CENTRAL ASIA - THE SMOULDERING VOLCANO
(This article was published on the site "Open Democracy" in April 2010)

Events in Kirghizstan seem to have crept up unexpectedly on an apparently unaware or inattentive international public opinion, principally and understandably focussed on other theatres, albeit in areas not all that distant, such as Afghanistan.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the former Central Asian Soviet Republics - with perhaps the exception of Tajikistan – have been rather superficially viewed as essentially calm. Occasional unrest has always seemed to be short-lived, and the very distance – both geographic and cultural – of these republics has kept them out of the western world’s attention.

Even long after the bygone days of the “great Game”, however, these Republics continue to have significant strategic importance either as producers of oil or natural gas, or for their geographic position which makes them essential partners in conveying these products to the West. These circumstances, in addition to the strategic military importance they have, especially in view of the Afghan conflict and the tensions between the West and Iran have been contributing factors in the endeavour, by the interested foreign Governments, to avoid the adoption of a hectoring attitude on delicate issues such as Democracy or the respect of Human Rights and political freedom.

The result of this rather cynical combination of indifference and covert encouragement has been the creation of an area which owes its stability principally to the inflexibility and virtual immovability of a leadership left over from the Soviet empire.

The only signs of movement have taken place in two of the smaller Republics, Kirghizstan and Turkmenistan, where the sudden death of a dictator whose behaviour could even have seemed comical in its extreme use of the personality cult, had given rise to some hopes of change, which, however have so far failed to take place. My feeling is that the very fact of their relatively small size, in terms of population, make it unlikely for the events there to have immediate far-reaching consequences, unless, of course, they would generate a spill-over effect in nearby Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan. At this time this is unlikely, because these two Republics, particularly the former, are very tightly run by a “nomenclatura” which has survived Soviet times and has flourished since, creating a sense of “Imperium in Imperio”, which, as things stand, appears totally secure, intangible and therefore, by our Western standards, “dependable”.

The question has been put as to whether the events in Bishkek were inspired, encouraged or even financed by outside influence. It is unlikely but not impossible, and some have seen a Russian hand in the events. It has to be clear, however that Russia, just like all the other nearby States, is not interested in destabilizing Kirghizstan, and if there was a Russian involvement it was probably aimed more simply to a regime change operation which, perhaps, got slightly out of control. Political turmoil and instability in those republics which some – with typical Eurocentric arrogance – insist on calling “the Stans”, is, at present in no-one’s interest. Not China, who has already a number of difficult and delicate border situations, certainly not Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan and, therefore, not even Russia, unless, of course there are splinter groups in the Russian services who still nurture imperial nostalgia.

This basically realistic overview, however, fails to take into account an inevitable process: the passage of time, and the resulting disappearance of these leaders from the scene: the nomenclatura is numerous and powerful, and these two aspects have held the key to the survival of these regimes, but it is also fast ageing, and has now been in power for a couple of decades. It is true that, especially through the wide, unscrupulous practice of nepotism, they feel that they have a reliable second generation waiting in the wings, but history tends to show that an inordinate trust in the products of nepotism can lead to disappointing results.

There are further reasons to fear a less than comforting future for these republics. On the one hand, of course, there is a growing population of political dissidents – who have shown their power in Kirgizstan and have been ruthlessly oppressed elsewhere, but in some of the Republics there are also signs of a growing and unyielding hostility on the part of Islamic “extremists”. Their presence, paradoxically, has actually been beneficial mainly because of the West’s instinctive reaction to this kind of threat, and the presence of these pockets of Islamic resistance has strengthened the case for support and encouragement of the repressive regimes in each of the former Soviet Central Asian Republics.

My experience in this part of the world makes me fear that we are dealing with a smouldering volcano, due to erupt in the not too distant future.

The uncertainty prevailing in Afghanistan, and, in spite of the continuous stream of official signs of optimism, in Pakistan should induce all the interested parties to take into careful consideration possible violent and destabilizing scenarios in the area under discussion: it is unrealistic to believe that the more or less benevolent neutrality of the Central Asian Republics can be counted on for an indefinite future.

This inevitably raises the question of how the Powers which are involved in the area can avoid being reduced to a role of passive spectators should events such as these take place. Even twenty years after the end of the Soviet Union, Russian interest and presence remain paramount, as, indeed, they were even in the days of the Tsarist Empire. It could, however be a grave error to think that, should the situation change radically, the defence of all the existing economic, political and strategic interests in any of the Republics could be entrusted to Russia, acting on its own. The danger does exist that the Russians would end up creating a false impression of “Law and Order” through military force placing then their own trusted allies at the head of Governments which would be, in every sense, puppet regimes. We cannot exclude that plans already exist in this sense and that a new “nomenclatura” is ready to emerge in case of severe trouble.
This, of course would not be an acceptable solution and could actually be the forerunner of grater tensions and violence.
It is my belief that - perhaps, for now, secretly and informally – the ground should be tested to ascertain to what extent Russian and “Western” interests coincide or diverge, and leverage should be put in place to persuade the Chinese to play a more visible role in the area. Perhaps, in lieu of “pre-emptive strikes”, a policy of “pre-emptive damage control” should be taken into consideration.


(The writer, a retired former Italian Diplomatic Officer, has spent about twenty years of his life in Central Asia – mainly in Afghanistan – and served as Italian Ambassador in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) between 1992 and 1995)