It would seem impossible to hurt the feelings of a senior citizen who has seen everything, and some things twice, but BBC Prime has managed to hurt me deeply in a programme recently aired which tried to list the 50 dishes one must taste before dying.
The programme was pleasantly superficial and took the viewer all over the world, presenting items which even I had never heard of but which sounded tempting and interesting. In many cases the presentation was accompanied by a brief skit to introduce the atmosphere of the Country, Region or Town famous for the delicacy which was being presented.
When the moment came for Neapolitan Pizza, my Italian heart swelled with pride, and I thought that, finally, the BBC would be justified in bringing out its mandolins and serenading viewers to the tune of “O Sole Mio”, which it invariably plays when showing documentaries about the Dolomite Alps or the City of Venice (It would be like playing “My Old Kentucky Home” while showing pictures of Alaska).
The Leit Motif, instead was the Mafia, and the music, I believe, was based on the score of “The Godfather” while the screen was filled with sinister figures in dark glasses and mention was even made of horses’ heads.
I won’t go into the fact that Pizza has nothing to do with Sicily and that the Mafia has nothing to do with Naples: these are items of local lore of which foreigners can very easily and understandably be unaware. I do however deeply resent the fact that so often images of Italy are associated with, of all things, the Mafia, while my Country has so much to offer which is more interesting and even amusing,
The Mafia is a terrible phenomenon which has nothing amusing about it and which damages and degrades the people of Sicily in many ways. Many Magistrates and Police officers, as well as ordinary citizens, have been killed while trying to oppose the Mafia, and turning it into a light-hearted background for the presentation of Pizza is cruelly unjust and in bad taste,
mercoledì 31 dicembre 2008
SOMALIA: A NEVERENDING TRAGEDY
There exist, in the world, places in which nothing ever seems to happen. These blissful, sleepy Gardens of Eden are therefore generally ignored by the international media unless a natural disaster or an unexpected political upheaval brings them briefly into the limelight. Other places, instead, receive more attention than they appear to deserve – the case of Zimbabwe comes to mind – principally because of past ties with Colonial powers who are perhaps driven by a feeling of guilt towards their wayward heir.
In this context it is difficult to understand why Somalia receives only sporadic attention, concentrated mainly on the issue of piracy, while events inside that unhappy Country are often glossed over and seldom, if ever, the subject of informed analysis, except for unwarranted and uninformed expressions of fear and hostility on the subject of the Islamic Courts, These, instead, should be given careful and objective consideration, and should be called upon to play a role in the future of Somalia.
The last concerted international attempt to halt civil unrest in Somalia and to create the framework for a credible system of Government took place in Kenya (first in Eldoret, then in Mbagathi) between 2001 and 2004. I was part of that process, representing Italy which, as the former colonial power, was called upon to play a very significant role, although the actual negotiations were left to a selected group of Somali leaders (the so-called “War Lords”), and led by Kenya with the support of Somalia’s neighbours, Ethiopia and Djibouti.
The negotiations were long, complex and often frustrating, but at the end a Federal Constitution was agreed upon and a transitional Federal Government was selected.
It was quite evident, quite soon after the end of the Peace Conference, that the success of the negotiations was only apparent and that after all those months, little had been accomplished in the aim of restoring confidence and normality in Somalia.
In the course of the Conference I began to spot some essential flaws, but was unable to persuade my fellow observers on the validity of my doubts.
Above all, I was amazed at the almost hostile indifference shown to the Islamic delegates, with whom I, instead, had frequent and extremely instructive meetings: it is a sad fact that, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, the very word “Islamic” caused phobic, almost knee-jerk reactions in many western observers. In reality, the people I met with were men and women of considerable integrity and moderate views, displaying no overt signs of being “anti-Western”. They had not been able to eliminate but they had largely softened the problems arising from clan rivalry, and thus felt that they would be in a better position than a heterogeneous coalition of “War Lords” to pacify the Country and lead it on a path of normalisation and the restoration of law and order.
The second issue which alarmed me was the gaining momentum of international support for the candidature of Abdullahi Yussuf to the Presidency of Somalia, particularly because of his close and longstanding ties with Ethiopia. By this I mean no disrespect for the President, who is a man of intelligence, culture and wisdom, or for Ethiopia, an amazingly interesting and very pleasant Country heir to one of the world’s most ancient civilisations.
Many of the Somali participants at the Conference, however, did attempt to point out that Abdullahi Yussuf belonged to the “wrong” clan, and would have great difficulty establishing his power base in the Capital, Mogadiscio – in fact, he currently operates from Baioda, to the north, in his home region of Puntland. They also objected strongly to his ties with Ethiopia which, rightly or wrongly, is seen by most Somalis as their traditional enemy. It is a fact that the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia seems to have exacerbated rather than placated the situation.
An indication of the basic validity of these objectio0ns can also be found in president Yussuf’s decision to resign in coincidence with the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops. Who most probably also had the task to protect him and his position.
Fresh attempts should urgently be undertaken by the International Community to try to find a solution to the Somali problems, but this time the Islamic Courts should be given a significant role in the negotiations, without, of course, ignoring the interests and preoccupations of Ethiopia and other interested parties. It is my belief that only the involvement of a movement which seems able to get close to the local populations and has proven its capability in ensuring stability can provide the right formula and bring together people who, after all, are united by their strong religious faith.
In this context it is difficult to understand why Somalia receives only sporadic attention, concentrated mainly on the issue of piracy, while events inside that unhappy Country are often glossed over and seldom, if ever, the subject of informed analysis, except for unwarranted and uninformed expressions of fear and hostility on the subject of the Islamic Courts, These, instead, should be given careful and objective consideration, and should be called upon to play a role in the future of Somalia.
The last concerted international attempt to halt civil unrest in Somalia and to create the framework for a credible system of Government took place in Kenya (first in Eldoret, then in Mbagathi) between 2001 and 2004. I was part of that process, representing Italy which, as the former colonial power, was called upon to play a very significant role, although the actual negotiations were left to a selected group of Somali leaders (the so-called “War Lords”), and led by Kenya with the support of Somalia’s neighbours, Ethiopia and Djibouti.
The negotiations were long, complex and often frustrating, but at the end a Federal Constitution was agreed upon and a transitional Federal Government was selected.
It was quite evident, quite soon after the end of the Peace Conference, that the success of the negotiations was only apparent and that after all those months, little had been accomplished in the aim of restoring confidence and normality in Somalia.
In the course of the Conference I began to spot some essential flaws, but was unable to persuade my fellow observers on the validity of my doubts.
Above all, I was amazed at the almost hostile indifference shown to the Islamic delegates, with whom I, instead, had frequent and extremely instructive meetings: it is a sad fact that, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, the very word “Islamic” caused phobic, almost knee-jerk reactions in many western observers. In reality, the people I met with were men and women of considerable integrity and moderate views, displaying no overt signs of being “anti-Western”. They had not been able to eliminate but they had largely softened the problems arising from clan rivalry, and thus felt that they would be in a better position than a heterogeneous coalition of “War Lords” to pacify the Country and lead it on a path of normalisation and the restoration of law and order.
The second issue which alarmed me was the gaining momentum of international support for the candidature of Abdullahi Yussuf to the Presidency of Somalia, particularly because of his close and longstanding ties with Ethiopia. By this I mean no disrespect for the President, who is a man of intelligence, culture and wisdom, or for Ethiopia, an amazingly interesting and very pleasant Country heir to one of the world’s most ancient civilisations.
Many of the Somali participants at the Conference, however, did attempt to point out that Abdullahi Yussuf belonged to the “wrong” clan, and would have great difficulty establishing his power base in the Capital, Mogadiscio – in fact, he currently operates from Baioda, to the north, in his home region of Puntland. They also objected strongly to his ties with Ethiopia which, rightly or wrongly, is seen by most Somalis as their traditional enemy. It is a fact that the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia seems to have exacerbated rather than placated the situation.
An indication of the basic validity of these objectio0ns can also be found in president Yussuf’s decision to resign in coincidence with the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops. Who most probably also had the task to protect him and his position.
Fresh attempts should urgently be undertaken by the International Community to try to find a solution to the Somali problems, but this time the Islamic Courts should be given a significant role in the negotiations, without, of course, ignoring the interests and preoccupations of Ethiopia and other interested parties. It is my belief that only the involvement of a movement which seems able to get close to the local populations and has proven its capability in ensuring stability can provide the right formula and bring together people who, after all, are united by their strong religious faith.
domenica 28 dicembre 2008
The Gaza Tragedy
In the course of the predominantly one-sided reporting of the Gaza massacres (As far as I could see only BBC World, Al Jazeera and an independent Italian network, “Sky TG 24” have attempted to hear both sides of the issue), there is a question which is only rarely, and then rather timidly asked of the various, usually rather self-assured, if not arrogant, Israeli spokespersons, whose task it is to justify the massive, disproportionate raids in Gaza.
The question could be thus summarised: How many Israeli civilians have been killed or even slightly injured, in the past eighteen months because of the so-called “rain of Hamas Rockets” ? And how does that number compare to the Palestinian civilians killed or injured in the same period, even before the beginning of this new exercise in indiscriminate killing?
The answers are sometimes evasive, but usually stubbornly rooted in the “rain of rockets” mantra, and are followed by detailed explanations on how these strikes are “surgical” and are not aimed at the civilian population.
These strikes seem to be about as “surgical” as a sawn-off shotgun blast in the belly, and the disdain already shown by Israel in 2006 regarding the fate of non Jewish civilians does not seem to have abated.
As usual in Middle East affairs, there are innumerable sets of wheels within wheels, and it would be a mistake to attempt to give a clean bill of health to any one of the protagonists as, indeed, it would be a mistake do demonise Israel, Hamas, Iran or others attributing the entire responsibility of the bloodshed exclusively to them.
My feeling is that the Egyptians secretly relished the imminent Israeli action against Gaza, because they felt that they had been snubbed by Hamas in a recent attempt at organising Palestinian reconciliation talks in Egypt. Hamas seems to share this feeling because that’s the only possible explanation for their refusal to accept Egypt’s offer to help evacuate the wounded from the Strip.
The West Bank Authorities (Fatah) perhaps also did not mind the idea of a lesson being given to Hamas by the Israelis, and this would explain the initially tepid reaction by the Fatah presidency, who at first attributed the main responsibility to Hamas.
Both Egypt and Fatah, however, were probably jolted by the ferocity and the extent of the attack, as well as the growing resentment that built up in many Arab Countries as well as Iran, and so they have now joined their voices in condemning the Israeli attack,
It is difficult to see what the final outcome of this episode will be, but it will certainly result in an accumulation of hatred and resentment which will make any further attempts at pacification even more difficult for the incoming Obama administration in the United States.
The question could be thus summarised: How many Israeli civilians have been killed or even slightly injured, in the past eighteen months because of the so-called “rain of Hamas Rockets” ? And how does that number compare to the Palestinian civilians killed or injured in the same period, even before the beginning of this new exercise in indiscriminate killing?
The answers are sometimes evasive, but usually stubbornly rooted in the “rain of rockets” mantra, and are followed by detailed explanations on how these strikes are “surgical” and are not aimed at the civilian population.
These strikes seem to be about as “surgical” as a sawn-off shotgun blast in the belly, and the disdain already shown by Israel in 2006 regarding the fate of non Jewish civilians does not seem to have abated.
As usual in Middle East affairs, there are innumerable sets of wheels within wheels, and it would be a mistake to attempt to give a clean bill of health to any one of the protagonists as, indeed, it would be a mistake do demonise Israel, Hamas, Iran or others attributing the entire responsibility of the bloodshed exclusively to them.
My feeling is that the Egyptians secretly relished the imminent Israeli action against Gaza, because they felt that they had been snubbed by Hamas in a recent attempt at organising Palestinian reconciliation talks in Egypt. Hamas seems to share this feeling because that’s the only possible explanation for their refusal to accept Egypt’s offer to help evacuate the wounded from the Strip.
The West Bank Authorities (Fatah) perhaps also did not mind the idea of a lesson being given to Hamas by the Israelis, and this would explain the initially tepid reaction by the Fatah presidency, who at first attributed the main responsibility to Hamas.
Both Egypt and Fatah, however, were probably jolted by the ferocity and the extent of the attack, as well as the growing resentment that built up in many Arab Countries as well as Iran, and so they have now joined their voices in condemning the Israeli attack,
It is difficult to see what the final outcome of this episode will be, but it will certainly result in an accumulation of hatred and resentment which will make any further attempts at pacification even more difficult for the incoming Obama administration in the United States.
The Return of the Little Father
BBC World, one of my favourite news and information channels, has been expressing surprise, even dismay and disapproval, at the perception that Russians feel nostalgia for Stalin, who is generally considered one of the most murderous and sinister leaders of the Twentieth Century.
I can understand the dismay and disapproval – albeit only up to a point – but I cannot understand the surprise.
I was in the former Soviet Union (Uzbekistan) in the early nineties, and I was then amazed at the nostalgia openly expressed by the large Russian minority – but also by a number of Uzbeks – for the times when the Soviet Union was a powerful member of the International Community and, above all, instrumental (in their view an indispensable contribution) to the defeat of Nazi Germany.
I am also old enough to remember the scenes of mass grief – almost hysteria – which marked Stalin’s funeral, and it is certain that no Soviet or Russian leader ever achieved - in Russian eyes – his stature until, that is, the present day, when Vladimir Putin seems to be a Twenty-first Century heir to the “Little Father”, the “Man of Steel”.
Disconcerting though it may seem to Westerners, it makes sense from the Russian point of view, and could well colour future Russian attitudes and actions.
I can understand the dismay and disapproval – albeit only up to a point – but I cannot understand the surprise.
I was in the former Soviet Union (Uzbekistan) in the early nineties, and I was then amazed at the nostalgia openly expressed by the large Russian minority – but also by a number of Uzbeks – for the times when the Soviet Union was a powerful member of the International Community and, above all, instrumental (in their view an indispensable contribution) to the defeat of Nazi Germany.
I am also old enough to remember the scenes of mass grief – almost hysteria – which marked Stalin’s funeral, and it is certain that no Soviet or Russian leader ever achieved - in Russian eyes – his stature until, that is, the present day, when Vladimir Putin seems to be a Twenty-first Century heir to the “Little Father”, the “Man of Steel”.
Disconcerting though it may seem to Westerners, it makes sense from the Russian point of view, and could well colour future Russian attitudes and actions.
giovedì 25 dicembre 2008
CASSANDRA
Cassandra, we know, was a tragic figure whose gift for prophesizing brought her only unhappiness and, ultimately, doom. There is, therefore, no sense of satisfaction, however grim, no hint of schadenfreude in those very few who, in the course of the past few years, have been trying to steer international opinion’s attention to the impending disaster in Afghanistan. The developing and extremely serious political crisis in Pakistan, as well as recent statements by president Karzai, extremely critical of NATO’s conduct, indicate that an urgent effort of basic reconsideration of NATO’s position is now long overdue.
Many well-known and respected columnists and commentators, formerly very obedient in supporting the constant and growingly hollow claims of success and victory broadcast by the NATO led military-civilian apparatus (one has to mention some notable exceptions to this rule, such as the BBC and Al Jazeera), have now started expressing doubts and even mentioning the existence of the “Durand Line”, albeit without really understanding its import: a remarkable discovery considering that this disputed border has been in existence since 1893 and has been at the root of many of Afghanistan’s problems, including the present day insurgency .
Only an objective appraisal of the situation will allow a correct assessment, and it is therefore essential to accept the fact that, as things now stand, NATO allies in Afghanistan are heading for political – if not necessarily military – disaster. The Allied presence on Afghan soil has actually strengthened the Taleban and turned it into a much more sophisticated – even “westernized” – entity, and this is not altogether a negative development because it could end up facilitating dialogue and negotiations. There are visible symptoms of this changing attitude, firstly the fact that Taleban fighters, once very reluctant to be photographed, now often allow themselves to be filmed and even to be interviewed on Television.
There is an apparently growing, though reluctant awareness of the noticeable deterioration of NATO’s position in Afghanistan, and the time has therefore obviously come to attempt to reconsider the options by assessing, first of all, whether the allied military presence in Afghanistan serves any purpose, and secondly, should this first assessment be favorable – as indeed it should be – freshly to analyze the situation and attempt to identify new strategies, not all of them necessarily military.
The primary fact to be considered is that this is a “war” that cannot be won on the battlefield, and that every new air strike which causes civilian casualties becomes a perfect recruiting tool for the Taleban. I recall that when I was serving in Herat (2005 – 2007) as Political Advisor to the Italian led Provincial Reconstruction Team, I did attempt, more than once, to point out that it would be a good idea to talk to the Taleban instead of only confronting them. I was then told, firmly and repeatedly, that, in the first place, the Allies “did not negotiate with terrorists”, and, secondly, that the Taleban “were not interested in negotiating or talking”.
The first of these principles, understandable as it is on moral grounds, should not be treated as a long term dogma directing all foreign policy actions: terrorist groups, in the past, following long and difficult negotiations, often mixed with or interrupted by violent action, have emerged and assumed legitimacy. The second statement was a totally false and unfounded fabrication, subsequently becoming one of the truisms fed to international opinion and generally accepted at face value: I, for example, found it very significant and interesting that, during my stay in Herat, I was cautiously but seriously approached by a Tribal Leader who claimed, and in all probability was, an emissary of Mullah Omar. I could not, of course, accept his invitation to travel to Kandahar with him to meet “the Elders” without instructions or guidance, which, though requested, never came.
The swift and dramatic deterioration of the situation in Pakistan ought to act as a further incentive to the occupying forces in Afghanistan and ought to be seen as the necessary catalyst needed to bring together many of the apparently unrelated strands which make up the fabric of Afghanistan’s, and the Region’s, crisis. Unless action is taken in the very near future, the situation will further deteriorate and the disaster which has been looming for many months will become reality. This would end up involving and damaging large strata of the population of Afghanistan, particularly in the West and the North of the Country, who see the return of the Taleban to power as an absolutely catastrophic development.
The momentum gained since the beginning of the year by the Taleban movement and its allies, both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, will certainly make negotiations much more difficult and problematic compared to even a few months ago. It is nonetheless essential radically to rethink the basis itself of NATO’s presence in that far away Country, employing, perhaps, also the advice of people who really know and are really capable of grasping the reality of the situation, and not primarily relying on some officially and universally acknowledged “armchair experts”, who base their competence on a few visits and on having read, in some cases even written, some articles or even a book or two on the subject.
The present crisis in Afghanistan has distant and complex roots and, by now, is only weakly related to “the war on terror”. Historical experience has shown the futility of seeking exclusively military solutions in that Country, no matter how many troops and sophisticated equipment are brought in. The time has therefore come to embark upon a difficult political and diplomatic venture, in the hope that it is not already too late.
Many well-known and respected columnists and commentators, formerly very obedient in supporting the constant and growingly hollow claims of success and victory broadcast by the NATO led military-civilian apparatus (one has to mention some notable exceptions to this rule, such as the BBC and Al Jazeera), have now started expressing doubts and even mentioning the existence of the “Durand Line”, albeit without really understanding its import: a remarkable discovery considering that this disputed border has been in existence since 1893 and has been at the root of many of Afghanistan’s problems, including the present day insurgency .
Only an objective appraisal of the situation will allow a correct assessment, and it is therefore essential to accept the fact that, as things now stand, NATO allies in Afghanistan are heading for political – if not necessarily military – disaster. The Allied presence on Afghan soil has actually strengthened the Taleban and turned it into a much more sophisticated – even “westernized” – entity, and this is not altogether a negative development because it could end up facilitating dialogue and negotiations. There are visible symptoms of this changing attitude, firstly the fact that Taleban fighters, once very reluctant to be photographed, now often allow themselves to be filmed and even to be interviewed on Television.
There is an apparently growing, though reluctant awareness of the noticeable deterioration of NATO’s position in Afghanistan, and the time has therefore obviously come to attempt to reconsider the options by assessing, first of all, whether the allied military presence in Afghanistan serves any purpose, and secondly, should this first assessment be favorable – as indeed it should be – freshly to analyze the situation and attempt to identify new strategies, not all of them necessarily military.
The primary fact to be considered is that this is a “war” that cannot be won on the battlefield, and that every new air strike which causes civilian casualties becomes a perfect recruiting tool for the Taleban. I recall that when I was serving in Herat (2005 – 2007) as Political Advisor to the Italian led Provincial Reconstruction Team, I did attempt, more than once, to point out that it would be a good idea to talk to the Taleban instead of only confronting them. I was then told, firmly and repeatedly, that, in the first place, the Allies “did not negotiate with terrorists”, and, secondly, that the Taleban “were not interested in negotiating or talking”.
The first of these principles, understandable as it is on moral grounds, should not be treated as a long term dogma directing all foreign policy actions: terrorist groups, in the past, following long and difficult negotiations, often mixed with or interrupted by violent action, have emerged and assumed legitimacy. The second statement was a totally false and unfounded fabrication, subsequently becoming one of the truisms fed to international opinion and generally accepted at face value: I, for example, found it very significant and interesting that, during my stay in Herat, I was cautiously but seriously approached by a Tribal Leader who claimed, and in all probability was, an emissary of Mullah Omar. I could not, of course, accept his invitation to travel to Kandahar with him to meet “the Elders” without instructions or guidance, which, though requested, never came.
The swift and dramatic deterioration of the situation in Pakistan ought to act as a further incentive to the occupying forces in Afghanistan and ought to be seen as the necessary catalyst needed to bring together many of the apparently unrelated strands which make up the fabric of Afghanistan’s, and the Region’s, crisis. Unless action is taken in the very near future, the situation will further deteriorate and the disaster which has been looming for many months will become reality. This would end up involving and damaging large strata of the population of Afghanistan, particularly in the West and the North of the Country, who see the return of the Taleban to power as an absolutely catastrophic development.
The momentum gained since the beginning of the year by the Taleban movement and its allies, both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, will certainly make negotiations much more difficult and problematic compared to even a few months ago. It is nonetheless essential radically to rethink the basis itself of NATO’s presence in that far away Country, employing, perhaps, also the advice of people who really know and are really capable of grasping the reality of the situation, and not primarily relying on some officially and universally acknowledged “armchair experts”, who base their competence on a few visits and on having read, in some cases even written, some articles or even a book or two on the subject.
The present crisis in Afghanistan has distant and complex roots and, by now, is only weakly related to “the war on terror”. Historical experience has shown the futility of seeking exclusively military solutions in that Country, no matter how many troops and sophisticated equipment are brought in. The time has therefore come to embark upon a difficult political and diplomatic venture, in the hope that it is not already too late.
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