CENTRAL ASIA - THE SMOULDERING VOLCANO
(This article was published on the site "Open Democracy" in April 2010)
Events in Kirghizstan seem to have crept up unexpectedly on an apparently unaware or inattentive international public opinion, principally and understandably focussed on other theatres, albeit in areas not all that distant, such as Afghanistan.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the former Central Asian Soviet Republics - with perhaps the exception of Tajikistan – have been rather superficially viewed as essentially calm. Occasional unrest has always seemed to be short-lived, and the very distance – both geographic and cultural – of these republics has kept them out of the western world’s attention.
Even long after the bygone days of the “great Game”, however, these Republics continue to have significant strategic importance either as producers of oil or natural gas, or for their geographic position which makes them essential partners in conveying these products to the West. These circumstances, in addition to the strategic military importance they have, especially in view of the Afghan conflict and the tensions between the West and Iran have been contributing factors in the endeavour, by the interested foreign Governments, to avoid the adoption of a hectoring attitude on delicate issues such as Democracy or the respect of Human Rights and political freedom.
The result of this rather cynical combination of indifference and covert encouragement has been the creation of an area which owes its stability principally to the inflexibility and virtual immovability of a leadership left over from the Soviet empire.
The only signs of movement have taken place in two of the smaller Republics, Kirghizstan and Turkmenistan, where the sudden death of a dictator whose behaviour could even have seemed comical in its extreme use of the personality cult, had given rise to some hopes of change, which, however have so far failed to take place. My feeling is that the very fact of their relatively small size, in terms of population, make it unlikely for the events there to have immediate far-reaching consequences, unless, of course, they would generate a spill-over effect in nearby Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan. At this time this is unlikely, because these two Republics, particularly the former, are very tightly run by a “nomenclatura” which has survived Soviet times and has flourished since, creating a sense of “Imperium in Imperio”, which, as things stand, appears totally secure, intangible and therefore, by our Western standards, “dependable”.
The question has been put as to whether the events in Bishkek were inspired, encouraged or even financed by outside influence. It is unlikely but not impossible, and some have seen a Russian hand in the events. It has to be clear, however that Russia, just like all the other nearby States, is not interested in destabilizing Kirghizstan, and if there was a Russian involvement it was probably aimed more simply to a regime change operation which, perhaps, got slightly out of control. Political turmoil and instability in those republics which some – with typical Eurocentric arrogance – insist on calling “the Stans”, is, at present in no-one’s interest. Not China, who has already a number of difficult and delicate border situations, certainly not Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan and, therefore, not even Russia, unless, of course there are splinter groups in the Russian services who still nurture imperial nostalgia.
This basically realistic overview, however, fails to take into account an inevitable process: the passage of time, and the resulting disappearance of these leaders from the scene: the nomenclatura is numerous and powerful, and these two aspects have held the key to the survival of these regimes, but it is also fast ageing, and has now been in power for a couple of decades. It is true that, especially through the wide, unscrupulous practice of nepotism, they feel that they have a reliable second generation waiting in the wings, but history tends to show that an inordinate trust in the products of nepotism can lead to disappointing results.
There are further reasons to fear a less than comforting future for these republics. On the one hand, of course, there is a growing population of political dissidents – who have shown their power in Kirgizstan and have been ruthlessly oppressed elsewhere, but in some of the Republics there are also signs of a growing and unyielding hostility on the part of Islamic “extremists”. Their presence, paradoxically, has actually been beneficial mainly because of the West’s instinctive reaction to this kind of threat, and the presence of these pockets of Islamic resistance has strengthened the case for support and encouragement of the repressive regimes in each of the former Soviet Central Asian Republics.
My experience in this part of the world makes me fear that we are dealing with a smouldering volcano, due to erupt in the not too distant future.
The uncertainty prevailing in Afghanistan, and, in spite of the continuous stream of official signs of optimism, in Pakistan should induce all the interested parties to take into careful consideration possible violent and destabilizing scenarios in the area under discussion: it is unrealistic to believe that the more or less benevolent neutrality of the Central Asian Republics can be counted on for an indefinite future.
This inevitably raises the question of how the Powers which are involved in the area can avoid being reduced to a role of passive spectators should events such as these take place. Even twenty years after the end of the Soviet Union, Russian interest and presence remain paramount, as, indeed, they were even in the days of the Tsarist Empire. It could, however be a grave error to think that, should the situation change radically, the defence of all the existing economic, political and strategic interests in any of the Republics could be entrusted to Russia, acting on its own. The danger does exist that the Russians would end up creating a false impression of “Law and Order” through military force placing then their own trusted allies at the head of Governments which would be, in every sense, puppet regimes. We cannot exclude that plans already exist in this sense and that a new “nomenclatura” is ready to emerge in case of severe trouble.
This, of course would not be an acceptable solution and could actually be the forerunner of grater tensions and violence.
It is my belief that - perhaps, for now, secretly and informally – the ground should be tested to ascertain to what extent Russian and “Western” interests coincide or diverge, and leverage should be put in place to persuade the Chinese to play a more visible role in the area. Perhaps, in lieu of “pre-emptive strikes”, a policy of “pre-emptive damage control” should be taken into consideration.
(The writer, a retired former Italian Diplomatic Officer, has spent about twenty years of his life in Central Asia – mainly in Afghanistan – and served as Italian Ambassador in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) between 1992 and 1995)
martedì 4 maggio 2010
venerdì 4 dicembre 2009
Can Afghanistan be governed by Kabul?
NOTE: This article was published on the site "Open Democracy" on November 27th.
SUMMARY:
The Afghan problem appears insoluble, and the recently decided "surge" will not contribute to a solution. The issue of decentralization has not been sufficiently addressed, and ought to be taken into account.
TEXT
The inauguration of
The Afghans are a patient people: it took almost ninety years for them to convince the British that any attempt permanently to occupy the country would be futile, and they also fought the Soviet invasion for almost a decade. NATO has been there, now, for eight years, and has yet to consolidate its presence, even in the capital city, Kabul, which, at times, such as the day of this infamous inauguration, appears totally occupied and blockaded, with checkpoints every few hundred meters and military presence visible at every corner, but yet can be the theatre of frightful attacks on foreign troops and – unfortunately – afghan and foreign civilians.
The invasion of Afghanistan was greeted with approval and understanding by almost all the world’s Governments as an apparently justified reaction to an act of terrorism ostensibly masterminded in Afghanistan itself, but very lame and contradictory justification has been given on the maintaining of a massive military presence there after the expulsion of Al Qaida – the achievement of the initial “casus belli”.
Whether or not there were also covert reasons to encourage the United States and at least some of its NATO allies into extending the Afghan operation from a simple surgical strike against Al Qaida into a “regime change” venture is open to conjecture, and constitutes one of those subjects seldom approached by international commentators. It would be a mistake to ignore the fact that a “western oriented”
There is the suggestion that NATO’s presence in
At this moment negotiations with the Insurgents would be conducted from a position of relative weakness. The concept itself, however, has been evolving from being an absolutely unmentionable anathema to a seemingly realistic option. Some three years ago, instead, when I was in
Should the concept prevail that Western forces have to remain in
Is a centralized presidential republic really the ideal system for that country or, indeed, could it ever be made to work no matter how much effort is put into the attempt? This is an extremely complex problem which should involve careful analysis and much consultation with a credible cross-section of Afghan political and civil society. It is my idea, however, that by creating a number of more autonomous regions it would be possible to enhance the differences, which already exist, in the approach to some of the non-military problems (e.g. human rights, corruption, etc.) which seem to slip further and further away at this particularly dramatic moment in the history of the NATO and International operations in Afghanistan.
This, among other things would entail two very delicate issues, the necessary reformulating of the Afghan Constitution and the renewed involvement of at least some of the so-called “war lords”.
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has been prepared with great care and approved by the Afghan Parliament. It does not, however, fully take into account the Country’s peculiarities, nor does it seem founded on the basis of local and tribal traditions. A radical change in the Constitution need not be a traumatic event, as long as all sides are allowed to participate, and as long as preconceived ideas are abandoned.
As far as the “war-lords” are concerned, it is important to distinguish between those who have emerged from the violent civil war years and are little more than glorified gangsters, and those, instead, who obviously wield an authority greater than what can be imposed by fear of retribution, but which is based , instead, on family and tribal realities. Serious attempts could be undertaken to involve some of these local chiefs – rather than the
Carlo Ungaro
November 27 2009
giovedì 6 agosto 2009
AFGHANISTAN ON THE BRINK
The official rhetoric, and the reports emerging from Afghanistan reveal an air of futility, almost of hopelessness. Perhaps attempts should be made to see things as they really are, and not as they are presented in a growingly fictitious NATO scenario offered by a largely obedient international press.
It is not improbable that the current, massive military operation taking place in Afghanistan’s Helmand Valley will result in a perceptible tactical success, thus possibly giving rise to further official declarations of optimism on the ultimate demise of the Afghan insurgency.
Much of the triumphant language on the conflict with the Taliban, complete with childish catch-phrases implying that the enemy is “on the run” has recently shifted from an Afghan to a Pakistani scenario. This, unfortunately appears to lessen the concentration on the war in Afghanistan, where the Allied forces are as far from victory now as they have ever been. The situation, there, appears ever more reminiscent of past Afghan conflicts, dating back to a distant past, and certainly to the increasingly quoted British Imperial misfortunes in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries.
It has to be said, however, that some encouraging signs are emerging and there appears a new willingness, on the part of the occupying forces, to discard some of the pre-existing prejudices and to embark upon a novel and perhaps more daring analysis of the problem, seen in its entirety.
Hostile though I am to acronyms and clever abbreviations the emergence of the term “Af-Pak” seems to me rather encouraging, in spite of the danger it entails of confusing one conflict – the one in Pakistan against a specific and perhaps ultimately “defeatable” insurgent – with another, in Afghanistan which, instead, is waged more against a cultural reality than an identifiable insurgent organisation.
There are moments in which there seems to be much clearer thinking on the inside of the Military command structure in Afghanistan than on the outside, and many of the Afghan “experts” who so frequently and generously share their intelligent insights with us could soon find themselves displaced by unsuspected wisdom from the very same sources which, until yesterday, fed them all the wrong and misleadingly optimistic information which they so eagerly passed along. Anyone who has spent time in the present Afghan situation can easily identify the sources of the “information” which is blithely passed on by eminent journalists: a cup of coffee at ISAF Headquarters in Kabul, a chat with diplomatic officers – preferably British or American – or a “power-point” briefing at one of the many PRTS disseminated around the Country, plus, of course, the inevitable encounters with representatives of Afghan “Civil Society” who, by now, have learned precisely what to say to impress their foreign interviewer.
The sad result is that most of what one reads today about Afghanistan seems to range from the monotonous (victory just around the corner) to the ludicrous (e.g., the need to persuade the two Governments to “recognise the Durand Line”) with little or no attention being reserved for the realistic (Why are we there, do we intend to stay, and, if so, on what terms, and, above all what is meant by “victory”, is it at all possible and what do we do after we have “won”).
Similar questions, of course need to be asked about the impending elections, a subject which is painful to those of us who had the pleasure of monitoring the overall successful and peaceful parliamentary and local elections in the Autumn of 2005. Here, again, we should ask ourselves, with cold realism, whether it is worth the risk of going ahead with the elections even at the peril of serious disruption on the part of the insurgents – perhaps at the cost of civilian fatalities. Are these elections necessary, or even useful? Should they take place everywhere, even in the most dangerous zones?
Returning to the original queries, it has to be said that any contemplation on what we wish to achieve should be preceded by a close and pitilessly honest analysis of what we have achieved so far. The result is depressing. Areas which, until a few months ago, were relatively secure (e.g. Herat) have now become dangerous. It is no secret that the level of corruption and the lack of confidence in elected or nominated officials have reached a new high point, and rightly so, this in spite of the presence of numerous men and women of quality and good will whom we seem unable to assist. That is why the questions “why are we here” and “do we intend to stay” are far from specious.
While the reasons for invading Afghanistan were clear and, to a large extent, accepted, those given for the Allies’ need to remain there, especially in the present conditions, and indeed for constant and repeated requests for further escalation of the conflict are far from convincing. It was perhaps true up to two or three years ago that the West’s military presence, especially in the form of the “PRT’s” (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) had a stabilizing and reassuring influence at least in some parts of the Country. The very sad, indeed tragic, truth is that, at present, the Allies have lost the positive momentum and it is they, rather than the insurgents, who have a growing destabilizing effect. When, in 2005, reacting to overtures from insurgent emissaries, I ventured to suggest – from my post as Political Advisor to the PRT in Herat – that the moment was ripe to talk with the Taliban, who had indirectly approached me, my suggestion was dismissed on the doubly misleading, and contradictory, grounds that “we don’t negotiate with terrorists” and that “the Taliban don’t want to negotiate”. At that moment, from a position of greater strength, the Allies could have achieved something through negotiations, now it will be much more difficult.
Even if the Pakistani forces should achieve a victory of sorts against their own insurgency – and it is certainly not impossible – the question remains as to what could be considered a “victory” by the Allies in Afghanistan, particularly if the term is considered on purely military grounds. But even in the event of a political settlement of sorts, would it be wise to remain in Afghanistan on terms similar to those now existing, building up a growing surge of hostility against foreign troops, and by reflex, also foreign civilians?
Radical rethinking is necessary and urgent both for the short term (the August 20 elections) and for the long term, i.e. the ultimate aims of our presence in that unfortunate Country.
Carlo Ungaro
It is not improbable that the current, massive military operation taking place in Afghanistan’s Helmand Valley will result in a perceptible tactical success, thus possibly giving rise to further official declarations of optimism on the ultimate demise of the Afghan insurgency.
Much of the triumphant language on the conflict with the Taliban, complete with childish catch-phrases implying that the enemy is “on the run” has recently shifted from an Afghan to a Pakistani scenario. This, unfortunately appears to lessen the concentration on the war in Afghanistan, where the Allied forces are as far from victory now as they have ever been. The situation, there, appears ever more reminiscent of past Afghan conflicts, dating back to a distant past, and certainly to the increasingly quoted British Imperial misfortunes in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries.
It has to be said, however, that some encouraging signs are emerging and there appears a new willingness, on the part of the occupying forces, to discard some of the pre-existing prejudices and to embark upon a novel and perhaps more daring analysis of the problem, seen in its entirety.
Hostile though I am to acronyms and clever abbreviations the emergence of the term “Af-Pak” seems to me rather encouraging, in spite of the danger it entails of confusing one conflict – the one in Pakistan against a specific and perhaps ultimately “defeatable” insurgent – with another, in Afghanistan which, instead, is waged more against a cultural reality than an identifiable insurgent organisation.
There are moments in which there seems to be much clearer thinking on the inside of the Military command structure in Afghanistan than on the outside, and many of the Afghan “experts” who so frequently and generously share their intelligent insights with us could soon find themselves displaced by unsuspected wisdom from the very same sources which, until yesterday, fed them all the wrong and misleadingly optimistic information which they so eagerly passed along. Anyone who has spent time in the present Afghan situation can easily identify the sources of the “information” which is blithely passed on by eminent journalists: a cup of coffee at ISAF Headquarters in Kabul, a chat with diplomatic officers – preferably British or American – or a “power-point” briefing at one of the many PRTS disseminated around the Country, plus, of course, the inevitable encounters with representatives of Afghan “Civil Society” who, by now, have learned precisely what to say to impress their foreign interviewer.
The sad result is that most of what one reads today about Afghanistan seems to range from the monotonous (victory just around the corner) to the ludicrous (e.g., the need to persuade the two Governments to “recognise the Durand Line”) with little or no attention being reserved for the realistic (Why are we there, do we intend to stay, and, if so, on what terms, and, above all what is meant by “victory”, is it at all possible and what do we do after we have “won”).
Similar questions, of course need to be asked about the impending elections, a subject which is painful to those of us who had the pleasure of monitoring the overall successful and peaceful parliamentary and local elections in the Autumn of 2005. Here, again, we should ask ourselves, with cold realism, whether it is worth the risk of going ahead with the elections even at the peril of serious disruption on the part of the insurgents – perhaps at the cost of civilian fatalities. Are these elections necessary, or even useful? Should they take place everywhere, even in the most dangerous zones?
Returning to the original queries, it has to be said that any contemplation on what we wish to achieve should be preceded by a close and pitilessly honest analysis of what we have achieved so far. The result is depressing. Areas which, until a few months ago, were relatively secure (e.g. Herat) have now become dangerous. It is no secret that the level of corruption and the lack of confidence in elected or nominated officials have reached a new high point, and rightly so, this in spite of the presence of numerous men and women of quality and good will whom we seem unable to assist. That is why the questions “why are we here” and “do we intend to stay” are far from specious.
While the reasons for invading Afghanistan were clear and, to a large extent, accepted, those given for the Allies’ need to remain there, especially in the present conditions, and indeed for constant and repeated requests for further escalation of the conflict are far from convincing. It was perhaps true up to two or three years ago that the West’s military presence, especially in the form of the “PRT’s” (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) had a stabilizing and reassuring influence at least in some parts of the Country. The very sad, indeed tragic, truth is that, at present, the Allies have lost the positive momentum and it is they, rather than the insurgents, who have a growing destabilizing effect. When, in 2005, reacting to overtures from insurgent emissaries, I ventured to suggest – from my post as Political Advisor to the PRT in Herat – that the moment was ripe to talk with the Taliban, who had indirectly approached me, my suggestion was dismissed on the doubly misleading, and contradictory, grounds that “we don’t negotiate with terrorists” and that “the Taliban don’t want to negotiate”. At that moment, from a position of greater strength, the Allies could have achieved something through negotiations, now it will be much more difficult.
Even if the Pakistani forces should achieve a victory of sorts against their own insurgency – and it is certainly not impossible – the question remains as to what could be considered a “victory” by the Allies in Afghanistan, particularly if the term is considered on purely military grounds. But even in the event of a political settlement of sorts, would it be wise to remain in Afghanistan on terms similar to those now existing, building up a growing surge of hostility against foreign troops, and by reflex, also foreign civilians?
Radical rethinking is necessary and urgent both for the short term (the August 20 elections) and for the long term, i.e. the ultimate aims of our presence in that unfortunate Country.
Carlo Ungaro
mercoledì 3 giugno 2009
THE CHRISTIAN TALEBAN ARE ALIVE AND WELL
I tend to think of myself as unshockable, but time and again events show me the error in my ways and I realise that I still can be shocked. Perhaps it’s a good thing, after all.
I was, if I may say so, shocked but not overly surprised to see that the recent murder of a Doctor who specialised in abortions was greeted with grim satisfaction on Fox “News” (I have to put the word in quotation marks and I don’t understand how they are authorised to qualify themselves as a “news” program).
Indeed the screen was filled by people who were quite literally foaming at the mouth in explaining how the doctor deserved what he got. I don’t remember the names of these correspondents, except for Mr. O’Reilly, but there is also a youngish, rapier thin lady who seems to have two sets of teeth and all the charm of an alligator. I remember her because she used to go into veritable paroxysms at the mention of some names, such as Michael Moore or Jon Stewart, and she frightened me a bit, thinking I could possibly meet her in a dark alley during one of my frequent visits to the U.S.
I fully understand that the issue of abortion raises strong, justified emotions (on both sides of the argument), but in my view the gist of the reportage was oriented in the direction of persuading viewers that this was not murder, but a richly deserved execution (not, of course, in so many words).
Isn’t this what Al Qaeda and the Taliban are supposed to be about?
Is a new breed of “Christian Taliban” emerging from the “Bible belt”?
I hope not, because Christian fundamentalists frighten me much more than their counterparts of other faiths.
I was, if I may say so, shocked but not overly surprised to see that the recent murder of a Doctor who specialised in abortions was greeted with grim satisfaction on Fox “News” (I have to put the word in quotation marks and I don’t understand how they are authorised to qualify themselves as a “news” program).
Indeed the screen was filled by people who were quite literally foaming at the mouth in explaining how the doctor deserved what he got. I don’t remember the names of these correspondents, except for Mr. O’Reilly, but there is also a youngish, rapier thin lady who seems to have two sets of teeth and all the charm of an alligator. I remember her because she used to go into veritable paroxysms at the mention of some names, such as Michael Moore or Jon Stewart, and she frightened me a bit, thinking I could possibly meet her in a dark alley during one of my frequent visits to the U.S.
I fully understand that the issue of abortion raises strong, justified emotions (on both sides of the argument), but in my view the gist of the reportage was oriented in the direction of persuading viewers that this was not murder, but a richly deserved execution (not, of course, in so many words).
Isn’t this what Al Qaeda and the Taliban are supposed to be about?
Is a new breed of “Christian Taliban” emerging from the “Bible belt”?
I hope not, because Christian fundamentalists frighten me much more than their counterparts of other faiths.
sabato 18 aprile 2009
"WAR ON PIRACY" WOULD BE A TRAGIC MISTAKE
Summary:
The Somali pirates cannot be defeated by the force of arms, and the International Community should try to find out the core reasons behind this dangerous situation.
Text:
Even as I was rejoicing at the successful operation to free the last remaining US captive in the hands of Somali pirates, the sight of the immense amount of naval and military hardware which was brought into play in a very short time inevitably led me to fear the possibility of an exaggerated military response on the part of the damaged countries to the undeniable threat posed by the growing number of Somali pirates and the growing sophistication of their methods.
Some historians, and I can recall, for example, Barbara Tuchman, have attributed the outbreak of the First World War principally to the tremendous build-up of modern armaments which, in a certain sense made war seem inevitable and even desirable. Some decades later, president Eisenhower, a source whose opinion was made all the more credible because of his brilliant military career, warned against the build-up of influence “whether sought or unsought” by the industrial-military complex.
Although I share the general feeling of confidence in the sagacity of president Obama, his Secretary of State and his other advisers, I felt apprehensive and feared that in the United States a momentum may be building up for a “war on piracy”, which would mirror, in its apparent ease and predestined doom, the ill-fated “war on terror” the consequences of which we have not yet ceased to suffer. Some symptoms in this direction are already emerging, indeed, this “war on piracy” has practically been declared. This is understandable within a culture which – more or less since the days of Theodore Roosevelt - has felt the need to identify an enemy, large (The Soviet Union, International Communism) or small (Cuba) on which to focus the country’s just wrath, and, therefore a move in this direction would probably arouse approval, perhaps even enthusiasm in some strata of public opinion, but it would constitute a tremendous military and political mistake.
The liberation of the American hostage was achieved through an extremely well executed “surgical” operation, which, however, could not be repeated with similar success for the hundreds of hostages, of diverse nationalities, currently in the hands of the Somali pirates.
A massive maritime operation, using modern and sophisticated naval hardware with the intent of knocking out the entire ramshackle Somali pirate “fleet” would be just as ill-advised, firstly because it would put the lives of all the captives at risk, and secondly because the very vastness of the maritime space involved, combined with the small size and uncertain number of pirate vessels would make any “search and destroy” mission almost impossible. Nor is there a viable land based alternative: of course, given the military means available, an invasion of Somalia by a “coalition of the willing” would be relatively easy, easier even than the famous “slam-dunk” operation in Iraq. Hunting out the pirates on land, however, would be no easier than hunting them out at sea, and the invading troops would be subject to growing hostility and violence which, in the long term, would force their withdrawal.
There are parallel reasons which can explain the current surge of piracy, and I think that the problem should be approached by analysing and tackling these issues, with an open mind and a willingness to admit past errors of judgement.
Somalia has been in a state of virtual anarchy since the early nineties. The reasons behind this are complex and unique, as I found out in the course of the years I spent as head of the Italian Diplomatic Delegation to Somalia and participated in the peace talks which were held in Kenya from 2001 to 2004.
Errors were doubtlessly committed by all, with no exception, during those long negotiations, but, in the end, for the first time in many years a Federal Constitution, an Assembly, a Government and a President did materialize with the full backing of the International Community.
The Institutions which emerged from the Conference proved, however, to be inadequate and, for many reasons which ought to be carefully analyzed, failed to bring about the stability and peace we all were hoping for. A state of total anarchy was circumvented by the appearance of the “Islamic Courts”, which brought about a semblance of order and social peace. Unfortunately the West has a tendency to knee-jerk reactions when it hears the term “Islamic”, and this autochthonous endeavour was violently subdued by the International Community, which added insult to injury by sending Christian troops to invade and subdue an Islamic Country, failing, moreover, to take into account the atavistic dislike and suspicion nurtured by the Somalis against the Ethiopians.
Recent events have brought the country back to a state of total anarchy, and I would not place excessive confidence of the present Government – certainly not representative and virtually devoid of authority – to restore order and to fulfil its tasks and obligations by actually governing the country. This weakness at the centre is, of course, the main cause of the current phenomenon, in that a Somali pirate can count on almost total immunity from any restraining or punitive action on the part of his Government.
It is certainly true that the growing number of young Somali men who have chosen this path are criminals, and dangerous criminals at that, but it must be borne in mind that they are also angry and desperate, and the causes of their anger and desperation ought to be examined and tackled. The cause of their anger goes well beyond the recent deployment of Ethiopian troops in Somalia, and has to do, on the one hand, with the massive and shameless exploitation of the waters they see as their own by foreign fishing fleets, and, perhaps principally, on the continuous use of their coasts as dumping grounds for toxic waste on the part of some European countries. In recent years an enterprising young Italian Journalist, Ilaria Alpi, was murdered, probably in connection with investigative reporting which she was carrying out on these and other subjects.
Their desperation is perhaps easier to understand, for there are few ways in which a young Somali can hope to make a living legally in his (or her) own country, as can be seen not only by the growing criminality, but also by the desperate and dangerous attempts to emigrate to foreign lands.
The problems caused by the Somali acts of piracy certainly constitute an immediate problem, and urgent measures have to be taken to protect the international shipping which legitimately uses those waters. This, however, would be useless without a serious attempt to resume intense negotiations with all the Somali interested parties – including the Islamic factions, which I frequently met and who are not (or should I say “not yet”) interested in acts of international terrorism.
I believe that a Conference should be convened as soon as possible, perhaps not in a neighbouring country, and a further serious attempt should be undertaken to eliminate the state of anarchy and to enable Somalis to undertake, with international help, the difficult task of reconstruction and reconciliation.
The Somali pirates cannot be defeated by the force of arms, and the International Community should try to find out the core reasons behind this dangerous situation.
Text:
Even as I was rejoicing at the successful operation to free the last remaining US captive in the hands of Somali pirates, the sight of the immense amount of naval and military hardware which was brought into play in a very short time inevitably led me to fear the possibility of an exaggerated military response on the part of the damaged countries to the undeniable threat posed by the growing number of Somali pirates and the growing sophistication of their methods.
Some historians, and I can recall, for example, Barbara Tuchman, have attributed the outbreak of the First World War principally to the tremendous build-up of modern armaments which, in a certain sense made war seem inevitable and even desirable. Some decades later, president Eisenhower, a source whose opinion was made all the more credible because of his brilliant military career, warned against the build-up of influence “whether sought or unsought” by the industrial-military complex.
Although I share the general feeling of confidence in the sagacity of president Obama, his Secretary of State and his other advisers, I felt apprehensive and feared that in the United States a momentum may be building up for a “war on piracy”, which would mirror, in its apparent ease and predestined doom, the ill-fated “war on terror” the consequences of which we have not yet ceased to suffer. Some symptoms in this direction are already emerging, indeed, this “war on piracy” has practically been declared. This is understandable within a culture which – more or less since the days of Theodore Roosevelt - has felt the need to identify an enemy, large (The Soviet Union, International Communism) or small (Cuba) on which to focus the country’s just wrath, and, therefore a move in this direction would probably arouse approval, perhaps even enthusiasm in some strata of public opinion, but it would constitute a tremendous military and political mistake.
The liberation of the American hostage was achieved through an extremely well executed “surgical” operation, which, however, could not be repeated with similar success for the hundreds of hostages, of diverse nationalities, currently in the hands of the Somali pirates.
A massive maritime operation, using modern and sophisticated naval hardware with the intent of knocking out the entire ramshackle Somali pirate “fleet” would be just as ill-advised, firstly because it would put the lives of all the captives at risk, and secondly because the very vastness of the maritime space involved, combined with the small size and uncertain number of pirate vessels would make any “search and destroy” mission almost impossible. Nor is there a viable land based alternative: of course, given the military means available, an invasion of Somalia by a “coalition of the willing” would be relatively easy, easier even than the famous “slam-dunk” operation in Iraq. Hunting out the pirates on land, however, would be no easier than hunting them out at sea, and the invading troops would be subject to growing hostility and violence which, in the long term, would force their withdrawal.
There are parallel reasons which can explain the current surge of piracy, and I think that the problem should be approached by analysing and tackling these issues, with an open mind and a willingness to admit past errors of judgement.
Somalia has been in a state of virtual anarchy since the early nineties. The reasons behind this are complex and unique, as I found out in the course of the years I spent as head of the Italian Diplomatic Delegation to Somalia and participated in the peace talks which were held in Kenya from 2001 to 2004.
Errors were doubtlessly committed by all, with no exception, during those long negotiations, but, in the end, for the first time in many years a Federal Constitution, an Assembly, a Government and a President did materialize with the full backing of the International Community.
The Institutions which emerged from the Conference proved, however, to be inadequate and, for many reasons which ought to be carefully analyzed, failed to bring about the stability and peace we all were hoping for. A state of total anarchy was circumvented by the appearance of the “Islamic Courts”, which brought about a semblance of order and social peace. Unfortunately the West has a tendency to knee-jerk reactions when it hears the term “Islamic”, and this autochthonous endeavour was violently subdued by the International Community, which added insult to injury by sending Christian troops to invade and subdue an Islamic Country, failing, moreover, to take into account the atavistic dislike and suspicion nurtured by the Somalis against the Ethiopians.
Recent events have brought the country back to a state of total anarchy, and I would not place excessive confidence of the present Government – certainly not representative and virtually devoid of authority – to restore order and to fulfil its tasks and obligations by actually governing the country. This weakness at the centre is, of course, the main cause of the current phenomenon, in that a Somali pirate can count on almost total immunity from any restraining or punitive action on the part of his Government.
It is certainly true that the growing number of young Somali men who have chosen this path are criminals, and dangerous criminals at that, but it must be borne in mind that they are also angry and desperate, and the causes of their anger and desperation ought to be examined and tackled. The cause of their anger goes well beyond the recent deployment of Ethiopian troops in Somalia, and has to do, on the one hand, with the massive and shameless exploitation of the waters they see as their own by foreign fishing fleets, and, perhaps principally, on the continuous use of their coasts as dumping grounds for toxic waste on the part of some European countries. In recent years an enterprising young Italian Journalist, Ilaria Alpi, was murdered, probably in connection with investigative reporting which she was carrying out on these and other subjects.
Their desperation is perhaps easier to understand, for there are few ways in which a young Somali can hope to make a living legally in his (or her) own country, as can be seen not only by the growing criminality, but also by the desperate and dangerous attempts to emigrate to foreign lands.
The problems caused by the Somali acts of piracy certainly constitute an immediate problem, and urgent measures have to be taken to protect the international shipping which legitimately uses those waters. This, however, would be useless without a serious attempt to resume intense negotiations with all the Somali interested parties – including the Islamic factions, which I frequently met and who are not (or should I say “not yet”) interested in acts of international terrorism.
I believe that a Conference should be convened as soon as possible, perhaps not in a neighbouring country, and a further serious attempt should be undertaken to eliminate the state of anarchy and to enable Somalis to undertake, with international help, the difficult task of reconstruction and reconciliation.
giovedì 19 marzo 2009
ITALY’S “NOUVELLE VAGUE” OF NEO - FASCISM
A glance, however cursory, at most of the world’s press gives the chilling sensation that the situation has gone out of hand and that Governments are no longer fully in control, no matter how determined and well-intentioned. The prime example comes to us from the United States, and I express my doubts not in a critical “anti-American”, or even “anti-establishment” frame of mind, but rather with the anguished thought that if president Obama, with the support enjoyed by him at this time, gives an impression of impotency in the path of an advancing juggernaut, what hope do weaker, less prosperous and less efficient Governments have?
Some – and the Italian Government is among them – appear to be seeking alternative strategies, which, in the light of historical precedent, are potentially dangerous and rather frightening. The idea is simple and not at all novel, for it has been used in the distant and recent past. It consists of building up an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, convincing the people that only a “strong” government, untrammelled by the inevitable intricacies associated with the Rule of Law, can bring about the country’s salvation. Around 100 B.C. this tactic was successfully used by Sulla, who thus contributed in the destruction of centuries of Roman republican rule and opened the door for the Empire and absolutism. It has been repeated, with variations, on many occasions and in many different societies, including the United States (the McCarthy years, the “terrorist threat, etc.), and, of course, in Italy and Germany in the twentieth century, paving the way for Fascist and Nazi rule.
If I concentrate attention on the Italian situation it is simply because Italy has had a historical tendency to act as a leader in many trends both positive (the Renaissance, architecture) and negative (Fascism, organised crime).
The current Italian Government is headed by Mr. Silvio Berlusconi, who is the owner of all the private TV networks which have a strong nation-wide appeal (there is only one exception, and it is being strongly discriminated against). As head of the Government he of course also has some say in the running of the very drab, predominantly idiotic, but much followed public TV networks. It is not surprising, therefore, that an atmosphere of subdued panic has so skilfully been created, particular care being taken – after staunch denials of either xenophobia or racism – to ensure that, in the public eye, the principal responsibility for the current atmosphere of insecurity lies with the immigrant community.
Many legislative and administrative measures have either been passed or are planned, which will do much to transform the very nature of democracy and of Italian society, usually considered rather open and permissive. Here are some examples, out of dozens:
- Medical staff, even in emergency wards, will have the obligation to report “illegal foreigners” who require treatment;
- children born of foreigners without residence permits will not be registered and will therefore not get a birth certificate;
- bands or posses of “unarmed volunteers” will be formed to patrol towns and cities by night in defence of “public order”;
These are just a few of a growing number of projected measures most of which will probably pass thanks to the current Government’s overpowering majority in both Houses of Parliament.
Italy has thus become the country of prohibitions, some of which are mind-boggling or bordering on the ridiculou: in some public parks it is forbidden to form groups of more than three people (“sedition”), in others anyone sitting on a park bench will have to prove either that he (or she) is an invalid or over the age of seventy (park benches have traditionally been used as resting places by the jobless or homeless, ergo, in today’s Italy, by “foreigners”).
The media are quick and eager to contribute to the image that the responsibility for all this “insecurity”, lies squarely and exclusively on the shoulders of foreigners living in Italy – at this time particularly Romanians. This is giving rise to an ever increasing number of xenophobic or racist incidents, some of which are extremely violent (an Indian homeless person was almost burned alive and an Eritrean youth was brutally beaten) and which do not meet much public disapproval.
In all this the Catholic Church, which, in Italy, has practically unlimited access to the media, plays an unpleasantly populist waiting game, occasionally rapping the Government’s knuckles over some perceived minor “misdeeds” against immigrants or the poor, but this only to gain support among the Catholic members of the hapless opposition Democratic Party, thus transforming it into a passive accomplice in the creation of a growing climate of repressive legislation. As a result Laws will be approved in the near future denying a terminally ill patient the liberty to refuse artificial life support.
A note of hope, however, can be sounded. This “Nouvelle Vague” of Italian neo-fascism is not the result of a deeply thought-out plot, and there is no sinister hidden figure pulling the strings. The very transformation of Italy’s society into a new “regime” would have to overcome a fundamental obstacle in the legendary inefficiency of the Government apparatus and of all endeavours which rely on Government support. Therefore, just as the Italian Banking system was saved from major disaster mainly because of its inefficient, slow moving and ponderous inability to react, so it can be hoped that the creation of a frightening police state will be held back by bureaucratic obstacles and the incurable Italian attachment to improvised solutions..
Some – and the Italian Government is among them – appear to be seeking alternative strategies, which, in the light of historical precedent, are potentially dangerous and rather frightening. The idea is simple and not at all novel, for it has been used in the distant and recent past. It consists of building up an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, convincing the people that only a “strong” government, untrammelled by the inevitable intricacies associated with the Rule of Law, can bring about the country’s salvation. Around 100 B.C. this tactic was successfully used by Sulla, who thus contributed in the destruction of centuries of Roman republican rule and opened the door for the Empire and absolutism. It has been repeated, with variations, on many occasions and in many different societies, including the United States (the McCarthy years, the “terrorist threat, etc.), and, of course, in Italy and Germany in the twentieth century, paving the way for Fascist and Nazi rule.
If I concentrate attention on the Italian situation it is simply because Italy has had a historical tendency to act as a leader in many trends both positive (the Renaissance, architecture) and negative (Fascism, organised crime).
The current Italian Government is headed by Mr. Silvio Berlusconi, who is the owner of all the private TV networks which have a strong nation-wide appeal (there is only one exception, and it is being strongly discriminated against). As head of the Government he of course also has some say in the running of the very drab, predominantly idiotic, but much followed public TV networks. It is not surprising, therefore, that an atmosphere of subdued panic has so skilfully been created, particular care being taken – after staunch denials of either xenophobia or racism – to ensure that, in the public eye, the principal responsibility for the current atmosphere of insecurity lies with the immigrant community.
Many legislative and administrative measures have either been passed or are planned, which will do much to transform the very nature of democracy and of Italian society, usually considered rather open and permissive. Here are some examples, out of dozens:
- Medical staff, even in emergency wards, will have the obligation to report “illegal foreigners” who require treatment;
- children born of foreigners without residence permits will not be registered and will therefore not get a birth certificate;
- bands or posses of “unarmed volunteers” will be formed to patrol towns and cities by night in defence of “public order”;
These are just a few of a growing number of projected measures most of which will probably pass thanks to the current Government’s overpowering majority in both Houses of Parliament.
Italy has thus become the country of prohibitions, some of which are mind-boggling or bordering on the ridiculou: in some public parks it is forbidden to form groups of more than three people (“sedition”), in others anyone sitting on a park bench will have to prove either that he (or she) is an invalid or over the age of seventy (park benches have traditionally been used as resting places by the jobless or homeless, ergo, in today’s Italy, by “foreigners”).
The media are quick and eager to contribute to the image that the responsibility for all this “insecurity”, lies squarely and exclusively on the shoulders of foreigners living in Italy – at this time particularly Romanians. This is giving rise to an ever increasing number of xenophobic or racist incidents, some of which are extremely violent (an Indian homeless person was almost burned alive and an Eritrean youth was brutally beaten) and which do not meet much public disapproval.
In all this the Catholic Church, which, in Italy, has practically unlimited access to the media, plays an unpleasantly populist waiting game, occasionally rapping the Government’s knuckles over some perceived minor “misdeeds” against immigrants or the poor, but this only to gain support among the Catholic members of the hapless opposition Democratic Party, thus transforming it into a passive accomplice in the creation of a growing climate of repressive legislation. As a result Laws will be approved in the near future denying a terminally ill patient the liberty to refuse artificial life support.
A note of hope, however, can be sounded. This “Nouvelle Vague” of Italian neo-fascism is not the result of a deeply thought-out plot, and there is no sinister hidden figure pulling the strings. The very transformation of Italy’s society into a new “regime” would have to overcome a fundamental obstacle in the legendary inefficiency of the Government apparatus and of all endeavours which rely on Government support. Therefore, just as the Italian Banking system was saved from major disaster mainly because of its inefficient, slow moving and ponderous inability to react, so it can be hoped that the creation of a frightening police state will be held back by bureaucratic obstacles and the incurable Italian attachment to improvised solutions..
martedì 3 marzo 2009
AFGHANISTAN: THE INEVITABILITY OF A GREEK TRAGEDY?
Summary
Afghanistan’s ancient history has Grecian - Macedonian elements, and some of its greatest cities (e.g. Herat) have been founded by Alexander the Great. Slight shifts in NATO and US policy seemed to offer a glimmer of hope, but recent developments paint a dark picture.
Text
Afghanistan keeps returning to the forefront of international attention, its prospects darker than ever. There can be no miracle cure and there will be no miracle worker, with the power and the ability of bringing about an appreciable change in a reasonably short term. The appointment of Richard Holbrooke does, however, justify some optimism, not only for his proven qualities as a tough negotiator, but also because of the backing he receives from an Administration whose utterances on the issue have been more pragmatic and less ideological than what we have been used to hearing. Further grounds for a more positive evaluation are the Afghan-Pakistani talks in Washington, even though the internal political situation in Pakistan gives little reason for excessive hope.
I met Ambassador Holbrooke in Afghanistan, some years ago, when I certainly had no idea that he would shortly be playing such an important role in the country. I was, at the time, very impressed at the idea of meeting him because I had spent six months in Bosnia from the beginning of January 1996: much of the Dayton agreement can and has been criticised, and the situation in Bosnia is certainly not solved, but, nevertheless, it was impressive to see people civilly seated round a table, who only a few weeks earlier had literally been at one another’s throats.
Ambassador Holbrooke has very probably understood that the first step in the attempt to find a solution to Afghanistan’s problems should, of course consist in trying to define what is meant by a “solution”, since a credible and realistic political plan, a “Nation Building” plan for Afghanistan, has never existed, certainly not since the unfortunate Soviet attempt to transform it into a Socialist Republic. At this stage it would seem much to late to implement one. The only plan left is to salvage what can be salvaged, in the attempt to put in place a structure which could somehow contain the activity of the Taliban, albeit without excluding them from the future power structure.
There are many pitfalls in this complex matter, and the greatest mistake of all would be to draw too many parallels between Iraq and Afghanistan: two totally different historical, political and military realities. It is a cause of particular apprehension that, citing the “success” (a debatable term, at best) of the “surge” in Iraq, some seem to persist in the belief that the numerical increase of the troops on the ground in Afghanistan by a few thousand units would actually help bring about a solution of the problem. In reality, this measure will probably only enhance US isolation, also in the eyes of the NATO partners who have shown no eagerness to contribute further combat units.
There, again, numbers do not tell the entire story. Many NATO countries justify their reluctance by pointing out that they already have a large number of troops on the ground, but, in reality, most of these are not combat troops, but basically units which serve as a security cover for civilian activities (The so-called “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” or PRT’s), and are seldom, if ever, by their own volition engaged in military confrontation with the insurgents.
Despite the insistence on the enhancement of the military presence, there seems to be, however, a growing consensus, both in the international media and among the principal world leaders, that a military solution in Afghanistan is practically impossible.
This is where strong international political leadership and guidance are greatly needed, because the situation, cannot be tackled without taking into urgent and serious consideration the following:
- Afghanistan is not a monolithic bloc but a very complex ethnic and tribal reality: this has to be kept in mind especially in matters concerning the future role of the Taliban, who are detested and feared in some areas (e.g. Herat and most of the North) and, instead, considered as rather representative in the East, in the neighborhood of the Pakistan border. In one way or another, however, they will have to be included in any political design for the future of Afghanistan.
- If it is true that the situation in Afghanistan depends very much on Pakistan’s ability to keep its own tribal areas in check, but the reverse is also true: Pakistan will not be able to maintain internal political stability unless the border issues with Afghanistan are finally tackled, to the point of always keeping in mind the question as to whether Pakistan can continue to exist as a Nation State within its present borders unless its is governed by a strong military dictatorship (which has been the case for most of Pakistan’s existence).
- The United States and NATO will not be able to solve the Afghan question without the cooperation of other interested parties. Should wider and stronger International involvement be called for, it would be sheer folly to exclude Iran, who is a major player – and not necessarily a negative player – on the Afghan scene. We must not forget that Persian – in a slightly modified version known as Dari – is one of Afghanistan’s two official languages.
- It will also be essential to tackle the problem of corruption with the greatest possible energy, because the level of corruption in today’s Afghanistan is actually creating a sense of nostalgia for the Taliban regime, which, though indubitably authoritarian and restrictive, had a reputation of incorruptibility.
Many other major problems - the Narcotics trade, just to mention one – remain on the table, but these cannot be taken into practical consideration until a decision is taken, and implemented, on the future status and position of Afghanistan.
These would be the words of advice that I would take the liberty of giving to Ambassador Holbrooke in the very unlikely event of meeting him again.
Afghanistan’s ancient history has Grecian - Macedonian elements, and some of its greatest cities (e.g. Herat) have been founded by Alexander the Great. Slight shifts in NATO and US policy seemed to offer a glimmer of hope, but recent developments paint a dark picture.
Text
Afghanistan keeps returning to the forefront of international attention, its prospects darker than ever. There can be no miracle cure and there will be no miracle worker, with the power and the ability of bringing about an appreciable change in a reasonably short term. The appointment of Richard Holbrooke does, however, justify some optimism, not only for his proven qualities as a tough negotiator, but also because of the backing he receives from an Administration whose utterances on the issue have been more pragmatic and less ideological than what we have been used to hearing. Further grounds for a more positive evaluation are the Afghan-Pakistani talks in Washington, even though the internal political situation in Pakistan gives little reason for excessive hope.
I met Ambassador Holbrooke in Afghanistan, some years ago, when I certainly had no idea that he would shortly be playing such an important role in the country. I was, at the time, very impressed at the idea of meeting him because I had spent six months in Bosnia from the beginning of January 1996: much of the Dayton agreement can and has been criticised, and the situation in Bosnia is certainly not solved, but, nevertheless, it was impressive to see people civilly seated round a table, who only a few weeks earlier had literally been at one another’s throats.
Ambassador Holbrooke has very probably understood that the first step in the attempt to find a solution to Afghanistan’s problems should, of course consist in trying to define what is meant by a “solution”, since a credible and realistic political plan, a “Nation Building” plan for Afghanistan, has never existed, certainly not since the unfortunate Soviet attempt to transform it into a Socialist Republic. At this stage it would seem much to late to implement one. The only plan left is to salvage what can be salvaged, in the attempt to put in place a structure which could somehow contain the activity of the Taliban, albeit without excluding them from the future power structure.
There are many pitfalls in this complex matter, and the greatest mistake of all would be to draw too many parallels between Iraq and Afghanistan: two totally different historical, political and military realities. It is a cause of particular apprehension that, citing the “success” (a debatable term, at best) of the “surge” in Iraq, some seem to persist in the belief that the numerical increase of the troops on the ground in Afghanistan by a few thousand units would actually help bring about a solution of the problem. In reality, this measure will probably only enhance US isolation, also in the eyes of the NATO partners who have shown no eagerness to contribute further combat units.
There, again, numbers do not tell the entire story. Many NATO countries justify their reluctance by pointing out that they already have a large number of troops on the ground, but, in reality, most of these are not combat troops, but basically units which serve as a security cover for civilian activities (The so-called “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” or PRT’s), and are seldom, if ever, by their own volition engaged in military confrontation with the insurgents.
Despite the insistence on the enhancement of the military presence, there seems to be, however, a growing consensus, both in the international media and among the principal world leaders, that a military solution in Afghanistan is practically impossible.
This is where strong international political leadership and guidance are greatly needed, because the situation, cannot be tackled without taking into urgent and serious consideration the following:
- Afghanistan is not a monolithic bloc but a very complex ethnic and tribal reality: this has to be kept in mind especially in matters concerning the future role of the Taliban, who are detested and feared in some areas (e.g. Herat and most of the North) and, instead, considered as rather representative in the East, in the neighborhood of the Pakistan border. In one way or another, however, they will have to be included in any political design for the future of Afghanistan.
- If it is true that the situation in Afghanistan depends very much on Pakistan’s ability to keep its own tribal areas in check, but the reverse is also true: Pakistan will not be able to maintain internal political stability unless the border issues with Afghanistan are finally tackled, to the point of always keeping in mind the question as to whether Pakistan can continue to exist as a Nation State within its present borders unless its is governed by a strong military dictatorship (which has been the case for most of Pakistan’s existence).
- The United States and NATO will not be able to solve the Afghan question without the cooperation of other interested parties. Should wider and stronger International involvement be called for, it would be sheer folly to exclude Iran, who is a major player – and not necessarily a negative player – on the Afghan scene. We must not forget that Persian – in a slightly modified version known as Dari – is one of Afghanistan’s two official languages.
- It will also be essential to tackle the problem of corruption with the greatest possible energy, because the level of corruption in today’s Afghanistan is actually creating a sense of nostalgia for the Taliban regime, which, though indubitably authoritarian and restrictive, had a reputation of incorruptibility.
Many other major problems - the Narcotics trade, just to mention one – remain on the table, but these cannot be taken into practical consideration until a decision is taken, and implemented, on the future status and position of Afghanistan.
These would be the words of advice that I would take the liberty of giving to Ambassador Holbrooke in the very unlikely event of meeting him again.
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