AFGHANISTAN: THE INEVITABILITY OF A GREEK TRAGEDY?

Summary

Afghanistan’s ancient history has Grecian - Macedonian elements, and some of its greatest cities (e.g. Herat) have been founded by Alexander the Great. Slight shifts in NATO and US policy seemed to offer a glimmer of hope, but recent developments paint a dark picture.

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Afghanistan keeps returning to the forefront of international attention, its prospects darker than ever. There can be no miracle cure and there will be no miracle worker, with the power and the ability of bringing about an appreciable change in a reasonably short term. The appointment of Richard Holbrooke does, however, justify some optimism, not only for his proven qualities as a tough negotiator, but also because of the backing he receives from an Administration whose utterances on the issue have been more pragmatic and less ideological than what we have been used to hearing. Further grounds for a more positive evaluation are the Afghan-Pakistani talks in Washington, even though the internal political situation in Pakistan gives little reason for excessive hope.

I met Ambassador Holbrooke in Afghanistan, some years ago, when I certainly had no idea that he would shortly be playing such an important role in the country. I was, at the time, very impressed at the idea of meeting him because I had spent six months in Bosnia from the beginning of January 1996: much of the Dayton agreement can and has been criticised, and the situation in Bosnia is certainly not solved, but, nevertheless, it was impressive to see people civilly seated round a table, who only a few weeks earlier had literally been at one another’s throats.

Ambassador Holbrooke has very probably understood that the first step in the attempt to find a solution to Afghanistan’s problems should, of course consist in trying to define what is meant by a “solution”, since a credible and realistic political plan, a “Nation Building” plan for Afghanistan, has never existed, certainly not since the unfortunate Soviet attempt to transform it into a Socialist Republic. At this stage it would seem much to late to implement one. The only plan left is to salvage what can be salvaged, in the attempt to put in place a structure which could somehow contain the activity of the Taliban, albeit without excluding them from the future power structure.

There are many pitfalls in this complex matter, and the greatest mistake of all would be to draw too many parallels between Iraq and Afghanistan: two totally different historical, political and military realities. It is a cause of particular apprehension that, citing the “success” (a debatable term, at best) of the “surge” in Iraq, some seem to persist in the belief that the numerical increase of the troops on the ground in Afghanistan by a few thousand units would actually help bring about a solution of the problem. In reality, this measure will probably only enhance US isolation, also in the eyes of the NATO partners who have shown no eagerness to contribute further combat units.

There, again, numbers do not tell the entire story. Many NATO countries justify their reluctance by pointing out that they already have a large number of troops on the ground, but, in reality, most of these are not combat troops, but basically units which serve as a security cover for civilian activities (The so-called “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” or PRT’s), and are seldom, if ever, by their own volition engaged in military confrontation with the insurgents.

Despite the insistence on the enhancement of the military presence, there seems to be, however, a growing consensus, both in the international media and among the principal world leaders, that a military solution in Afghanistan is practically impossible.

This is where strong international political leadership and guidance are greatly needed, because the situation, cannot be tackled without taking into urgent and serious consideration the following:


- Afghanistan is not a monolithic bloc but a very complex ethnic and tribal reality: this has to be kept in mind especially in matters concerning the future role of the Taliban, who are detested and feared in some areas (e.g. Herat and most of the North) and, instead, considered as rather representative in the East, in the neighborhood of the Pakistan border. In one way or another, however, they will have to be included in any political design for the future of Afghanistan.
- If it is true that the situation in Afghanistan depends very much on Pakistan’s ability to keep its own tribal areas in check, but the reverse is also true: Pakistan will not be able to maintain internal political stability unless the border issues with Afghanistan are finally tackled, to the point of always keeping in mind the question as to whether Pakistan can continue to exist as a Nation State within its present borders unless its is governed by a strong military dictatorship (which has been the case for most of Pakistan’s existence).
- The United States and NATO will not be able to solve the Afghan question without the cooperation of other interested parties. Should wider and stronger International involvement be called for, it would be sheer folly to exclude Iran, who is a major player – and not necessarily a negative player – on the Afghan scene. We must not forget that Persian – in a slightly modified version known as Dari – is one of Afghanistan’s two official languages.
- It will also be essential to tackle the problem of corruption with the greatest possible energy, because the level of corruption in today’s Afghanistan is actually creating a sense of nostalgia for the Taliban regime, which, though indubitably authoritarian and restrictive, had a reputation of incorruptibility.

Many other major problems - the Narcotics trade, just to mention one – remain on the table, but these cannot be taken into practical consideration until a decision is taken, and implemented, on the future status and position of Afghanistan.

These would be the words of advice that I would take the liberty of giving to Ambassador Holbrooke in the very unlikely event of meeting him again.