CASSANDRA

Cassandra, we know, was a tragic figure whose gift for prophesizing brought her only unhappiness and, ultimately, doom. There is, therefore, no sense of satisfaction, however grim, no hint of schadenfreude in those very few who, in the course of the past few years, have been trying to steer international opinion’s attention to the impending disaster in Afghanistan. The developing and extremely serious political crisis in Pakistan, as well as recent statements by president Karzai, extremely critical of NATO’s conduct, indicate that an urgent effort of basic reconsideration of NATO’s position is now long overdue.

Many well-known and respected columnists and commentators, formerly very obedient in supporting the constant and growingly hollow claims of success and victory broadcast by the NATO led military-civilian apparatus (one has to mention some notable exceptions to this rule, such as the BBC and Al Jazeera), have now started expressing doubts and even mentioning the existence of the “Durand Line”, albeit without really understanding its import: a remarkable discovery considering that this disputed border has been in existence since 1893 and has been at the root of many of Afghanistan’s problems, including the present day insurgency .

Only an objective appraisal of the situation will allow a correct assessment, and it is therefore essential to accept the fact that, as things now stand, NATO allies in Afghanistan are heading for political – if not necessarily military – disaster. The Allied presence on Afghan soil has actually strengthened the Taleban and turned it into a much more sophisticated – even “westernized” – entity, and this is not altogether a negative development because it could end up facilitating dialogue and negotiations. There are visible symptoms of this changing attitude, firstly the fact that Taleban fighters, once very reluctant to be photographed, now often allow themselves to be filmed and even to be interviewed on Television.

There is an apparently growing, though reluctant awareness of the noticeable deterioration of NATO’s position in Afghanistan, and the time has therefore obviously come to attempt to reconsider the options by assessing, first of all, whether the allied military presence in Afghanistan serves any purpose, and secondly, should this first assessment be favorable – as indeed it should be – freshly to analyze the situation and attempt to identify new strategies, not all of them necessarily military.

The primary fact to be considered is that this is a “war” that cannot be won on the battlefield, and that every new air strike which causes civilian casualties becomes a perfect recruiting tool for the Taleban. I recall that when I was serving in Herat (2005 – 2007) as Political Advisor to the Italian led Provincial Reconstruction Team, I did attempt, more than once, to point out that it would be a good idea to talk to the Taleban instead of only confronting them. I was then told, firmly and repeatedly, that, in the first place, the Allies “did not negotiate with terrorists”, and, secondly, that the Taleban “were not interested in negotiating or talking”.

The first of these principles, understandable as it is on moral grounds, should not be treated as a long term dogma directing all foreign policy actions: terrorist groups, in the past, following long and difficult negotiations, often mixed with or interrupted by violent action, have emerged and assumed legitimacy. The second statement was a totally false and unfounded fabrication, subsequently becoming one of the truisms fed to international opinion and generally accepted at face value: I, for example, found it very significant and interesting that, during my stay in Herat, I was cautiously but seriously approached by a Tribal Leader who claimed, and in all probability was, an emissary of Mullah Omar. I could not, of course, accept his invitation to travel to Kandahar with him to meet “the Elders” without instructions or guidance, which, though requested, never came.

The swift and dramatic deterioration of the situation in Pakistan ought to act as a further incentive to the occupying forces in Afghanistan and ought to be seen as the necessary catalyst needed to bring together many of the apparently unrelated strands which make up the fabric of Afghanistan’s, and the Region’s, crisis. Unless action is taken in the very near future, the situation will further deteriorate and the disaster which has been looming for many months will become reality. This would end up involving and damaging large strata of the population of Afghanistan, particularly in the West and the North of the Country, who see the return of the Taleban to power as an absolutely catastrophic development.

The momentum gained since the beginning of the year by the Taleban movement and its allies, both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, will certainly make negotiations much more difficult and problematic compared to even a few months ago. It is nonetheless essential radically to rethink the basis itself of NATO’s presence in that far away Country, employing, perhaps, also the advice of people who really know and are really capable of grasping the reality of the situation, and not primarily relying on some officially and universally acknowledged “armchair experts”, who base their competence on a few visits and on having read, in some cases even written, some articles or even a book or two on the subject.

The present crisis in Afghanistan has distant and complex roots and, by now, is only weakly related to “the war on terror”. Historical experience has shown the futility of seeking exclusively military solutions in that Country, no matter how many troops and sophisticated equipment are brought in. The time has therefore come to embark upon a difficult political and diplomatic venture, in the hope that it is not already too late.