AFGHANISTAN: THE ATTACK ON THE KABUL INTERCONTINENTAL

Rome, July 6, 2011



The “Kabul Intercontinental” hotel, attacked last week by insurgents, was built and inaugurated In those halcyon years preceding the end of Zahir Shah’s reign, when Afghanistan seemed like a haven of peace and Kabul was known – rather inappropriately – as “the Paris of Central Asia”.
Even then this massive structure built on a hill overlooking the city stood out and was the object of much comment, not all of it favourable. Already in those years, within the ostensibly “westernized” Kabul civil society, voices were raised which expressed disapproval and, above all, the fear that king Zahir Shah – just like one of his unfortunate predecessors, Amanullah Khan – was showing undue haste in aligning the Capital to Western models, failing to take into account the growing disapproval of the highly conservative rural population. The fact itself that this new modern hotel even had an outdoor swimming pool, open to both sexes, fuelled the growing tide of disapproval.
The significance of this recent Taliban action seems highly symbolic and therefore goes well beyond the loss of life and material damage caused. Many have been quick to point out the startling similarity of this episode to the Mumbai terrorist attacks, but a more appropriate parallel could be drawn with a similar assault on the Serena Hotel in the very heart of Kabul, some years ago.
At the time, this incident took many international observers by surprise, and did constitute a veritable turning point in the Taliban strategy, giving notice that nowhere in Afghanistan, not even the capital, could be considered even remotely safe.
No matter what the official line has repeatedly stated, events have been steadily deteriorating since then, and the erstwhile Cassandra's, those who have repeatedly stated that the war as such, is “unwinnable”, are unfortunately being proven right.
Cassandra, we know, was a tragic figure whose gift for prophesizing brought her only unhappiness and, ultimately, doom. There is, therefore, no sense of satisfaction, however grim, no hint of schadenfreude in those very few who, in the course of the past years, have been trying to steer international opinion’s attention to the impending and palpably inevitable disaster in Afghanistan.
It is undeniable that some positive points have emerged, not the least of them being the growing – albeit somewhat shaky - role of Afghan security forces in the armed struggle. It is also true that in many parts of the country, particularly the North and the West, the quality of life, especially for women, has somewhat improved, and that in some regions there is a growing taste for Civil Society’s active participation in local political life. The overall picture, however, remains bleak and desolate.
The term itself, “turning point”, employed ad nauseam on all occasions (lastly the elimination of Osama Bin Laden) is deceptive, because it seems evident that, at this stage, there really is nowhere to turn. Even if, through covert negotiations, power could be handed over to some “moderate” Taliban factions (whatever that may possibly mean), they themselves will probably experience great difficulty in controlling the more extremist elements. For their part, the NATO forces will not have the availability of a nearby haven from which to intervene and aid the new Government in its battle to control the extremists. Pakistan, in its present state of turmoil, is out of the question and the former Soviet Central Asian Republics do not offer guarantees of long term reliability. Their regimes, though apparently strong, would experience great difficulties in granting hospitality to NATO forces with the purpose of keeping an eye on Afghanistan. To what extent Drones can be used to this effect is open to question.
The situation is darkly reminiscent of the Soviet pull-out over twenty years ago: for a while, the Soviet Union was able to keep control of the Afghan skies and thus allow the survival of the Government, but the collapse of the Soviet structure fatally brought about the civil war which eventually led to the Taliban takeover.
“Staying on”, however, is out of the question, not only for the growing unpopularity of the conflict in American and European public opinion, but also because no advantage would be obtained, only the protraction of an equivocal situation which is destroying the very fabric of Afghan culture and civilization.
It seems clear that news of minor victories or setbacks on the military front have lost significance and that close attention has to be paid to the harsh messages that the Taliban have been sending not only to the NATO forces, but also to those sections of the Afghan population still inclined to welcome the presence of foreign forces and to collaborate with them. The attack on the Intercontinental, a very visible symbol of foreign presence has to be placed in this context.
It could well be too late, but perhaps attempts should be made to ensure some local autonomy in the Northern and Western provinces, granting the future Afghan government rather full power in the rest of the country. Perhaps some of the less sinister warlords, who, in some areas, still command respect and loyalty could be “rehabilitated” to this end.
The alternatives to total disaster are fast diminishing, and the time has come fundamentally to revisit Afghan policy, also, of course, in the military sector, but more particularly with an eye to civilian development.
It is almost impossible to keep track of the constantly shifting aims declared by the coalition upon invading Afghanistan and in subsequent years. The latest seems to be oriented toward leaving Afghanistan as a “neutral buffer state”, which, of course, has been its historical role for centuries. This would mean that a return to a distant past in a climate of total uncertainty will be considered sufficient to express satisfaction at the outcome of the long conflict in Afghanistan, and this is a point well worth reflecting upon.

Carlo Ungaro