AFGHANISTAN’S TRIBAL STRUCTURE NEEDS TO BE RESPECTED

The recent Conference held in Rome on “the way forward” in Afghanistan, has laid bare the basic unwillingness – or inability - of the International Community to consider a change in its stance on the complex process of “transition”. The only positive aspect of the conference was the belated, and rather passive, presence of Iran.
Of much greater import is the news that, in the forthcoming Lisbon summit, the “withdrawal date” may be moved forward another four years, thus scrapping the growingly unrealistic target date of July 2011, and, at the same time, creating internal political problems to many of the participating countries, not excluding the United States.
By now the statements coming from ISAF spokespersons on the alleged military progress seem totally otiose, and can easily be disregarded. Further thought should be given to the civilian issues which have been either overlooked or wrongly approached.
Many commentators on Afghanistan have recently concentrated their attention on the tribalism and nepotism which appear to dominate Karzai’s presidential style. Few, however, have bothered to point out that tribalism and nepotism, in some social and cultural contexts, can actually become extremely strong foundations on which to construct a credible and successful government. This has often been the way in Afghanistan, as well as in other similar societies, whenever a free choice of governance was available. Most likely only a system based on these principles could possibly ensure relative peace in Afghanistan after the departure of foreign troops.
Those who were interested in Afghanistan’s political structure in the peaceful and relatively prosperous years of the Zahir Shah Monarchy (1932 – 1973) will recall that while, to all appearances, Afghanistan was a unified Kingdom ruled by a benevolent, unassuming and rather Western oriented Monarch, in reality the King owed his power exclusively to the combined goodwill of the Pashto tribes (he was a Mohammedzai), and was treated with respect, but certainly not with undue reverence, by the non-Pashto Provinces, in the North and in the West.
Any attempt to plaster over this centuries old reality with a flimsy veneer of Western political philosophy, however well-intentioned, is doomed to failure. The very words – “tribalism” and “nepotism” – have negative connotations for us, but we ought to realise that these are fundamental social truths which, in past centuries, were driving forces even behind the construction of modern Europe, kept in check mainly by strong unifying forces such as the Empire, the Papacy and the rising Monarchies and Baronies eventually to become today’s Nation States. These basic factors in human social development actually still have an important role in some European areas.
This fundamental character of Afghan society has to be understood and respected in order to avoid errors of the past, even those committed during the Monarchy and in the following years which can be summarised as a futile attempt to accelerate history by imposing alien social and political models unsuited to the fabric of Afghan society.
The recent news of “secret” talks between the insurgency and the Karzai Government, with the seeming support of the NATO Command, although, as yet, rather ambiguous, could be a positive signal, indicating a way out of the Afghan labyrinth without excessive further damage to the Civil Society. There is reason to fear, however, that, even if successful, these negotiations may terminate the foreign occupation of Afghanistan but will not lead the country to a peaceful future, and will not avoid the seemingly inevitable inter-ethnic and tribal violence which will follow NATO withdrawal. There is, in fact, a substantial risk that any agreement would, in reality, be limited to the Pashto ethnicity, with only some formal concern shown for the other parts of the population, and this will have tragic effects on the fragile social structure left over from all these years of foreign occupation.
A serious attempt ought to be made, instead, for a greater involvement of tribal and other traditional leaders. The somewhat discredited Karzai leadership and the Taleban insurgency should not be left alone in determining Afghanistan’s future. Perhaps a second great Jirga, this time convened in the traditional manner and not limited to leaders faithful to the Karzai line, could lay the initial groundwork for the creation of an Afghan state able to elicit the loyalty of the entire population.
If, however, present policies are going to be stubbornly pursued, the end of foreign occupation will most probably be followed by tribal and ethnic conflicts, basically a “civil war”, which will leave the country subject to even greater divisions than those left by the Soviet Union in 1989. It is absurd to believe that, in the space of a few months, a unified army and a reliable police force can be formed through patchy training programmes in a Country historically divided along ethnic and tribal lines, and which has been either in a state of virtual anarchy or under foreign domination for over three decades.
As long as the International community, responsible for Afghanistan’s future after long years of occupation, keeps talking of “transition” in irresponsibly unenlightened terms, even the most slender remaining hopes for peaceful development will prove vain.