctrinal points.
It could therefore appear ironic that he, of all people, should now reign at the head of one of the world’s most politically pragmatic organisations. Symbols of this pragmatism abound and are evident all over Rome: The Church, for example, has always been and still is adamantly opposed to homosexuality, and yet two self confessed homosexuals, who, while in Rome, led scandalously open love lives, are very ostentatiously buried within Saint Peter’s Basilica. I refer, of course, to Queen Christina of Sweden (1689) and Charles Edward, the last heir to the Stuart throne, known also as “Bonnie Prince Charlie” or “The Young Pretender”, who died in 1788.
This spirit of pragmatism was put to extremely good use in the first years of the Fascist regime in Italy, in the early 1920’s. In the space of about six years, Benito Mussolini, an anti-Catholic, blaspheming womanizer, and an avowed atheist, was transformed into “the man sent to us by Divine Providence” and proceeded to “normalise” the relations between the Church and the Italian state, which had been very strained at least since 1861, by signing the “Lateran Pacts”, or the “Concordat”, in February 1929.
What was shown then, and is now being repeated with chilling analogy, was the masterful way in which Catholic Church manipulates political life in Italy more than it does in other Catholic countries. The technique used then, and still used today is of disarming simplicity and is limited to meting out reprimands and rewards with the aim of bringing the erring Government to heel.
It could therefore be argued that Silvio Berlusconi, with his growingly erratic behaviour, has actually played into the hands of the Catholic Hierarchy, who, with a sagacious use of the many Catholic media outlets, have alternated sharp words of criticism with warm praise for the Government’s readiness to toe the line in matters of interest to the Catholic Church, gaining, in a moment of drastic financial cutbacks, substantial subsidies for “private” (i.e. Catholic) schools..
There is, however, a growing perception that a large part of the Catholic electorate has been profoundly shocked by the latest information on the Prime Minister’s activities, and that this sense of disquiet has filtered up, through the Parishes, to the Bishop’s Conference and, finally, to the Holy See and the Pope himself. As a result, the Supreme Pontiff and leading personalities in the Church have come up with formal statements – couched, of course, in extremely cautious and indirect terms – critical of the lack of moral sensibility on the part of “those elected to high government office”. It was interesting, almost amusing, to not the haste with which the Prime Minister’s political party assured the public that those words “are not addressed to us.”
For many years the Roman Catholic Hierarchy has been outspoken in its support for right-wing governments in Italy, particularly those formed by Berlusconi, and, therefore, bland as they were, the words spoken by high ranking prelates have to be taken into consideration. In spite of this unquestionable support, there is a strong possibility that, in the future, the Church may abandon Berlusconi and prefer sustaining a prominent Catholic political figure. On the other hand, the Church may use the occasion to increase the pressure on the Prime Minister thus bringing the Italian Government even closer to the approved Catholic ideology.
The question remains as to why Italian political leaders should be so sensitive to the pressures of the Church, considering that the Italian population is not particularly devout in its adherence to Catholicism.
This is a very interesting issue which would deserve closer scrutiny, but the paradox remains in the sense that the “immoral” behaviour of the Prime Minister and the subsequent Catholic reaction could end up further reducing Italy’s status as a secular state.
giovedì 13 gennaio 2011
Is This the End of the Road for Berlusconi?
With their typical and incurable penchant for over dramatisation, the Italian media and many political commentators had dubbed December 14, 2010, as “the day of reckoning”. Many, in fact – but not all – firmly believed that, on that fateful day, the Berlusconi Government would lose a vote of confidence and be compelled to resign, thus finally ushering in a new political era.
The Prime Minister, instead, using tactics which many decried as “shameful”, was able to attract a sufficient number of vacillating parliamentarians to his cause and survived the vote of confidence by the narrow margin of three votes. This was remarkable, considering that his majority, just a few months back, had seemed virtually unassailable.
The really important events, however, took place not within the “Palazzo” – as Italians contemptuously call the seats of power – but rather in the streets of Rome where a protest demonstration called by students exposed the City centre to episodes of violence unheard of since the seventies, and which caught the nation by surprise revealing, as it did, the extreme anger of the younger generations as well as their growing disaffection with the Machiavellian manoeuvrings which typify the Italian political scene.
Whatever his shortcomings, real or perceived, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, in power for the most part of the past sixteen years, has succeeded in forging much of Italy’s social reality and perceptions to his own image. If, on the one hand, recent events had led some to believe that he had come to the end of his remarkable political career, others did not hesitate to assert that it would be a bit early to start trotting out his political obituary, since he had given signs of a remarkable survival instinct several times in the past.
There is however no doubt that, even up to a few days before the vote, Berlusconi and his closest entourage appeared nervous, ill at ease, more irritable than usual and even beset by a sense of panic, as shown by their renewed and ever more violent attacks on hostile media, allegedly “communist inspired”, whose criticism of the Government has been defined as “anti-Italian” by the Prime Minister himself. Frequent references were also made to an alleged “international anti-Italian conspiracy” supported by the international media. To prove the existence of this supposed “foreign conspiracy” a variety of allegations were brought into play, such as the insistence, by the international press, to publicize “negative” stories about Italy, for example the garbage scandal in Naples or the Prime Minister’s sexual escapades.
It could be entertaining, but, in the long run, fatuous and useless, to sift through all the events and statements which have typified these days, some verging on the farcical, such as the shouting match, using raunchy epithets in the Neapolitan dialect, held between Alessandra Mussolini, the “Duce’s” granddaughter, and one of Berlusconi's former beauty queen cabinet ministers, recently dubbed by “Der Spiegel” as “the world’s most beautiful minister”. This, as well as other episodes, could indicate that there is trouble brewing in Berlusconi’s gynaeceum, for beauty queens, as a rule, seem unwilling obediently to toe the party line.
The basic situation, though apparently complex, can be defined by a few fundamental guidelines: The opposition parties, loud in their disapproval of Berlusconi, would, in reality, prefer to see the Government last a while longer, because they feel politically insecure and fear defeat should early elections be called.
The Prime Minister himself, though quite sure of victory, would also prefer to avoid elections, fearing the apparent surge in the popularity of his allied party, the Northern League, which, for its part, would, instead be very glad to see the fall of the Government, knowing that they would emerge with renewed strength in case of early elections.
At least three possible scenarios could emerge from this unpleasantly chaotic atmosphere:
By very aggressively continuing in his campaign to pursue and purchase the votes of insecure parliamentarians, Berlusconi could weather the storm and continue until 2014. At that date a successor will have to be found for president Napolitano, who will have reached the end of his mandate, and Berlusconi would have a good chance to be elected President by a joint session of the Italian Parliament. This solution may seem rather unlikely, but is certainly not impossible.
A more likely scenario, the one pursued, sometimes obliquely, more often openly, by the Prime Minister’s main ally, the Northern League, would have Berlusconi handing in his resignation to president Napolitano, acting on the assumption that the President will call for the dissolution of Parliament and new elections. Those very opposition political forces who are clamouring for Berlusconi's resignation fear this outcome because they feel that a coalition between Berlusconi and the xenophobic, racist “Northern League” would almost certainly win, bringing Berlusconi back into power, albeit under the Leagues' thrall.
The only way in which Berlusconi can be defeated would be through the creation of a “national unity“ caretaker transitional Government, perhaps under the leadership of a non-political figure, to last out the remaining years of the legislature. This is probably the solution also favoured by president Napolitano – for there is no love lost between him and Berlusconi – but it risks being stymied by the divisions which beset the opposition political parties, who seem intent in an almost suicidal campaign destined to discourage any attempt at unity. Berlusconi’s attitude is ambiguous: on the one hand he has repeated his opposition to early elections, but, at the same time, he has been multiplying his appearances on Television and has refurbished all his old electoral slogans against “Communists in Cashmere sweaters” who have infiltrated the Judicial system and are out to get him.
In this volatile, unpredictable and perhaps ultimately dangerous situation, it would be useful to shift the focus of analysis on the role played by the Roman Catholic Church, embodied by the Italian Episcopal Conference (CEI), whose interference in Italian political life has become increasingly pervasive and forceful, filling, as it were, a preoccupying political and institutional void.
The Vatican, viewed from Rome, appears far more intriguing and interesting – some would even say sinister - than is generally recognized. Outsiders – even journalists and commentators who have lived in Rome for some time - seldom fully appreciate the burdensome weight that the Vatican, the Holy See and the Church (three quite distinct realities) represent in the complex, sometimes comically ritualised Italian political game. A review of the attitudes and moves of the Roman Catholic Authorities over the past months and years could bring about a deeper understanding of the grave – some would say epochal – current state of political upheaval in Italy.
The suffocating grip that the Catholic Hierarchy has and keeps on the Italian political and social scene, beginning, of course, with the main sources of information, needs to be understood. Italian public radio and television, even in the very rare programs which are critical of the Government, dare not contradict or critically comment the Vatican’s line on the principal and most sensitive issues. This is of particular significance in a monoglot society in which foreign sources of information are ignored.
It should be understood that, by his erratic behaviour (i.e. affairs with young girls of dubious reputation, occasional use of blasphemous language, etc.), Berlusconi has actually played into the hands of the Catholic Church, which, by shifting from attitudes of condemnation to expressions of support has been able to obtain privileges and to prevent the discussion of sensitive topics in Parliament.
At this stage, in an attitude chillingly reminiscent of the early years of Fascism, the Church seems rather inclined to favour the continuation of the present Government, using the votes of one of the opposition parties, the U.D.C,, whose leader, Ferdinando Casini, with the shy smile of an unfrocked priest, could well be the political personality most favoured by the Church to take over from Berlusconi when the time is ripe.
The Northern League has practically issued an ultimatum: if the Government cannot obtain a credible majority by the end of January, it would be best to have new elections. The tough, competent Minister for the Economy has indirectly made it clear that no money would be available further to purchase favours and votes, and this seems to put Berlusconi in a weakened position, unless Casini, encouraged by the Vatican, should step in, abandoning his opposition allies and thus ensuring a solid majority.
This solution also has risks, because the Northern League has stated that it would not be ready to share power with the U.D.C. unless Casini’s party gives assurances that it will make vital concessions in the League’s struggle to pass laws transforming Italy’s structure into a federal system.
The situation is far from clear and seems to get murkier by the day. Perhaps by the end of January a solution will be found, but the ensuing political scene will be more fragile and volatile than ever.
Published by Open Democracy on January 12 2012
The Prime Minister, instead, using tactics which many decried as “shameful”, was able to attract a sufficient number of vacillating parliamentarians to his cause and survived the vote of confidence by the narrow margin of three votes. This was remarkable, considering that his majority, just a few months back, had seemed virtually unassailable.
The really important events, however, took place not within the “Palazzo” – as Italians contemptuously call the seats of power – but rather in the streets of Rome where a protest demonstration called by students exposed the City centre to episodes of violence unheard of since the seventies, and which caught the nation by surprise revealing, as it did, the extreme anger of the younger generations as well as their growing disaffection with the Machiavellian manoeuvrings which typify the Italian political scene.
Whatever his shortcomings, real or perceived, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, in power for the most part of the past sixteen years, has succeeded in forging much of Italy’s social reality and perceptions to his own image. If, on the one hand, recent events had led some to believe that he had come to the end of his remarkable political career, others did not hesitate to assert that it would be a bit early to start trotting out his political obituary, since he had given signs of a remarkable survival instinct several times in the past.
There is however no doubt that, even up to a few days before the vote, Berlusconi and his closest entourage appeared nervous, ill at ease, more irritable than usual and even beset by a sense of panic, as shown by their renewed and ever more violent attacks on hostile media, allegedly “communist inspired”, whose criticism of the Government has been defined as “anti-Italian” by the Prime Minister himself. Frequent references were also made to an alleged “international anti-Italian conspiracy” supported by the international media. To prove the existence of this supposed “foreign conspiracy” a variety of allegations were brought into play, such as the insistence, by the international press, to publicize “negative” stories about Italy, for example the garbage scandal in Naples or the Prime Minister’s sexual escapades.
It could be entertaining, but, in the long run, fatuous and useless, to sift through all the events and statements which have typified these days, some verging on the farcical, such as the shouting match, using raunchy epithets in the Neapolitan dialect, held between Alessandra Mussolini, the “Duce’s” granddaughter, and one of Berlusconi's former beauty queen cabinet ministers, recently dubbed by “Der Spiegel” as “the world’s most beautiful minister”. This, as well as other episodes, could indicate that there is trouble brewing in Berlusconi’s gynaeceum, for beauty queens, as a rule, seem unwilling obediently to toe the party line.
The basic situation, though apparently complex, can be defined by a few fundamental guidelines: The opposition parties, loud in their disapproval of Berlusconi, would, in reality, prefer to see the Government last a while longer, because they feel politically insecure and fear defeat should early elections be called.
The Prime Minister himself, though quite sure of victory, would also prefer to avoid elections, fearing the apparent surge in the popularity of his allied party, the Northern League, which, for its part, would, instead be very glad to see the fall of the Government, knowing that they would emerge with renewed strength in case of early elections.
At least three possible scenarios could emerge from this unpleasantly chaotic atmosphere:
By very aggressively continuing in his campaign to pursue and purchase the votes of insecure parliamentarians, Berlusconi could weather the storm and continue until 2014. At that date a successor will have to be found for president Napolitano, who will have reached the end of his mandate, and Berlusconi would have a good chance to be elected President by a joint session of the Italian Parliament. This solution may seem rather unlikely, but is certainly not impossible.
A more likely scenario, the one pursued, sometimes obliquely, more often openly, by the Prime Minister’s main ally, the Northern League, would have Berlusconi handing in his resignation to president Napolitano, acting on the assumption that the President will call for the dissolution of Parliament and new elections. Those very opposition political forces who are clamouring for Berlusconi's resignation fear this outcome because they feel that a coalition between Berlusconi and the xenophobic, racist “Northern League” would almost certainly win, bringing Berlusconi back into power, albeit under the Leagues' thrall.
The only way in which Berlusconi can be defeated would be through the creation of a “national unity“ caretaker transitional Government, perhaps under the leadership of a non-political figure, to last out the remaining years of the legislature. This is probably the solution also favoured by president Napolitano – for there is no love lost between him and Berlusconi – but it risks being stymied by the divisions which beset the opposition political parties, who seem intent in an almost suicidal campaign destined to discourage any attempt at unity. Berlusconi’s attitude is ambiguous: on the one hand he has repeated his opposition to early elections, but, at the same time, he has been multiplying his appearances on Television and has refurbished all his old electoral slogans against “Communists in Cashmere sweaters” who have infiltrated the Judicial system and are out to get him.
In this volatile, unpredictable and perhaps ultimately dangerous situation, it would be useful to shift the focus of analysis on the role played by the Roman Catholic Church, embodied by the Italian Episcopal Conference (CEI), whose interference in Italian political life has become increasingly pervasive and forceful, filling, as it were, a preoccupying political and institutional void.
The Vatican, viewed from Rome, appears far more intriguing and interesting – some would even say sinister - than is generally recognized. Outsiders – even journalists and commentators who have lived in Rome for some time - seldom fully appreciate the burdensome weight that the Vatican, the Holy See and the Church (three quite distinct realities) represent in the complex, sometimes comically ritualised Italian political game. A review of the attitudes and moves of the Roman Catholic Authorities over the past months and years could bring about a deeper understanding of the grave – some would say epochal – current state of political upheaval in Italy.
The suffocating grip that the Catholic Hierarchy has and keeps on the Italian political and social scene, beginning, of course, with the main sources of information, needs to be understood. Italian public radio and television, even in the very rare programs which are critical of the Government, dare not contradict or critically comment the Vatican’s line on the principal and most sensitive issues. This is of particular significance in a monoglot society in which foreign sources of information are ignored.
It should be understood that, by his erratic behaviour (i.e. affairs with young girls of dubious reputation, occasional use of blasphemous language, etc.), Berlusconi has actually played into the hands of the Catholic Church, which, by shifting from attitudes of condemnation to expressions of support has been able to obtain privileges and to prevent the discussion of sensitive topics in Parliament.
At this stage, in an attitude chillingly reminiscent of the early years of Fascism, the Church seems rather inclined to favour the continuation of the present Government, using the votes of one of the opposition parties, the U.D.C,, whose leader, Ferdinando Casini, with the shy smile of an unfrocked priest, could well be the political personality most favoured by the Church to take over from Berlusconi when the time is ripe.
The Northern League has practically issued an ultimatum: if the Government cannot obtain a credible majority by the end of January, it would be best to have new elections. The tough, competent Minister for the Economy has indirectly made it clear that no money would be available further to purchase favours and votes, and this seems to put Berlusconi in a weakened position, unless Casini, encouraged by the Vatican, should step in, abandoning his opposition allies and thus ensuring a solid majority.
This solution also has risks, because the Northern League has stated that it would not be ready to share power with the U.D.C. unless Casini’s party gives assurances that it will make vital concessions in the League’s struggle to pass laws transforming Italy’s structure into a federal system.
The situation is far from clear and seems to get murkier by the day. Perhaps by the end of January a solution will be found, but the ensuing political scene will be more fragile and volatile than ever.
Published by Open Democracy on January 12 2012
sabato 11 dicembre 2010
AFGHANISTAN’S TRIBAL STRUCTURE NEEDS TO BE RESPECTED
The recent Conference held in Rome on “the way forward” in Afghanistan, has laid bare the basic unwillingness – or inability - of the International Community to consider a change in its stance on the complex process of “transition”. The only positive aspect of the conference was the belated, and rather passive, presence of Iran.
Of much greater import is the news that, in the forthcoming Lisbon summit, the “withdrawal date” may be moved forward another four years, thus scrapping the growingly unrealistic target date of July 2011, and, at the same time, creating internal political problems to many of the participating countries, not excluding the United States.
By now the statements coming from ISAF spokespersons on the alleged military progress seem totally otiose, and can easily be disregarded. Further thought should be given to the civilian issues which have been either overlooked or wrongly approached.
Many commentators on Afghanistan have recently concentrated their attention on the tribalism and nepotism which appear to dominate Karzai’s presidential style. Few, however, have bothered to point out that tribalism and nepotism, in some social and cultural contexts, can actually become extremely strong foundations on which to construct a credible and successful government. This has often been the way in Afghanistan, as well as in other similar societies, whenever a free choice of governance was available. Most likely only a system based on these principles could possibly ensure relative peace in Afghanistan after the departure of foreign troops.
Those who were interested in Afghanistan’s political structure in the peaceful and relatively prosperous years of the Zahir Shah Monarchy (1932 – 1973) will recall that while, to all appearances, Afghanistan was a unified Kingdom ruled by a benevolent, unassuming and rather Western oriented Monarch, in reality the King owed his power exclusively to the combined goodwill of the Pashto tribes (he was a Mohammedzai), and was treated with respect, but certainly not with undue reverence, by the non-Pashto Provinces, in the North and in the West.
Any attempt to plaster over this centuries old reality with a flimsy veneer of Western political philosophy, however well-intentioned, is doomed to failure. The very words – “tribalism” and “nepotism” – have negative connotations for us, but we ought to realise that these are fundamental social truths which, in past centuries, were driving forces even behind the construction of modern Europe, kept in check mainly by strong unifying forces such as the Empire, the Papacy and the rising Monarchies and Baronies eventually to become today’s Nation States. These basic factors in human social development actually still have an important role in some European areas.
This fundamental character of Afghan society has to be understood and respected in order to avoid errors of the past, even those committed during the Monarchy and in the following years which can be summarised as a futile attempt to accelerate history by imposing alien social and political models unsuited to the fabric of Afghan society.
The recent news of “secret” talks between the insurgency and the Karzai Government, with the seeming support of the NATO Command, although, as yet, rather ambiguous, could be a positive signal, indicating a way out of the Afghan labyrinth without excessive further damage to the Civil Society. There is reason to fear, however, that, even if successful, these negotiations may terminate the foreign occupation of Afghanistan but will not lead the country to a peaceful future, and will not avoid the seemingly inevitable inter-ethnic and tribal violence which will follow NATO withdrawal. There is, in fact, a substantial risk that any agreement would, in reality, be limited to the Pashto ethnicity, with only some formal concern shown for the other parts of the population, and this will have tragic effects on the fragile social structure left over from all these years of foreign occupation.
A serious attempt ought to be made, instead, for a greater involvement of tribal and other traditional leaders. The somewhat discredited Karzai leadership and the Taleban insurgency should not be left alone in determining Afghanistan’s future. Perhaps a second great Jirga, this time convened in the traditional manner and not limited to leaders faithful to the Karzai line, could lay the initial groundwork for the creation of an Afghan state able to elicit the loyalty of the entire population.
If, however, present policies are going to be stubbornly pursued, the end of foreign occupation will most probably be followed by tribal and ethnic conflicts, basically a “civil war”, which will leave the country subject to even greater divisions than those left by the Soviet Union in 1989. It is absurd to believe that, in the space of a few months, a unified army and a reliable police force can be formed through patchy training programmes in a Country historically divided along ethnic and tribal lines, and which has been either in a state of virtual anarchy or under foreign domination for over three decades.
As long as the International community, responsible for Afghanistan’s future after long years of occupation, keeps talking of “transition” in irresponsibly unenlightened terms, even the most slender remaining hopes for peaceful development will prove vain.
Of much greater import is the news that, in the forthcoming Lisbon summit, the “withdrawal date” may be moved forward another four years, thus scrapping the growingly unrealistic target date of July 2011, and, at the same time, creating internal political problems to many of the participating countries, not excluding the United States.
By now the statements coming from ISAF spokespersons on the alleged military progress seem totally otiose, and can easily be disregarded. Further thought should be given to the civilian issues which have been either overlooked or wrongly approached.
Many commentators on Afghanistan have recently concentrated their attention on the tribalism and nepotism which appear to dominate Karzai’s presidential style. Few, however, have bothered to point out that tribalism and nepotism, in some social and cultural contexts, can actually become extremely strong foundations on which to construct a credible and successful government. This has often been the way in Afghanistan, as well as in other similar societies, whenever a free choice of governance was available. Most likely only a system based on these principles could possibly ensure relative peace in Afghanistan after the departure of foreign troops.
Those who were interested in Afghanistan’s political structure in the peaceful and relatively prosperous years of the Zahir Shah Monarchy (1932 – 1973) will recall that while, to all appearances, Afghanistan was a unified Kingdom ruled by a benevolent, unassuming and rather Western oriented Monarch, in reality the King owed his power exclusively to the combined goodwill of the Pashto tribes (he was a Mohammedzai), and was treated with respect, but certainly not with undue reverence, by the non-Pashto Provinces, in the North and in the West.
Any attempt to plaster over this centuries old reality with a flimsy veneer of Western political philosophy, however well-intentioned, is doomed to failure. The very words – “tribalism” and “nepotism” – have negative connotations for us, but we ought to realise that these are fundamental social truths which, in past centuries, were driving forces even behind the construction of modern Europe, kept in check mainly by strong unifying forces such as the Empire, the Papacy and the rising Monarchies and Baronies eventually to become today’s Nation States. These basic factors in human social development actually still have an important role in some European areas.
This fundamental character of Afghan society has to be understood and respected in order to avoid errors of the past, even those committed during the Monarchy and in the following years which can be summarised as a futile attempt to accelerate history by imposing alien social and political models unsuited to the fabric of Afghan society.
The recent news of “secret” talks between the insurgency and the Karzai Government, with the seeming support of the NATO Command, although, as yet, rather ambiguous, could be a positive signal, indicating a way out of the Afghan labyrinth without excessive further damage to the Civil Society. There is reason to fear, however, that, even if successful, these negotiations may terminate the foreign occupation of Afghanistan but will not lead the country to a peaceful future, and will not avoid the seemingly inevitable inter-ethnic and tribal violence which will follow NATO withdrawal. There is, in fact, a substantial risk that any agreement would, in reality, be limited to the Pashto ethnicity, with only some formal concern shown for the other parts of the population, and this will have tragic effects on the fragile social structure left over from all these years of foreign occupation.
A serious attempt ought to be made, instead, for a greater involvement of tribal and other traditional leaders. The somewhat discredited Karzai leadership and the Taleban insurgency should not be left alone in determining Afghanistan’s future. Perhaps a second great Jirga, this time convened in the traditional manner and not limited to leaders faithful to the Karzai line, could lay the initial groundwork for the creation of an Afghan state able to elicit the loyalty of the entire population.
If, however, present policies are going to be stubbornly pursued, the end of foreign occupation will most probably be followed by tribal and ethnic conflicts, basically a “civil war”, which will leave the country subject to even greater divisions than those left by the Soviet Union in 1989. It is absurd to believe that, in the space of a few months, a unified army and a reliable police force can be formed through patchy training programmes in a Country historically divided along ethnic and tribal lines, and which has been either in a state of virtual anarchy or under foreign domination for over three decades.
As long as the International community, responsible for Afghanistan’s future after long years of occupation, keeps talking of “transition” in irresponsibly unenlightened terms, even the most slender remaining hopes for peaceful development will prove vain.
IS BERLUSCONI ITALY'S "COME-BACK KID"?
Whatever his shortcomings, and, indeed, there are many, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has succeeded in forging much of Italy’s social reality and perceptions to his own image. If, on the one hand, recent events could appear as threatening an end to his remarkable political career, there are also reasons to believe that it could be a bit early to start trotting out his political obituary.
There is no doubt that Berlusconi and his closest entourage do appear nervous, ill at ease, more irritable than usual and even beset by a sense of panic, as shown by their renewed and ever more violent attacks on hostile media, allegedly “communist inspired”, whose criticism of the Government has been defined as “anti-Italian” by the Prime Minister himself. The latest symptom of panic has been a succession of remarks, at first veiled and then increasingly overt, by Berlusconi and his Foreign Minister, on a presumed “anti-Italian conspiracy” supported by the international media. To prove the existence of this assumed “foreign conspiracy” a variety of allegations are brought into play. Reference is often made on the insistence, by the international press, to publicize “negative” stories about Italy, such as the garbage scandal in Naples or the Prime Minister’s sexual escapades. More recently, the damaging files published by Wikileaks have also been repeatedly mentioned, in an attempt to cast Wikileaks as a co-conspirator, while at the same time minimizing the import of the published material, defined, by the Prime Minister and the obedient public Television, as “gossip, lifted from the opposition newspapers”.
All this, in conjunction with an apparently growing pressure from large segments of the Italian political scene, including former allies, urging Berlusconi to resign would seem to confirm the approaching Gotterdammerung, which, as usual in Italy, is not devoid of comic-opera settings. A recent example was given by a publicly televised heated exchange of insults, in the Neapolitan dialect, between a former beauty queen, now a Cabinet Minister (dubbed by some as the “world’s most beautiful Minister”), and the Duce’s grand-daughter, Alessandra Mussolini, both part of Berlusconi’s majority. The insults were of an extremely vulgar variety and had to be translated into Italian, giving the public a welcome respite from the grey, nebulous and ever less understandable statements by other political leaders..
Berlusconi, however, has shown in the past to be an incredible political survivor, and it may be a mistake to consider his political career as being over. He could actually benefit from the state of utter confusion in which the Italian political scene finds itself, and end up as one of the two beneficiaries of the ongoing crisis (the other beneficiary being his closest political ally, the “Northern League”).
This is no ordinary political crisis. Berlusconi is dominated by two very strong ambitions: firstly to avoid appearing in Court to face a number of prosecutions which could even end up with prison sentences, and, secondly, to be elected President of the Republic and triumphantly enter the Quirinale Palace, official home of Popes, Kings and Presidents since the sixteenth century.
The date of December 14 could well indicate the future trends. On that day there will be two simultaneous votes in Parliament (something unheard of in Italian republican history): a “vote of confidence” in the Government, called by Berlusconi's allies, in the Senate, and a “vote of no confidence”, presented by a loose collection of his rivals, in the Lower House. On that same day, in one of those dramatic coincidences so dear to the Italian political sensibility, the Constitutional Court was scheduled to rule on the constitutionality of one of the many legal shields which the Berlusconi Government has enacted to protect the Prime Minister from prosecution. This last event has been postponed and will take place in January, thus giving the Prime Minister some further breathing space.
At least three possible scenarios could emerge:
By very aggressively pursuing and purchasing the votes of insecure parliamentarians, Berlusconi could well win both confidence votes and thus weather the storm and continue until 2014, when, as Prime Minister, he could have a good chance to be elected President by a joint session of the Italian Parliament. This solution may seem rather unlikely, but is certainly not impossible.
After either losing one of the confidence votes, or winning by a very thin margin, Berlusconi could decide to hand in his resignation to president Napolitano, acting on the assumption that the President will call for the dissolution of Parliament and new elections. Those very opposition political forces who are clamouring for Berlusconi's resignation fear this outcome because they feel that a coalition between Berlusconi and the xenophobic, racist “Northern League” would almost certainly win, bringing Berlusconi back into power, albeit under the Leagues' thrall.
The only way in which Berlusconi can be defeated would be through the creation of a “national unity“ caretaker transitional Government, perhaps under the leadership of a non-political figure, to last out the remaining years of the legislature (i.e. until the year 2014). This is probably the solution also favoured by president Napolitano – for there is no love lost between him and Berlusconi – but it risks being stymied by the divisions which beset the opposition political parties, who seem intent in an almost suicidal campaign destined to discourage any attempt at unity.
In politics, and even more so in Italian politics, a week is a very long time, and much can happen before December 14, including the forging of alliances among groups or parties which at this stage seem anchored to irreconcilable positions. Close attention will also have to be paid to the actions of the Catholic Church which has been interfering in Italian politics with growing forcefulness, and which could well become the deciding factor either by abandoning Berlusconi because of his “immoral” behaviour, or by endorsing him thus encouraging the “Catholic” political leaders to signify their support and save the government from a crisis which would otherwise seem inevitable.
There is no doubt that Berlusconi and his closest entourage do appear nervous, ill at ease, more irritable than usual and even beset by a sense of panic, as shown by their renewed and ever more violent attacks on hostile media, allegedly “communist inspired”, whose criticism of the Government has been defined as “anti-Italian” by the Prime Minister himself. The latest symptom of panic has been a succession of remarks, at first veiled and then increasingly overt, by Berlusconi and his Foreign Minister, on a presumed “anti-Italian conspiracy” supported by the international media. To prove the existence of this assumed “foreign conspiracy” a variety of allegations are brought into play. Reference is often made on the insistence, by the international press, to publicize “negative” stories about Italy, such as the garbage scandal in Naples or the Prime Minister’s sexual escapades. More recently, the damaging files published by Wikileaks have also been repeatedly mentioned, in an attempt to cast Wikileaks as a co-conspirator, while at the same time minimizing the import of the published material, defined, by the Prime Minister and the obedient public Television, as “gossip, lifted from the opposition newspapers”.
All this, in conjunction with an apparently growing pressure from large segments of the Italian political scene, including former allies, urging Berlusconi to resign would seem to confirm the approaching Gotterdammerung, which, as usual in Italy, is not devoid of comic-opera settings. A recent example was given by a publicly televised heated exchange of insults, in the Neapolitan dialect, between a former beauty queen, now a Cabinet Minister (dubbed by some as the “world’s most beautiful Minister”), and the Duce’s grand-daughter, Alessandra Mussolini, both part of Berlusconi’s majority. The insults were of an extremely vulgar variety and had to be translated into Italian, giving the public a welcome respite from the grey, nebulous and ever less understandable statements by other political leaders..
Berlusconi, however, has shown in the past to be an incredible political survivor, and it may be a mistake to consider his political career as being over. He could actually benefit from the state of utter confusion in which the Italian political scene finds itself, and end up as one of the two beneficiaries of the ongoing crisis (the other beneficiary being his closest political ally, the “Northern League”).
This is no ordinary political crisis. Berlusconi is dominated by two very strong ambitions: firstly to avoid appearing in Court to face a number of prosecutions which could even end up with prison sentences, and, secondly, to be elected President of the Republic and triumphantly enter the Quirinale Palace, official home of Popes, Kings and Presidents since the sixteenth century.
The date of December 14 could well indicate the future trends. On that day there will be two simultaneous votes in Parliament (something unheard of in Italian republican history): a “vote of confidence” in the Government, called by Berlusconi's allies, in the Senate, and a “vote of no confidence”, presented by a loose collection of his rivals, in the Lower House. On that same day, in one of those dramatic coincidences so dear to the Italian political sensibility, the Constitutional Court was scheduled to rule on the constitutionality of one of the many legal shields which the Berlusconi Government has enacted to protect the Prime Minister from prosecution. This last event has been postponed and will take place in January, thus giving the Prime Minister some further breathing space.
At least three possible scenarios could emerge:
By very aggressively pursuing and purchasing the votes of insecure parliamentarians, Berlusconi could well win both confidence votes and thus weather the storm and continue until 2014, when, as Prime Minister, he could have a good chance to be elected President by a joint session of the Italian Parliament. This solution may seem rather unlikely, but is certainly not impossible.
After either losing one of the confidence votes, or winning by a very thin margin, Berlusconi could decide to hand in his resignation to president Napolitano, acting on the assumption that the President will call for the dissolution of Parliament and new elections. Those very opposition political forces who are clamouring for Berlusconi's resignation fear this outcome because they feel that a coalition between Berlusconi and the xenophobic, racist “Northern League” would almost certainly win, bringing Berlusconi back into power, albeit under the Leagues' thrall.
The only way in which Berlusconi can be defeated would be through the creation of a “national unity“ caretaker transitional Government, perhaps under the leadership of a non-political figure, to last out the remaining years of the legislature (i.e. until the year 2014). This is probably the solution also favoured by president Napolitano – for there is no love lost between him and Berlusconi – but it risks being stymied by the divisions which beset the opposition political parties, who seem intent in an almost suicidal campaign destined to discourage any attempt at unity.
In politics, and even more so in Italian politics, a week is a very long time, and much can happen before December 14, including the forging of alliances among groups or parties which at this stage seem anchored to irreconcilable positions. Close attention will also have to be paid to the actions of the Catholic Church which has been interfering in Italian politics with growing forcefulness, and which could well become the deciding factor either by abandoning Berlusconi because of his “immoral” behaviour, or by endorsing him thus encouraging the “Catholic” political leaders to signify their support and save the government from a crisis which would otherwise seem inevitable.
sabato 9 ottobre 2010
AFGHANISTAN BETRAYED
(This article was published in "Open Democracy" on October 9, 2010)
The approach of winter has usually indicated a respite in the Afghan conflict. This year, however, there seems to be no pause in the continuous litany of bad news emerging from there. Pakistan, for its part, seems relatively quiet. Perhaps the tragic floods, greeted with some indifference by the outside world, have contributed in quieting down insurgent and military activity there, since both the Army and the insurgent forces have been occupied in rescue operations. The Western Alliance’s most visible contribution has been the continuation of the destruction of villages by Drone attacks, thus probably hastening the demise of this “democratic” government in favour of a military administration as well as accumulating further anti-Western resentment for the immediate future.
The tense and violent atmosphere in which the recent Afghan parliamentary elections have taken place is a prime indication of how the situation is fast deteriorating. Dishonestly triumphant proclamations would have us compare these elections – in terms of turnout and number of violent episodes - to the recent, disastrous, almost farcical presidential vote. A different image emerges if a comparison is made with the previous parliamentary elections, in the fall of 2005, which I witnessed as an international monitor and which took place, by and large, in a peaceful and even good-humoured atmosphere.
At this stage, it is difficult to express an informed evaluation of the news that “secret” negotiations are taking place between the Taleban and the Afghan Government. The very tribal structure of the latter, and the apparent absolute condition set by the Taleban that no agreement can be reached with foreign troops still in occupation seem to indicate some fragility in the proceedings.
In any historical analysis, it is not always easy to identify turning points, in which right or wrong decisions can be viewed as fundamental in determining the course of events. This is all the more arduous when the events are chronologically close and fresh in the memory of protagonists and witnesses.
Those fateful months, between 2005 and 2006, may well have constituted one of those watershed moments, in which a less obtuse mentality on the part of the Allies could possibly have prevented the road to what now seems like an inevitable disaster.
It is a well-known axiom that negotiations with insurgent, or “guerrilla” forces have to be undertaken from a position of unquestionable strength, unless, as in the case of the Soviet forces in 1989, their aim is to secure retreat. This, I believe, was the basic reasoning behind the much publicised intentions to “liberate” Kandahar, and thus be able to confront the insurgency in the wake of a resounding military success. Of course, wiser counsels having prevailed, the offensive never took place, and there has been no visible shift of the situation in NATO’s favour.
The Western forces, however, most certainly were in a position of strength in 2006, and even the sporadic suicide attacks in the name of the Taleban insurgency were usually perpetrated by Arabs or Pakistanis, showing that the movement was not all that strong on the ground. At that stage, albeit in indirect, oblique ways, overtures were being made by some of the Taleban leaders, including the Mullah Omar. Suggestions to the effect that it would be a good idea to respond to these approaches were, however, slapped down unceremoniously with the specious (and contradictory) motivations that “we don’t negotiate with terrorists” and that “the Taleban don’t want to talk”.
It was apparently believed that, with a “democratically elected” Parliament and President, the Afghans had become masters of their own fate. According to a childishly dangerous thinking, the holding of elections in occupied territories invariably constitutes a panacea and should subsequently discourage complaints on the part of the population. I really don’t know what would have happened if “free and democratic” elections had been held in Italy in 1944. Elections should come after pacification, not as an early step towards peace and normality.
It is no coincidence, therefore, that the situation began to deteriorate rapidly in the spring of 2007 when the sum of allied mistakes, miscalculations and cynical unconcern seemed to give the insurgency – no longer exclusively “Taleban” – renewed vigour, allowing it to expand and to infiltrate the population with ease.
All this paved the way for the present situation, in which it has become acceptable, indeed fashionable to assert that there is no satisfactory explanation to justify NATO’s continued presence in Afghanistan on these terms, that the war is unwinnable no matter how many “surges” can be added, and that we are on our way to the third betrayal or abandonment of the Afghan people by the West in the space of two short decades.
In 1989, after ten years of occupation, the Soviet Union bought its way out of Afghanistan, leaving behind a country torn by civil war which most often involved those very “war lords”, as well as the Taleban, who had been armed and financed by the West to resist Soviet occupation. At this stage the country needed outside help and was instead abandoned to itself. The chief victim of this short-sighted policy was, of course, the charismatic figure of Ahmed Shah Massoud, who was to be assassinated on the eve of the September 11 attacks. Massoud had tried to alert Western public opinion, even addressing the European Parliament, but meeting polite indifference. He has been quoted as lamenting the fact that Europeans and Americans did not realise that his fight against the Taleban was also in our interest.
The Afghan people were again betrayed and abandoned right after the 2001 invasion. At first it was really believed that NATO’s invasion of Afghanistan would serve many purposes: the eradication of Al Qaeda, the defeat of the Taleban, and the encouragement of reform. None of this was true, and the Afghan invasion served principally as a dress rehearsal for the invasion of Iraq, which had far greater weight on the western agendas.
The third betrayal is imminent, and will occur when, after having destroyed much of what was left of the country’s fragile social structure , we shall again leave the Afghanistan to itself, expressing totally insincere and unrealistic confidence in its “democratic” institutions..
It is tragically easy to foresee the consequences.
The approach of winter has usually indicated a respite in the Afghan conflict. This year, however, there seems to be no pause in the continuous litany of bad news emerging from there. Pakistan, for its part, seems relatively quiet. Perhaps the tragic floods, greeted with some indifference by the outside world, have contributed in quieting down insurgent and military activity there, since both the Army and the insurgent forces have been occupied in rescue operations. The Western Alliance’s most visible contribution has been the continuation of the destruction of villages by Drone attacks, thus probably hastening the demise of this “democratic” government in favour of a military administration as well as accumulating further anti-Western resentment for the immediate future.
The tense and violent atmosphere in which the recent Afghan parliamentary elections have taken place is a prime indication of how the situation is fast deteriorating. Dishonestly triumphant proclamations would have us compare these elections – in terms of turnout and number of violent episodes - to the recent, disastrous, almost farcical presidential vote. A different image emerges if a comparison is made with the previous parliamentary elections, in the fall of 2005, which I witnessed as an international monitor and which took place, by and large, in a peaceful and even good-humoured atmosphere.
At this stage, it is difficult to express an informed evaluation of the news that “secret” negotiations are taking place between the Taleban and the Afghan Government. The very tribal structure of the latter, and the apparent absolute condition set by the Taleban that no agreement can be reached with foreign troops still in occupation seem to indicate some fragility in the proceedings.
In any historical analysis, it is not always easy to identify turning points, in which right or wrong decisions can be viewed as fundamental in determining the course of events. This is all the more arduous when the events are chronologically close and fresh in the memory of protagonists and witnesses.
Those fateful months, between 2005 and 2006, may well have constituted one of those watershed moments, in which a less obtuse mentality on the part of the Allies could possibly have prevented the road to what now seems like an inevitable disaster.
It is a well-known axiom that negotiations with insurgent, or “guerrilla” forces have to be undertaken from a position of unquestionable strength, unless, as in the case of the Soviet forces in 1989, their aim is to secure retreat. This, I believe, was the basic reasoning behind the much publicised intentions to “liberate” Kandahar, and thus be able to confront the insurgency in the wake of a resounding military success. Of course, wiser counsels having prevailed, the offensive never took place, and there has been no visible shift of the situation in NATO’s favour.
The Western forces, however, most certainly were in a position of strength in 2006, and even the sporadic suicide attacks in the name of the Taleban insurgency were usually perpetrated by Arabs or Pakistanis, showing that the movement was not all that strong on the ground. At that stage, albeit in indirect, oblique ways, overtures were being made by some of the Taleban leaders, including the Mullah Omar. Suggestions to the effect that it would be a good idea to respond to these approaches were, however, slapped down unceremoniously with the specious (and contradictory) motivations that “we don’t negotiate with terrorists” and that “the Taleban don’t want to talk”.
It was apparently believed that, with a “democratically elected” Parliament and President, the Afghans had become masters of their own fate. According to a childishly dangerous thinking, the holding of elections in occupied territories invariably constitutes a panacea and should subsequently discourage complaints on the part of the population. I really don’t know what would have happened if “free and democratic” elections had been held in Italy in 1944. Elections should come after pacification, not as an early step towards peace and normality.
It is no coincidence, therefore, that the situation began to deteriorate rapidly in the spring of 2007 when the sum of allied mistakes, miscalculations and cynical unconcern seemed to give the insurgency – no longer exclusively “Taleban” – renewed vigour, allowing it to expand and to infiltrate the population with ease.
All this paved the way for the present situation, in which it has become acceptable, indeed fashionable to assert that there is no satisfactory explanation to justify NATO’s continued presence in Afghanistan on these terms, that the war is unwinnable no matter how many “surges” can be added, and that we are on our way to the third betrayal or abandonment of the Afghan people by the West in the space of two short decades.
In 1989, after ten years of occupation, the Soviet Union bought its way out of Afghanistan, leaving behind a country torn by civil war which most often involved those very “war lords”, as well as the Taleban, who had been armed and financed by the West to resist Soviet occupation. At this stage the country needed outside help and was instead abandoned to itself. The chief victim of this short-sighted policy was, of course, the charismatic figure of Ahmed Shah Massoud, who was to be assassinated on the eve of the September 11 attacks. Massoud had tried to alert Western public opinion, even addressing the European Parliament, but meeting polite indifference. He has been quoted as lamenting the fact that Europeans and Americans did not realise that his fight against the Taleban was also in our interest.
The Afghan people were again betrayed and abandoned right after the 2001 invasion. At first it was really believed that NATO’s invasion of Afghanistan would serve many purposes: the eradication of Al Qaeda, the defeat of the Taleban, and the encouragement of reform. None of this was true, and the Afghan invasion served principally as a dress rehearsal for the invasion of Iraq, which had far greater weight on the western agendas.
The third betrayal is imminent, and will occur when, after having destroyed much of what was left of the country’s fragile social structure , we shall again leave the Afghanistan to itself, expressing totally insincere and unrealistic confidence in its “democratic” institutions..
It is tragically easy to foresee the consequences.
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