AN "ITALIAN SPRING"? VOTERS REBELLION IN ITALY

Rome, July 5, 2011




The extent of the damage inflicted on Italy’s governing majority by recent electoral results can be measured by a recent statement uttered on public Television by one of the most austere and influential Government ministers who recalled an anecdote about Louis XVI refusing to believe that the attack on the Bastille was a “revolution”, treating it rather as a “revolt” and consequently coming to a grisly end. Giulio Tremonti, Minister of the Economy, thus publicly warned Berlusconi that what had taken place was not a “revolt”, but a real “revolution” by the Italian electorate and ought to be taken seriously.
Even a few months ago, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s hold on power seemed impregnable, largely through his vast control over private an public media.
In the course of the past four weeks, however, both Mr. Berlusconi and his only meaningful political ally, the “Northern League”, have suffered a number of unpredicted and severe setbacks as a result of what amounts to a virtual revolt by the Italian electorate which, in recent years, had seemed very passive, to the point of indifference, and readily obedient to their party’s call.
The results of recent local elections in Milan had sounded a warning, with Mr. Berlusconi being defeated in his own territory in spite of an unprecedented, totally personalised media propaganda onslaught, but the hardest and perhaps fatal blow came two weeks later as the results of four public referenda showed the electorate’s disillusionment, even hostility, to the current governing coalition.
In commenting the recent referendum results in Italy, most observers have put the accent on the massive vote (well over 90%) against the nuclear power program which had been similarly rejected by a popular referendum in 1987. The situation, however, needs to be viewed in a much more complex light and could well constitute a fundamental turning point in the Italian political scene.
According to the Italian Constitution, a referendum will be considered valid only if “50% plus 1” of the voters cast a ballot. Many previous attempts at repealing laws through the referendum process have failed because those who opposed the referendum simply abstained. In spite of an abstention campaign launched by both the majority parties, counting on the obedience of their followers, a massive 57% of the electorate chose to vote, and the vote in favour of repealing the laws subject to referendum was uniformly above 90%.
The laws thus repealed concerned the nuclear power programme, the privatisation of the water supply and – perhaps most importantly – the right of the Prime Minister and other Government officials to refuse to appear in court if subject to prosecution for crimes allegedly committed even in periods prior to their accession to office. This last law had been hastily passed with the express intention of protecting the Prime Minister from prosecution. The extremely high proportion of votes cast for its repeal therefore shows an unexpected disaffection of the electorate with Mr. Berlusconi..
A great many questions have been raised by this result, and it would be difficult to tackle them all. Some issues, however, seem of primary importance, and the first consideration that comes to mind is that the main opposition parties, though eager to board the victory bandwagon , were also taken by surprise and can be considered victims of the new political climate, which they did very little to inspire. The successful candidates in Milan and Naples actually ran against the “official” opposition candidates and therefore, until the very end, received only tepid support. Similarly, the referendum vote was considered a lost cause, and only two fringe parties campaigned in its favour: Berlusconi's unwise decision to put himself in the front line, signifying that a vote against his party was a vote against him certainly helped the winners much more than the late and ineffectual support of the main opposition parties. While it is easy to indicate who came out as the loser – and it has been an unprecedented personal defeat for Berlusconi – it is much more difficult to understand who the ultimate winner will be, and the next few, certainly hectic, weeks of Italian political activity will certainly concentrate on the solution of this conundrum..
It is also interesting to note that supporters of the winning candidates and of the referenda received very limited exposure on TV: this could be the beginning of the end of the so-called “videocracy” which has ruled Italy for the past years. The term “videocracy” was recently coined as the title of an excellent, bitter-sweet documentary about Italian politics. Television seemed to be the dominating power, and those who controlled Television controlled the nation. Perhaps the governing parties, and particularly the Prime Minister, have been guilty of over-exposure thus creating irritation instead of consensus. In the recent municipal elections, the parties least exposed to TV coverage came out on top, and this seems highly significant.

Another important concern, which has not been addressed by international observers, is the effect that these results will have on the Catholic hierarchy which, particularly in the recent past, has had a strong, and at times pernicious influence on Italian politics. It may appear specious to speak of the “Catholic vote” in an almost totally “Catholic” country. But traditionally there have always been politicians who have identified themselves as “Catholic” and have therefore received approval and backing from the Church hierarchy. The attitude of the Church towards Berlusconi has been ambiguous: he has occasionally had his knuckles lightly rapped for his behaviour, but the Church has constantly given him its support in exchange for remarkably useful favours. There were complaints, however, from the grass roots, expressed mainly through Parish Priests and the surprisingly massive turnout in a referendum which was widely regarded as for or against Berlusconi will cause some rethinking and could end up with the Church withdrawing its support with understandably negative consequences for the Government.
An early symptom of this change of attitude came very shortly after the vote, when the Italian Bishops Conference came out very strongly against some statements by a member of the Government.

One of the primary considerations, of course, concerns the effect these two “slaps in the face” (as a high ranking Northern League official put it) will have on the ruling coalition and the way in which Berlusconi will choose to react: at the moment he seems intent on the suicidal policy of urgently enacting a questionable fiscal reform, in spite of the fragile situation of the economy.
Berlusconi has been promising “tax cuts” and “Fiscal reform” ever since he first came to power in 1994, but there has been no visible decrease in taxation. He is very much of a populist leader and he has made it known that he wants urgently to enact a “fiscal reform” to alleviate taxes, obviously in the hope of regaining popular support. The type of reform he has in mind would end up increasing Italy’s public debt – one of the highest in the world – and would go against EU advice and rules. His view of fiscal reform, moreover, has always been in favour of the upper income brackets, and this would cause further dissent in a moment when the gap between rich and poor is visibly increasing. This is a risky path and an injudicious fiscal policy at this stage could reduce Italy to the conditions faced by Greece, Portugal and other “problem” Countries.
The ruling majority is in deep trouble. Some stalwart party members openly and ostentatiously disobeyed Party orders by casting their votes in the referendum, and there already have been acrimonious exchanges between the two ruling parties and also within the parties themselves. There is much uncertainty on what the future developments will be, but this has certainly all the earmarks of an important watershed moment.