giovedì 20 maggio 2010

THE AFGHAN LABYRINTH

An "exit strategy" is little use in the Afghan labyrinth

Carlo Ungaro, 19 May 2010
Subjects:
· Taliban insurgency in Pakistan and Afghanistan
We need to break old assumptions if Afghanistan and Pakistan are to be secured, argues Carlo Ungaro
About the author
Carlo Ungaro is a former Italian diplomat. He spent sixteen years serving in Afghanistan. Between 2000 and 2007, he served as political adviser to the Italian led ISAF forces in Herat.
The term “exit strategy” often signifies a tacit admission of basic mistakes committed upon entering a conflict. This is particularly true in the case of Afghanistan where an analogy can be drawn with the story of Theseus and his hunt for the Minotaur in the Labyrinth. In fact, just like the initial occupation of Afghanistan, entering the Labyrinth did not pose major problems for Theseus, but his twenty-first century’s successors – the NATO forces – although they quickly found the Minotaur’s lair, discovered that the beast had fled and that, lacking Ariadne’s clew, they remained trapped in the impenetrable maze of Afghan political and social reality.It would be useless, at this stage, to indulge in recrimination and to lament the fact that, at the time of the invasion and in its immediate aftermath, advice was apparently not sought, or perhaps it was obtained and not heeded, from those who could have foretold many of the problems, which so often have seemed to come as a surprise both to the NATO leadership and to many political commentators. It would be just as futile for those Cassandra's – among whom I include myself – to come out in triumphant “I told you so!” statements. The situation is far too serious to allow these attitudes.It was clear, already many months back, that a totally fresh assessment was needed, and that the reiteration of NATO’s oft intoned mantra’s would not bring the problem any closer to a solution. It appears, however, that the reluctance to “learn lessons” persists, and that NATO is preparing for another military “triumph”, this time with a dauntingly ambitious objective, Kandahar, a city of significant importance which, occupied countless times but never really conquered, has had an important role in Afghan history throughout the centuries. Granted that, with the massive armament and logistic abundance at their disposal, the NATO forces will manage to gain at least apparent control of Kandahar, would that in any way signify that final victory is at hand? And has a lucid and unequivocal idea ever been expressed as to what would really be meant by “victory”, other than the avoidance of obvious defeat?Clearly, a solution has to be sought somewhere between the alternative of precipitous withdrawal and dogged resistance. The only question that insistently comes to mind is whether there is still time for a radical rethinking process aimed both at halting, or at least diminishing the bloodshed, and at the search for a long term solution not conditioned by past prejudices.One of the eminently foreseeable – but apparently unforeseen – consequences of the military action in Afghanistan has been the extension of the conflict into Pakistan, a development which will leave deep scars, no matter what the outcome. This, in reality, and not the military conflict in Afghanistan itself, is the principal obstacle to any real and lasting solution. The fact is that the boundary existing between Afghanistan and Pakistan’s North West (the “Durand Line”) has never been recognised by any Afghan government since the creation of Pakistan, nor was it ever accepted by the tribal populations on the Pakistani side of the border. This situation, which should have been addressed with energy and decision as soon as the inevitability of Pakistan’s involvement became apparent, was instead allowed to fester, creating an area of permanent conflict, which shall remain so until reality is recognised. This is the key on which all future attempts competently to address the Afghan quandary will have to be based. As past experiences have shown, and the Soviet debacle comes readily to mind as the most recent example, throwing in more troops and vast additional sums of money destined for development projects would be a tragic waste, unless the underlying political problems are taken into unprejudiced consideration.A process of radical revision of war aims and future scenarios should be undertaken with great urgency. The opening phases should preferably take place in a third country, possibly neutral, and should begin by the bold eradication of two fundamentally flawed beliefs which doggedly persist in all present-day evaluations:1. That Afghanistan and Pakistan can be treated as two separate problems and that, after a militarily imposed “normalisation”, they will be able to coexist within the present geo-political framework;2. That Afghanistan can ever be ruled efficiently as a monolithic entity from a government – whether autocratic or “democratic” – situated in Kabul.These are complex and potentially dangerous issues, but until they are taken into careful consideration there will be no hope for any kind of satisfactory settlement.This may seem un-realistic, and our political leaders will prefer to continue in their belief that the repetition of well-tried platitudes can bring about the solution of problems.They ought to cast their minds back about twenty years and try to remember how many greatly respected personalities from the United States and Europe would come away from Belgrade swearing solemn oaths on the absolute inviolability of Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. It is also essential to recall where this kind of obstinacy finally led.It is furthermore important to consider that the visible growing war-weariness in the public opinion of many NATO allies, and the need for democratic Governments at least partially to heed the feelings of their electorate, add poignancy and urgency to the quest for a valid new approach.

martedì 4 maggio 2010

THE POPE AND ITALY

THE POPE AND ITALY

The recent statements by the Vatican, recognising the criminal behaviour of the reverend Marcial Maciel Degollado, founder of the Legionnaires of Christ, could constitute an important step in a new approach by the Roman Catholic Church, in spite of some ambiguity in their content. This circumstance, coupled with the fact that there have been fewer and fewer items in the news about the recent Vatican paedophilia scandal should not, in however, generate the idea that the issue has blown over. The effects are still deeply felt in The United States and in Northern Europe, where the Catholic Church’s crisis is palpable. Much less so in Italy, which, having the Vatican Enclave on its soil, would theoretically appear to be the most directly and intimately involved.
The Vatican, it has to be said, is not a creation of Mussolini, as some would have it, but a long lasting historical reality, which has for many centuries conditioned life in Italy.
It has therefore been interesting to note, in these past weeks, how rare and feeble Italian reactions to the Vatican paedophilia scandal have been. When compared to the often indignant response given by Roman Catholics across Europe and in the Americas, it would seem that Italians have, by and large, viewed the situation with indifference, and the TV channels, both public and private, have actually been totally and uncritically supportive of the Pope and the Holy See, as, indeed, have the rare statements issued by political personalities both of the Right and of the Left.
In their news programmes and commentary, the public Radio and TV, which ought to be completely secular, have absolutely and unquestioningly accepted all the explanations issued by the Vatican. Thus the majority of Italians – culturally isolated because of a pernicious form of monolingual obstinacy, and with almost all of their information obtained through the National TV – are convinced, for example, that a small group of Jewish Law firms in the United States have inspired all this “idle gossip” for the double purpose of discrediting the Catholic Church – which, in Italian eyes, is the only “truly” Christian Church – and milking the “alleged victims” of lots of money in legal fees. They are told, as well, and appear to believe that the ordinary people of the world are all in sympathy with the “Holy Father”, as the public news channels insist on calling him, even having the speakers modulate their tone of voice upon mentioning his August name.
The Vatican statement on the reverend Maciel Degollado, for example, received no comment at all in public radio and television broadcasts, while much space was dedicated to the opening of the exhibition of the Shroud of Turin, with pious references being made to its miraculous origin, but no mention of any sceptical attitudes in the scientific community.
And yet, walking the streets of the Holy City (Rome), a vast number of empty – albeit beautiful – Churches meet the eye, and visible signs of devotion (e.g. the penance of the Holy steps at San Giovanni) are quite rare. Even the crowds in St. Peter’s square at the Papal benediction are, to a large extent foreign or, at least, from other parts of Italy (usually the North), with, of course, an appreciable number of tourists attracted by a spectacle so incongruous for the Twenty-first century.
Very few in Italy read Holy Scripture – the idea being that this is precisely what Priests are for – and even devout Church-goers show an appalling doctrinal and cultural ignorance on the meaning of most devotional rites and are likely to respond with indignant disbelief if told that Jesus was actually Jewish.
All the more surprising, then, to realise what a tremendous power the Vatican and the clergy wield in Italian politics. The fact is that any pronouncement by the Bishops on political matters have tangible effects on the Nation’s political and social life, as was shown in the recent local elections, in which some pointed statements about the “new” (for Italy) abortion pill is thought to have secured the victory of some key candidates, known to be obedient and to toe the line of Catholic orthodoxy, at least in their public postures and statements.
It could be argued that also in the United States religion has an important role in public life, but there on the one hand, no political candidates casts doubt on the firm tenet of separation between Church (any Church) and State, while on the other it is clear that Americans constitute one of the most deeply religious communities in the predominantly Christian world. Neither of these considerations apply in the Italian political and social scene, where the issue of exposing the Crucifix in public buildings (including schools and Tribunals) was treated with incredible emotion by politicians to the point that a Government Minister was seen on public TV, brandishing a Crucifix like an exorcist and issuing death threats to all those who oppose its continued exposition.
This is by no means a new or thoroughly modern situation. In many phases of their history Italians have mingled a show of affectionate pride in being, as it were, the custodians of the Holy See on their territory, with an open hostility which has also ended in episodes of assassination and rebellion.
There was a moment, in the Nineteenth Century, during the battles for Italy’s independence, when secular hostility to the Pope and the Church seemed to gain the upper hand (one can cite the short-lived “Roman Republic” in 1848 and, of course, the conquest of Rome by the Italian State in 1870), but after World War II, with the Catholic Party (“Christian Democrats”) seen as the only credible democratic alternative to Communism – or so, of course, their slogan ran – the take-over by the Church was relatively easy and has resulted in the present equivocal situation which has been further complicated by the fact that the collapse of the Christian Democrats has caused a veritable Diaspora of Catholic politicians who have joined almost every Party on the rather broad Italian political spectrum.
The image therefore emerges of a population with an essentially “pagan” view of Religion, generally limited to an almost Oedipal adoration of the Virgin as well as deep veneration for a selected number of Saints who frequently, sometimes even punctually, come across with the required miracles. It is therefore all the more remarkable that this same population should appear so totally subservient to a Church which is perhaps the most dogmatic religious body on Earth. This is a paradox which defies explanation, and which could be shrugged off with wry amusement, if it weren’t for the thoroughly negative effect Vatican interference has had and keeps having on Italy’s social and political structure, seriously hindering progress, even in Science and Medicine, whenever proposed innovations are deemed contrary to the strictest tenets of the Roman Catholic Catechism.
Italy is going through a crisis which could be almost defined as existential, with creeping forms of occult, but ever more evident, neo-fascist attitudes making frequent appearances.
In this context the growing influence of the Church in public affairs, as evidenced by the behaviour of the Public information services, seems like a justified cause for alarm.



(The Author is a retired senior Italian diplomatic officer)
CENTRAL ASIA - THE SMOULDERING VOLCANO
(This article was published on the site "Open Democracy" in April 2010)

Events in Kirghizstan seem to have crept up unexpectedly on an apparently unaware or inattentive international public opinion, principally and understandably focussed on other theatres, albeit in areas not all that distant, such as Afghanistan.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the former Central Asian Soviet Republics - with perhaps the exception of Tajikistan – have been rather superficially viewed as essentially calm. Occasional unrest has always seemed to be short-lived, and the very distance – both geographic and cultural – of these republics has kept them out of the western world’s attention.

Even long after the bygone days of the “great Game”, however, these Republics continue to have significant strategic importance either as producers of oil or natural gas, or for their geographic position which makes them essential partners in conveying these products to the West. These circumstances, in addition to the strategic military importance they have, especially in view of the Afghan conflict and the tensions between the West and Iran have been contributing factors in the endeavour, by the interested foreign Governments, to avoid the adoption of a hectoring attitude on delicate issues such as Democracy or the respect of Human Rights and political freedom.

The result of this rather cynical combination of indifference and covert encouragement has been the creation of an area which owes its stability principally to the inflexibility and virtual immovability of a leadership left over from the Soviet empire.

The only signs of movement have taken place in two of the smaller Republics, Kirghizstan and Turkmenistan, where the sudden death of a dictator whose behaviour could even have seemed comical in its extreme use of the personality cult, had given rise to some hopes of change, which, however have so far failed to take place. My feeling is that the very fact of their relatively small size, in terms of population, make it unlikely for the events there to have immediate far-reaching consequences, unless, of course, they would generate a spill-over effect in nearby Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan. At this time this is unlikely, because these two Republics, particularly the former, are very tightly run by a “nomenclatura” which has survived Soviet times and has flourished since, creating a sense of “Imperium in Imperio”, which, as things stand, appears totally secure, intangible and therefore, by our Western standards, “dependable”.

The question has been put as to whether the events in Bishkek were inspired, encouraged or even financed by outside influence. It is unlikely but not impossible, and some have seen a Russian hand in the events. It has to be clear, however that Russia, just like all the other nearby States, is not interested in destabilizing Kirghizstan, and if there was a Russian involvement it was probably aimed more simply to a regime change operation which, perhaps, got slightly out of control. Political turmoil and instability in those republics which some – with typical Eurocentric arrogance – insist on calling “the Stans”, is, at present in no-one’s interest. Not China, who has already a number of difficult and delicate border situations, certainly not Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan and, therefore, not even Russia, unless, of course there are splinter groups in the Russian services who still nurture imperial nostalgia.

This basically realistic overview, however, fails to take into account an inevitable process: the passage of time, and the resulting disappearance of these leaders from the scene: the nomenclatura is numerous and powerful, and these two aspects have held the key to the survival of these regimes, but it is also fast ageing, and has now been in power for a couple of decades. It is true that, especially through the wide, unscrupulous practice of nepotism, they feel that they have a reliable second generation waiting in the wings, but history tends to show that an inordinate trust in the products of nepotism can lead to disappointing results.

There are further reasons to fear a less than comforting future for these republics. On the one hand, of course, there is a growing population of political dissidents – who have shown their power in Kirgizstan and have been ruthlessly oppressed elsewhere, but in some of the Republics there are also signs of a growing and unyielding hostility on the part of Islamic “extremists”. Their presence, paradoxically, has actually been beneficial mainly because of the West’s instinctive reaction to this kind of threat, and the presence of these pockets of Islamic resistance has strengthened the case for support and encouragement of the repressive regimes in each of the former Soviet Central Asian Republics.

My experience in this part of the world makes me fear that we are dealing with a smouldering volcano, due to erupt in the not too distant future.

The uncertainty prevailing in Afghanistan, and, in spite of the continuous stream of official signs of optimism, in Pakistan should induce all the interested parties to take into careful consideration possible violent and destabilizing scenarios in the area under discussion: it is unrealistic to believe that the more or less benevolent neutrality of the Central Asian Republics can be counted on for an indefinite future.

This inevitably raises the question of how the Powers which are involved in the area can avoid being reduced to a role of passive spectators should events such as these take place. Even twenty years after the end of the Soviet Union, Russian interest and presence remain paramount, as, indeed, they were even in the days of the Tsarist Empire. It could, however be a grave error to think that, should the situation change radically, the defence of all the existing economic, political and strategic interests in any of the Republics could be entrusted to Russia, acting on its own. The danger does exist that the Russians would end up creating a false impression of “Law and Order” through military force placing then their own trusted allies at the head of Governments which would be, in every sense, puppet regimes. We cannot exclude that plans already exist in this sense and that a new “nomenclatura” is ready to emerge in case of severe trouble.
This, of course would not be an acceptable solution and could actually be the forerunner of grater tensions and violence.
It is my belief that - perhaps, for now, secretly and informally – the ground should be tested to ascertain to what extent Russian and “Western” interests coincide or diverge, and leverage should be put in place to persuade the Chinese to play a more visible role in the area. Perhaps, in lieu of “pre-emptive strikes”, a policy of “pre-emptive damage control” should be taken into consideration.


(The writer, a retired former Italian Diplomatic Officer, has spent about twenty years of his life in Central Asia – mainly in Afghanistan – and served as Italian Ambassador in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) between 1992 and 1995)