domenica 29 aprile 2012
AFGHANISTAN - THE ULTIMATE TRAGEDY
Cassandra, we are told, felt no joy at predicting calamities. Reality, in Afghanistan, is proving to be worse than the most pessimistic predictions, and this is not a motive of satisfaction for those who foretold disaster.
The recent, concerted attacks on Kabul itself indicate that this disaster could be even closer than was thought.
It was in the winter of 2006 that many objective observers, some of them, such as myself, in Afghanistan, realised that the tide was turning, and that ultimate military “victory” had eluded the present occupiers, just as, in the past, it had eluded others.
Even as late as the summer of 2007, there could perhaps still have been room for successful negotiation with the Taleban, who had not as yet shown signs of having as strong and widespread an organization as they have now. The NATO allies, however, chose enhanced – and ultimately unsuccessful - military action, without enunciating a clear and credible set of realistic war aims apart from the destruction of the enemy.
Now that no alternatives appear to a policy of more or less decorous withdrawal, the immensity of the tragedy brought upon Afghanistan finally comes to light and the real risk is leaving the Afghan people in a situation far worse than at the time of the invasion.
It is an undeniable fact that a great number of Afghans, particularly but not exclusively women, were relieved at the apparent end of the Taleban regime which, greeted at first with approval, had really brought civil society to its knees, annulling the undeniable progress which had taken place in the waning years of the Monarchy, In the short life of the “Socialist Republic” and even, with due reservations, during the Soviet occupation.
A great number of Afghans, therefore, for the most part motivated by a genuine feeling of hope, freely chose to cooperate with the invading forces, thus actively participating – especially in Kabul, in the North and in the West of the country – in the rebuilding of their society. It was heartening to see adult women taking advantage of the newly obtained freedom in order to compensate for the years of deprivation by resuming the process of education, as, indeed, was the sight of schoolgirls, smartly attired in their uniforms, marching off to classes from which they had been banned by the preceding regime.
It was also pleasantly instructive, in the Autumn of 2005, to follow, as a Monitor, the regional elections, in a rather far away and isolated post to the west of the country, near the Iranian border. No western military presence was requested and none was needed, for the electoral process took place in an atmosphere of quiet determination, with a large turnout, both male and female.
To ask what went wrong, or where did we miss the opportunity of preventing disaster is as fatuous a question as the “Who Lost China” question was in the U.S.A. of the fifties and sixties. It is far more useful to attempt to analyse whether any options are left to prevent a massive retaliation upon the departure of the last NATO troops, for which only belated and far from encouraging preparations are being made.
Once the Taleban return to power, there will be a very large number of Afghans – primarily, but not only, women – who will be left to pay a heavy price for their “collaboration with the enemy”, and this seems an almost inevitable legacy left by the hurried, unwise and poorly planned invasion of 2001.
The military mission in Afghanistan is well beyond recovery, and any last effort by the NATO forces must concentrate on the safety of the civilians left behind.
The Soviet Union faced a similar problem when they left, and, for a time, were able to protect the Najibullah government by controlling the skies from neighbouring Central Asian bases: this protection came to a violent end with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and Civil war ensued.
At this stage, negotiations with the Taleban appear even more futile than before, and any promises made by them will almost certainly be broken as soon as they regain full control of the country. The solution found by the Soviet Union would be difficult because there is no neighbouring haven from which the Taleban’s activities could be controlled. Leaving a “friendly” government – either Karzai or another political figure – in control would be a very short-lived solution, and it is difficult to predict a positive outcome of the inevitable NATO withdrawal.
The alternative, bleak though it may seem, appears to be between a strong Taleban-controlled government, it is to be hoped more moderate than the preceding one, or a renewal of the civil war which followed the Soviet withdrawal and came to an uncertain end only with the Taleban takeover.
Afghan civil society faces tremendous hardships: it is difficult to imagine, for example, what will become of the numerous female NGO’s created over these past years, and which have undertaken a tremendous task of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Nor is it easy to think of all those Afghan civilians – men and women – who have been working,, steadfastly and loyally – with the ISAF civilian-military organizations (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRT’s) scattered around the country. Their future looks bleak indeed, and there is little left except hope. But hope, in itself, is not usually creative.
Scenarios for Italy’s political future: a resurgent role for the Roman Catholic Church
Rome, April 26, 2012
Italy’s current struggle to overcome a crisis of proportions unprecedented in the post-war decades has stimulated considerable comment in the international media. Few have noted, however, that the principal beneficiary of the current social and political turmoil could well turn out to be the Roman Catholic Church, ever present in the Italian political scene, and whose influence is certainly destined to grow.
Over the centuries, the Church has played a relevant, often violently divisive role in the destinies of the Italian Peninsula. This role, relatively subdued in the first years of Italy’s independence and even during the Fascist regime, emerged with renewed vigour in the post war years taking full advantage of apprehensions aroused by Communist takeovers in many Central European Countries. As a result, Catholic political figures dominated the Italian scene for well over two decades after the end of the War..
The dramatic demise of what has been inaccurately called Italy’s “First Republic” took place in the nineteen nineties, as the end of the “Cold War” coincided with the upheaval caused by a growing number of vigorous investigations of corruption on the part of the leading political parties. The Catholic oriented “Christian Democratic” party, which had participated in all the post-war Governments, leading most of them, was particularly exposed and, as a result, it imploded and ceased to exist, causing an authentic “Diaspora” of its leading figures towards either ignominious retirement or the many newly formed political groupings.
If this ensured the political survival of many Catholic leaders, it did, however, weaken the presence of the Church, which no longer had a single and reliable interlocutor in the Italian Parliament or Government.
In reality, however, even before that, ever since the mid - Seventies , the influence of the Church in Italy had already been waning and had suffered setbacks unimaginable only a few years earlier, particularly the resounding defeats in popular referenda on the controversial issues of divorce and abortion. Since then, the Church has had to struggle hard – with the help of much of the Italian political establishment and also the public radio and television outlets – to regain the position of moral and political supremacy to which it feels entitled.
Recent events have unexpectedly reversed the negative trend and appear set to pave the way for the Vatican’s resurgence as a leading player on the Italian political scene.
In mid-Autumn of last year, the economic and financial situation in Italy appeared to be reeling out of control, and signs of incipient political unrest led many to fear the country was heading for disaster. Professor Mario Monti, a respected and well-known personality with no political affiliation was then asked to form a “technical” government, composed exclusively of unelected personalities, also seen as a-political.
Attention has since been focussed on Italy’s unusual situation, and on Professor Monti’s numerous accomplishments and occasional setbacks, while the growing symptoms of the strong, steadily waxing resurgence of the Roman Catholic Church as a political actor has gone virtually unnoticed.
It is worth recalling that, with the appearance and electoral triumph of the populist Silvio Berlusconi in 1994, the Church had found itself in a quandary, and had reluctantly opted for support of Berlusconi – in spite of his rather sketchy claims to Catholic orthodoxy – in exchange for a growing number of legislative and monetary benefits. This rather cynical attitude – a form of “real-politick” not new to the Vatican – in the long run risked alienating the support of grass-roots Catholics, who grew restive at the apparent acquiescence of the Church and the Italian Bishops Conference at behaviour patterns which appeared to grow ever more blatant and unacceptable in the course of time.
In the month of May of last year, Mr Berlusconi's party - along with practically all the other mainstream political parties – suffered unexpected and undeniable debacles both in local elections (Milan and Naples) and in the massive turnout of the Italian electorate at referenda which the Government had openly opposed. The disaster suffered by Berlusconi quite evidently persuaded the Church to modify its position, and it is interesting to notice how the lack of support from the Church ultimately brought about Mr. Berlusconi’s downfall, with key members of his party abandoning ship and drifting towards the political centre. Meanwhile, the persistent popular approval of the staunchly Catholic Professor Monti seemed to indicate the way forward, and to open the way for a Centrist gathering of political leaders whose positions are close to those preferred by the Church and the Bishops’ Conference.
There is, at present, much confusion and uncertainty in Italy, particularly among the established political parties, which now seem to have reached an all-time low in the approval rating by the country’s electorate (apparently under 10%). This condition, somewhat astounding in the land which coined the expression “Partitocrazia”, has induced leading Catholic political figures, on the right and on the left, to converge towards the centre, thus ensuring a more dynamic, integrated and efficient presence of the Church on the political scene.
In spite of the apparent calm, and the seemingly hapless bluster of the discredited political parties, Italy’s traditional volatility still endures and it is therefore difficult clearly to envisage future trends. It is improbable, however, that either Professor Monti or most of his government colleagues will be tempted to undertake a political career, even though present polls would encourage them in this prospect, and it therefore seems that, in 2013 (or, perhaps, earlier), the Italian electorate will be called upon to choose among the existing political parties and politicians. A new, openly “Christian” formation could well upset the balance and bring the Church back to the centre of Italian political life.
Surprisingly, this process, which until recently seemed a relatively distant prospect, has already begun, even before the rather crucial local elections scheduled for the month of May. The leading, and highly influential, Catholic dominated centrist party (the “U.D.C.”, led by a darkly handsome political opportunist, Ferdinando Casini – one of the few capable politicians left in Italy) has announced its dissolution and an imminent change of name: a considerable group of Catholic Parliamentarians belonging to Berlusconi’s majority party have already publicly shown interest, while the other, minor, centrist groups seem to have been caught off balance and face little alternative to joining the new formation.
This development, coupled with the existential crisis which has greatly weakened the xenophobic, even at times racist, Northern League has enhanced the political parties’ self confidence, and there are growing and persistent rumours of early elections, with the month of October set as a possible date. Whenever the next elections are held – they will be mandatory in the Spring of 2013 – this new formation will surely play a leading role, finally returning the Roman Catholic Church as a principal player on the Italian political scene.
In the broader, international context, this will mean that Italy would even further distance itself from the growingly secular attitudes of most other European Union Countries, while much of the social progress, limited and slow as it may have been, achieved in the past decades will be the object of open attempts at abolition or, at least, revision. The prospect, endorsed by president Napolitano, of having a woman as the next Head of State would also drift further into the future since both of the two leading prospective female candidates are vehemently opposed by the Catholic Hierarchy.
Grim as this prospect may appear, it would certainly be a development preferable to the opportunity which the existing political void could give to unscrupulous populist movements, aiming to prey upon the voters’ insecurity and anger.
martedì 6 marzo 2012
The December 2011 Bonn Conference: A farewell to Afghanistan?
This article was published by "Open Democracy" in February 2012
In December 2001, just over ten years ago, allegedly in the “wake of rapid victory”, a much heralded International Conference on Afghanistan took place in Bonn, the actual, original “Small Town in Germany”. Its task consisted mainly of setting up a future road-map for that unfortunate Central Asian country torn by years of Foreign invasion and civil war. A “Democratic” constitution was drawn up, and many extremely sagacious decisions were taken, including the creation of an “International Security Assistance Force”, or “ISAF” to oversee and guide Afghanistan towards peace, stability and development, through a rather novel type of “Civilian-Military cooperation”, which, although perhaps well-intentioned, proved to be unwieldy and therefore only partially successful.. Some viewed this as an audacious leap into the future. Realists, however, preferred to think of it rather as a brave, perhaps utopian attempt to reset the Afghan calendar to a situation at least as promising as it appeared before the Soviet invasion of 1979.
At the time, even old Afghan hands who had been sceptical and apprehensive of the West’s military involvement in that difficult mountain state, traditionally inhospitable to foreign invaders, had greeted the Bonn Conference with relief and some optimism. After all – as president Bush himself solemnly assured us – the enemy was “on the run”, and the military problem in Afghanistan appeared to be practically solved, with only civilian reconstruction tasks remaining.
In the light of subsequent developments – after an initial period of moderately justified confidence – the Bonn Conference of last December 5 can be viewed only with profound scepticism and more than a touch of melancholia. Indeed, in spite of the forced note of official optimism, echoed by a waning number of the more obedient International Media, there are reasons to believe that this will most probably be the final curtain call for the West’s involvement in the very gloomy and apparently hopeless Afghan picture.
The aims of the 2011 Conference, although set out very clearly, aroused only tepid interest. Among scores of participants (85 States, plus the United Nations and 15 International Organizations) the absence of two – Pakistan and the Taliban – who would certainly have had an important role to play, further diminished the meeting’s credibility. The absence of Pakistan, who boycotted the conference because of a recent NATO air strike on its territory was certainly a blow , and note should be taken of the refusal of the Taliban to participate, even though, in reality, no invitation to them was ever extended.
The Conference, as expected, produced many high-toned documents and declarations on both the military and civilian future of Afghanistan: It was, however, evident that there was little connection between what was being stated in Bonn and the realities on the ground, both in terms of NATO’s military position and, even more blatantly, of the complicated process of transfer of civilian power to the Afghans.
It is an historical fact that military cooperation among allies is never easy, even when the war aims are clear and interests coincide (it is enough to remember the great problems besetting the Anglo-American alliance in the waning months of World War II, both in Italy and in Normandy). This was particularly noticeable in Afghanistan, since the early years of the NATO intervention. Apart from the United States, with their “Enduring Freedom” operation, a large number of European and NATO countries participated, some with sizeable contingents, others with a more symbolic presence. The “chain of command” was uncertain, and each military contingent kept to its own agenda and rules of engagement, thus favouring a state of confusion among the civilian populations and facilitating the penetration of insurgent forces. One of the important side-effects of the prolonged foreign military presence in Afghanistan was the birth and rapid burgeoning of terrorism, which had not existed before (the Taliban, however distasteful their policies may appear, were not a “terrorist” organization, and the early episodes of suicide attacks were perpetrated mainly by young Arabs or Pakistanis). The situation was certainly not helped by obvious uncertainty regarding the actual war aims of the NATO forces.
The original, exclusive, war aim put forward to justify the invasion of Afghanistan was to “get” Osama Bin Laden. This was achieved ten years later, in another country, with Bin Laden by then perhaps more of a symbolic figure than a real threat. An impressive subsequent string of alternative “war aims”, none of which either convincing or even partially successful, were subsequently presented to explain the need of a continued and growing Western presence in Afghanistan.
It is amazing, even appalling, to consider, today, that behind the theatrically arrogant sabre-rattling in the aftermath of 9/11, there apparently was only minimal political or strategic planning. Important and profound historical realities were apparently not taken into consideration before embarking on a military venture in an environment which had proved fatal to many invaders, including the British Empire and the Soviet Union.. Some of the most essential aspects, such as the inevitability and complexity of Pakistan’s involvement, were treated very superficially, perhaps even overlooked. When Richard Holbrooke, years later, tried to tackle the matter, events had already taken a definite turn for the worse and were probably beyond the control of either ISAF or the United States.
A potentially sinister and dangerous consequence of this has been the threat of the destabilization of Pakistan, all the more perilous because of Pakistan’s modern and well-equipped nuclear arsenal, which must absolutely not fall into the “wrong” hands.
One of the very first issues which ought to have been tackled, as soon as Pakistan’s involvement appeared inevitable, was the persistent border problem raised by the infamous 1894 “Durand Line”. No Afghan government has ever recognized this border, and also the local populations in Pakistan's North West Frontier area do not see it as a real barrier to their movements. For an appreciable amount of time the present conflict has had this porous, traditionally perilous border area as one of its focal points, but there is no evidence of the problem having been taken into serious consideration either in 2001 or ever since, except, perhaps, from an exclusively military point of view.
At the present stage it is probably too late to emerge from Afghanistan having achieved even an acceptably honourable defeat, and only a belated, rigorous attempt at a totally new approach to the problem, beginning with an open minded assessment of past errors and miscalculations, eschewing trite repetitions of pious intents, could perhaps avoid total disaster and humiliation.
The current tendency of hurling accusations of “duplicity” and “treachery” at Pakistan, along with the continued dissemination of rhetorical declarations and shibboleths, coupled with patently false and self-serving versions of past events (including the origins of the Taliban) will, instead, in no way contribute to clarify the situation, which now, more than ever before, demands a clear-headed assessment.
The accusation of “duplicitous” behaviour levelled at Pakistan takes many forms. Most recently it has been stated that the Pakistani armed forces have taken military action against the Taliban in Pakistan, but are reluctant to do so on Afghan territory. This would appear as the result of a reasonable Pakistani analysis of its own national interests, rather than the proof of double-dealing. The Pakistani Taliban are hostile to the Islamabad Government, which they accuse of being far too submissive to U.S. demands, while the Taliban in Afghanistan could well be an influential component of a future Afghan government, and would certainly remember any aggressive military action taken against them: Pakistan can ill afford to have a antagonistic neighbour to its North-West, and Islamabad’s view of itself as surrounded by hostile forces - whether justified or not – cannot be ignored and needs to be respected.
Several new elements are added, almost daily, to worsen the complexity of the situation, and certainly the persevering rumours of an imminent military coup in Islamabad do little to clarify matters. The continued, insistent use of pilotless drones – the surgical precision of which can easily be questioned – has added a new dimension to the hostility with which the entire operation is viewed in Pakistan, while, in Afghanistan itself, the recent murder of four French ISAF military personnel on a training mission by one of their Afghan trainees serves to show that hopes of leaving the country in a sufficiently stable state are unrealistic.
It is perhaps too late, at this stage, to reconsider the entire venture and to bring it to a relatively peaceful and dignified end. When the Soviet troops left, after a ten year occupation, marching across the bridge on the Oxus, they, at least, were going “home”, and, above all, to a place from which they could indirectly protect the puppet government they left behind – this, naturally, only until the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is no comfortable, nearby place from which the NATO allies can exercise this kind of immediate, close range surveillance and protection of whatever political structure they will be leaving behind in Afghanistan: the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia cannot be considered dependable and the nearest alternative, Turkey, is already quite a way off. It is difficult to imagine an Indian option which would not further and deeply irritate Pakistan, and, as a result, Afghanistan appears destined to be left to itself, in hopeless isolation, just as it was in 1989.
The damage done to Afghanistan and the Afghans will, in any case, take many years to repair, and continued military action against targets in Pakistan is certainly not the answer..
In December 2001, just over ten years ago, allegedly in the “wake of rapid victory”, a much heralded International Conference on Afghanistan took place in Bonn, the actual, original “Small Town in Germany”. Its task consisted mainly of setting up a future road-map for that unfortunate Central Asian country torn by years of Foreign invasion and civil war. A “Democratic” constitution was drawn up, and many extremely sagacious decisions were taken, including the creation of an “International Security Assistance Force”, or “ISAF” to oversee and guide Afghanistan towards peace, stability and development, through a rather novel type of “Civilian-Military cooperation”, which, although perhaps well-intentioned, proved to be unwieldy and therefore only partially successful.. Some viewed this as an audacious leap into the future. Realists, however, preferred to think of it rather as a brave, perhaps utopian attempt to reset the Afghan calendar to a situation at least as promising as it appeared before the Soviet invasion of 1979.
At the time, even old Afghan hands who had been sceptical and apprehensive of the West’s military involvement in that difficult mountain state, traditionally inhospitable to foreign invaders, had greeted the Bonn Conference with relief and some optimism. After all – as president Bush himself solemnly assured us – the enemy was “on the run”, and the military problem in Afghanistan appeared to be practically solved, with only civilian reconstruction tasks remaining.
In the light of subsequent developments – after an initial period of moderately justified confidence – the Bonn Conference of last December 5 can be viewed only with profound scepticism and more than a touch of melancholia. Indeed, in spite of the forced note of official optimism, echoed by a waning number of the more obedient International Media, there are reasons to believe that this will most probably be the final curtain call for the West’s involvement in the very gloomy and apparently hopeless Afghan picture.
The aims of the 2011 Conference, although set out very clearly, aroused only tepid interest. Among scores of participants (85 States, plus the United Nations and 15 International Organizations) the absence of two – Pakistan and the Taliban – who would certainly have had an important role to play, further diminished the meeting’s credibility. The absence of Pakistan, who boycotted the conference because of a recent NATO air strike on its territory was certainly a blow , and note should be taken of the refusal of the Taliban to participate, even though, in reality, no invitation to them was ever extended.
The Conference, as expected, produced many high-toned documents and declarations on both the military and civilian future of Afghanistan: It was, however, evident that there was little connection between what was being stated in Bonn and the realities on the ground, both in terms of NATO’s military position and, even more blatantly, of the complicated process of transfer of civilian power to the Afghans.
It is an historical fact that military cooperation among allies is never easy, even when the war aims are clear and interests coincide (it is enough to remember the great problems besetting the Anglo-American alliance in the waning months of World War II, both in Italy and in Normandy). This was particularly noticeable in Afghanistan, since the early years of the NATO intervention. Apart from the United States, with their “Enduring Freedom” operation, a large number of European and NATO countries participated, some with sizeable contingents, others with a more symbolic presence. The “chain of command” was uncertain, and each military contingent kept to its own agenda and rules of engagement, thus favouring a state of confusion among the civilian populations and facilitating the penetration of insurgent forces. One of the important side-effects of the prolonged foreign military presence in Afghanistan was the birth and rapid burgeoning of terrorism, which had not existed before (the Taliban, however distasteful their policies may appear, were not a “terrorist” organization, and the early episodes of suicide attacks were perpetrated mainly by young Arabs or Pakistanis). The situation was certainly not helped by obvious uncertainty regarding the actual war aims of the NATO forces.
The original, exclusive, war aim put forward to justify the invasion of Afghanistan was to “get” Osama Bin Laden. This was achieved ten years later, in another country, with Bin Laden by then perhaps more of a symbolic figure than a real threat. An impressive subsequent string of alternative “war aims”, none of which either convincing or even partially successful, were subsequently presented to explain the need of a continued and growing Western presence in Afghanistan.
It is amazing, even appalling, to consider, today, that behind the theatrically arrogant sabre-rattling in the aftermath of 9/11, there apparently was only minimal political or strategic planning. Important and profound historical realities were apparently not taken into consideration before embarking on a military venture in an environment which had proved fatal to many invaders, including the British Empire and the Soviet Union.. Some of the most essential aspects, such as the inevitability and complexity of Pakistan’s involvement, were treated very superficially, perhaps even overlooked. When Richard Holbrooke, years later, tried to tackle the matter, events had already taken a definite turn for the worse and were probably beyond the control of either ISAF or the United States.
A potentially sinister and dangerous consequence of this has been the threat of the destabilization of Pakistan, all the more perilous because of Pakistan’s modern and well-equipped nuclear arsenal, which must absolutely not fall into the “wrong” hands.
One of the very first issues which ought to have been tackled, as soon as Pakistan’s involvement appeared inevitable, was the persistent border problem raised by the infamous 1894 “Durand Line”. No Afghan government has ever recognized this border, and also the local populations in Pakistan's North West Frontier area do not see it as a real barrier to their movements. For an appreciable amount of time the present conflict has had this porous, traditionally perilous border area as one of its focal points, but there is no evidence of the problem having been taken into serious consideration either in 2001 or ever since, except, perhaps, from an exclusively military point of view.
At the present stage it is probably too late to emerge from Afghanistan having achieved even an acceptably honourable defeat, and only a belated, rigorous attempt at a totally new approach to the problem, beginning with an open minded assessment of past errors and miscalculations, eschewing trite repetitions of pious intents, could perhaps avoid total disaster and humiliation.
The current tendency of hurling accusations of “duplicity” and “treachery” at Pakistan, along with the continued dissemination of rhetorical declarations and shibboleths, coupled with patently false and self-serving versions of past events (including the origins of the Taliban) will, instead, in no way contribute to clarify the situation, which now, more than ever before, demands a clear-headed assessment.
The accusation of “duplicitous” behaviour levelled at Pakistan takes many forms. Most recently it has been stated that the Pakistani armed forces have taken military action against the Taliban in Pakistan, but are reluctant to do so on Afghan territory. This would appear as the result of a reasonable Pakistani analysis of its own national interests, rather than the proof of double-dealing. The Pakistani Taliban are hostile to the Islamabad Government, which they accuse of being far too submissive to U.S. demands, while the Taliban in Afghanistan could well be an influential component of a future Afghan government, and would certainly remember any aggressive military action taken against them: Pakistan can ill afford to have a antagonistic neighbour to its North-West, and Islamabad’s view of itself as surrounded by hostile forces - whether justified or not – cannot be ignored and needs to be respected.
Several new elements are added, almost daily, to worsen the complexity of the situation, and certainly the persevering rumours of an imminent military coup in Islamabad do little to clarify matters. The continued, insistent use of pilotless drones – the surgical precision of which can easily be questioned – has added a new dimension to the hostility with which the entire operation is viewed in Pakistan, while, in Afghanistan itself, the recent murder of four French ISAF military personnel on a training mission by one of their Afghan trainees serves to show that hopes of leaving the country in a sufficiently stable state are unrealistic.
It is perhaps too late, at this stage, to reconsider the entire venture and to bring it to a relatively peaceful and dignified end. When the Soviet troops left, after a ten year occupation, marching across the bridge on the Oxus, they, at least, were going “home”, and, above all, to a place from which they could indirectly protect the puppet government they left behind – this, naturally, only until the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is no comfortable, nearby place from which the NATO allies can exercise this kind of immediate, close range surveillance and protection of whatever political structure they will be leaving behind in Afghanistan: the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia cannot be considered dependable and the nearest alternative, Turkey, is already quite a way off. It is difficult to imagine an Indian option which would not further and deeply irritate Pakistan, and, as a result, Afghanistan appears destined to be left to itself, in hopeless isolation, just as it was in 1989.
The damage done to Afghanistan and the Afghans will, in any case, take many years to repair, and continued military action against targets in Pakistan is certainly not the answer..
martedì 21 febbraio 2012
PROFESSOR MONTI'S 100 DAYS
Professor Monti's 100 days
Published on openDemocracy (http://www.opendemocracy.net)
Professor Monti's 100 days
Carlo Ungaro, 21st February 2012
In this new European era of technocratic majoritarianism, Italian voters are convinced by none of
the political parties. They hope their new Prime Minister might fix things. And post-Monti? There are
signs of a rallying around the 'Catholic vote'.
About the author
Carlo Ungaro is a former Italian diplomat. He spent sixteen years serving in Afghanistan. Between
2000 and 2007, he served as political adviser to the Italian led ISAF forces in Herat.
Professor Mario Monti was appointed to the post of Italian Prime Minister last November. It might be
anticipated that this week the national and international media will be celebrating his first ‘100 days’
in power. This slightly trivial approach appears justified in Monti’s case, for success in his endeavour
could well represent a major milestone in Italy’s political and economic development, and this not
only as a result of the stark contrast of his style of government compared to the preceding
Berlusconi era.
To understand the Italian situation in its complexity, the events which led to the fall of Berlusconi
and to the formation of the current ‘technical’ Government need retracing. Precisely because
Monti’s mandate will be extremely short, at the most until next spring, it is important to
understand how this experience is viewed by Italian public opinion and to deduce what could lie
ahead, also taking into account the fact that the Roman Catholic Church will certainly have a
renewed, more forcible and relevant role in future developments.
For a number of months before the fall of Berlusconi’s Government, there had been intense
speculation on his future both in the Italian and in the international media. The basic turning point,
however, came in May of last year, when, in spite of a massive, no holds barred, media campaign,
Berlusconi and his allies suffered humiliating defeats in local elections in Milano – his own political
backyard - and Naples, to be followed only weeks later by similar setbacks in four key popular
referenda. Few outside observers, however, noted that, while it was easy to point out that Berlusconi
and his allies were the losers, the main opposition party, which had supported neither of the two
winning candidates nor the referenda, was certainly not the winner. The ‘Democratic Party’ made a
belated attempt to get onto the winning bandwagon, but emerged from the experience with an
extremely battered image. The ensuing crisis, in spite of its apparent inevitability, played itself out in
excruciating slow motion because of the Prime Minister’s insistence that he could count on his
dwindling but still decisive majority in Parliament, and rescue Italy from what was already then
being called “a Greek situation”.
Outside factors, however, including reliable opinion polls that showed his approval rating drop from
over 60% to an appalling 24%, gave the Party members the necessary courage to persuade
Berlusconi to leave. His parliamentary majority, if needed, would probably still be there in spite of
numerous defections, and a ‘no confidence’ vote could easily be arranged, forcing Monti’s
resignation, at the drop of a hat. But the forces behind Berlusconi know full well that if the
Government were to be brought down, the outcome of the ensuing elections would be disastrous for
Page 1 of 3
Published on openDemocracy (http://www.opendemocracy.net)
them.
On the other hand, the Italian electorate has shown such mistrust of the political world that the main
opposition group, the ‘Democratic Party’ and most of its allies, would fare only slightly better. They,
in any case, do not have the number of votes needed to topple the existing Government.
The resulting paradox is that Monti is supported by an abnormally large majority formed by the two
main, bitterly antagonistic, political parties, neither of which appears willing or able to precipitate his
fall. This circumstance represents both the strength and the weakness of the Government, for while
the numerical majority appears solid as never before in Italian democratic history, it is, in reality,
very fragile and needs careful handling on the part of the Prime Minister and his colleagues.
In his cool, detached, self-deprecating manner, Monti appears impervious to all the ongoing,
albeit somewhat muted, political uproar in the two houses of Parliament, as, indeed, he has been
able to weather some rather severe waves of protest, by continuing steadily along his declared path
and, when necessary, asking Parliament for a vote of confidence, which he is practically certain to
obtain. One extremely relevant factor – which certainly has not escaped either his or the Political
Parties’ notice – is that in spite of the protests and the discomfort brought about by them, and in
spite of the severe, painful, economic measures the Government is imposing, all the opinion
polls indicate that Monti’s approval rating remains close to 60%.
In the coming days, the Government will probably face new waves of strikes and protests, as it
endeavours to update Italy’s antiquated labour laws. But there is a feeling abroad that this
storm also will be weathered with style and that things will continue more or less along the
established path.
Monti has stated that he has no political ambitions for the future: his protestations are credible also
because he seems ill-suited to the rough-and-tumble atmosphere of the Italian electoral process. He
does, however have a realistic chance of succeeding Giorgio Napolitano as President of the Republic,
his only rival being, at this time, Silvio Berlusconi.
But what about the future of Italian politics in a post-Monti era?
Confusion and paradox are endemic qualities in Italy’s political life, and the present situation is no
exception. None of the parties, except, perhaps those who ‘safely’ oppose Monti (the Northern
League and some maverick but increasingly influential left wing parties) are looking forward to the
inevitable electoral challenge set for spring of next year. It is absolutely impossible to foresee the
outcome of these elections, but it seems safe to assume that they will bring about some
fundamental changes in Italy’s political spectrum.
Strangely enough, the party which will probably benefit the most will be one of the minority ‘Centrist’
parties, the U.D.C., led by devout Roman Catholic Ferdinando Casini, who, with his darkly handsome
looks is a well recognised figure on Italian TV screens. This party has been, until now, the most
stalwart of Monti’s supporters, and appears to be moving with growing confidence towards a leading
position in Italy’s political centre. It is important to note that most of the defectors from Berlusconi’s
party have been drifting towards the Catholic centre, and this will give renewed vigour to the
‘Catholic’ vote, which, in Italy, is traditionally a force to be reckoned with.
Country or region: Italy
EU
Topics: Civil society
Conflict
Democracy and government
International politics
This article is published by Carlo Ungaro, and openDemocracy.net under a Creative
Commons licence [8]. You may republish it with attribution for non-commercial purposes following
Page 2 of 3
Published on openDemocracy (http://www.opendemocracy.net)
Professor Monti's 100 days
Carlo Ungaro, 21st February 2012
In this new European era of technocratic majoritarianism, Italian voters are convinced by none of
the political parties. They hope their new Prime Minister might fix things. And post-Monti? There are
signs of a rallying around the 'Catholic vote'.
About the author
Carlo Ungaro is a former Italian diplomat. He spent sixteen years serving in Afghanistan. Between
2000 and 2007, he served as political adviser to the Italian led ISAF forces in Herat.
Professor Mario Monti was appointed to the post of Italian Prime Minister last November. It might be
anticipated that this week the national and international media will be celebrating his first ‘100 days’
in power. This slightly trivial approach appears justified in Monti’s case, for success in his endeavour
could well represent a major milestone in Italy’s political and economic development, and this not
only as a result of the stark contrast of his style of government compared to the preceding
Berlusconi era.
To understand the Italian situation in its complexity, the events which led to the fall of Berlusconi
and to the formation of the current ‘technical’ Government need retracing. Precisely because
Monti’s mandate will be extremely short, at the most until next spring, it is important to
understand how this experience is viewed by Italian public opinion and to deduce what could lie
ahead, also taking into account the fact that the Roman Catholic Church will certainly have a
renewed, more forcible and relevant role in future developments.
For a number of months before the fall of Berlusconi’s Government, there had been intense
speculation on his future both in the Italian and in the international media. The basic turning point,
however, came in May of last year, when, in spite of a massive, no holds barred, media campaign,
Berlusconi and his allies suffered humiliating defeats in local elections in Milano – his own political
backyard - and Naples, to be followed only weeks later by similar setbacks in four key popular
referenda. Few outside observers, however, noted that, while it was easy to point out that Berlusconi
and his allies were the losers, the main opposition party, which had supported neither of the two
winning candidates nor the referenda, was certainly not the winner. The ‘Democratic Party’ made a
belated attempt to get onto the winning bandwagon, but emerged from the experience with an
extremely battered image. The ensuing crisis, in spite of its apparent inevitability, played itself out in
excruciating slow motion because of the Prime Minister’s insistence that he could count on his
dwindling but still decisive majority in Parliament, and rescue Italy from what was already then
being called “a Greek situation”.
Outside factors, however, including reliable opinion polls that showed his approval rating drop from
over 60% to an appalling 24%, gave the Party members the necessary courage to persuade
Berlusconi to leave. His parliamentary majority, if needed, would probably still be there in spite of
numerous defections, and a ‘no confidence’ vote could easily be arranged, forcing Monti’s
resignation, at the drop of a hat. But the forces behind Berlusconi know full well that if the
Government were to be brought down, the outcome of the ensuing elections would be disastrous for
Page 1 of 3
Published on openDemocracy (http://www.opendemocracy.net)
them.
On the other hand, the Italian electorate has shown such mistrust of the political world that the main
opposition group, the ‘Democratic Party’ and most of its allies, would fare only slightly better. They,
in any case, do not have the number of votes needed to topple the existing Government.
The resulting paradox is that Monti is supported by an abnormally large majority formed by the two
main, bitterly antagonistic, political parties, neither of which appears willing or able to precipitate his
fall. This circumstance represents both the strength and the weakness of the Government, for while
the numerical majority appears solid as never before in Italian democratic history, it is, in reality,
very fragile and needs careful handling on the part of the Prime Minister and his colleagues.
In his cool, detached, self-deprecating manner, Monti appears impervious to all the ongoing,
albeit somewhat muted, political uproar in the two houses of Parliament, as, indeed, he has been
able to weather some rather severe waves of protest, by continuing steadily along his declared path
and, when necessary, asking Parliament for a vote of confidence, which he is practically certain to
obtain. One extremely relevant factor – which certainly has not escaped either his or the Political
Parties’ notice – is that in spite of the protests and the discomfort brought about by them, and in
spite of the severe, painful, economic measures the Government is imposing, all the opinion
polls indicate that Monti’s approval rating remains close to 60%.
In the coming days, the Government will probably face new waves of strikes and protests, as it
endeavours to update Italy’s antiquated labour laws. But there is a feeling abroad that this
storm also will be weathered with style and that things will continue more or less along the
established path.
Monti has stated that he has no political ambitions for the future: his protestations are credible also
because he seems ill-suited to the rough-and-tumble atmosphere of the Italian electoral process. He
does, however have a realistic chance of succeeding Giorgio Napolitano as President of the Republic,
his only rival being, at this time, Silvio Berlusconi.
But what about the future of Italian politics in a post-Monti era?
Confusion and paradox are endemic qualities in Italy’s political life, and the present situation is no
exception. None of the parties, except, perhaps those who ‘safely’ oppose Monti (the Northern
League and some maverick but increasingly influential left wing parties) are looking forward to the
inevitable electoral challenge set for spring of next year. It is absolutely impossible to foresee the
outcome of these elections, but it seems safe to assume that they will bring about some
fundamental changes in Italy’s political spectrum.
Strangely enough, the party which will probably benefit the most will be one of the minority ‘Centrist’
parties, the U.D.C., led by devout Roman Catholic Ferdinando Casini, who, with his darkly handsome
looks is a well recognised figure on Italian TV screens. This party has been, until now, the most
stalwart of Monti’s supporters, and appears to be moving with growing confidence towards a leading
position in Italy’s political centre. It is important to note that most of the defectors from Berlusconi’s
party have been drifting towards the Catholic centre, and this will give renewed vigour to the
‘Catholic’ vote, which, in Italy, is traditionally a force to be reckoned with.
Country or region: Italy
EU
Topics: Civil society
Conflict
Democracy and government
International politics
This article is published by Carlo Ungaro, and openDemocracy.net under a Creative
Commons licence [8]. You may republish it with attribution for non-commercial purposes following
Page 2 of 3
giovedì 1 dicembre 2011
Italy – After the fall of Berlusconi, who reaps the benefits?
(Published by Open Democracy, December 1, 2011)
Rome, November 28 2011
In the months of May and June of the current year, a political upheaval – scarcely noticed abroad – took place in Italy. A grossly disobedient electorate ignored warnings, threats and blandishments from the four main political forces (Berlusconi’s Party and the Northern League on the right, the Centrist coalition and the Democratic Party on the left), casting massive majority votes for candidates outside the political mainstream in both the Neapolitan and Milanese municipal elections. That same electorate, a scarce two weeks later, repeated its defiance on a national scale by voting – again with a massive majority – in favour of four referenda openly opposed by the Right and only tepidly supported by the Centre and Left.
Some commentators – in reality very few indeed – speculated that the Roman Catholic Church, slightly marginalised by the secular right wing parties in power, would seize the opportunity offered by this debacle of organized politics to regain the central role it has habitually played in Italian politics.
As the Berlusconi administration wound to its unhappy end, many of the party faithful started abandoning ship. This growing erosion was significant enough, but even more so was the circumstance that most of the defectors, including one of the most glamorous and “faithful” of Mr. Berlusconi’s political gynaecaeum, appeared to be drifting towards the one centrist party – the “U.D.C.” – which has constantly asserted its staunch Catholic obedience, under the leadership of darkly handsome Pier Ferdinando Casini. Some comment was also raised by the sudden reappearance on the public scene of old stalwarts of the so-called “First Republic”, long dormant relicts of the defunct “Christian Democratic Party”, which led Italy for over four decades after World War II. They also seemed to be attracted by Casini, on whom, perhaps, the Church is pinning its political hopes for the future.
The analysis of Italian politics always reveals situations of far greater complexity than expected. The fall of Berlusconi and the possible end of “Berlusconismo” or even of the “Second Republic” are important events, but even more significant are the medium and long term consequences of Mr. Berlusconi’s long awaited downfall and the creation of a competent but potentially fragile “technical” Government.
The stark contrast between the rigid sobriety of the Monti government and its predecessor seems to have overawed some commentators who - with the exception of the “Northern League”, and a group of diehard Berlusconi nostalgics – are pouring praise, largely deserved but rather extravagant and premature, on the newborn cabinet. True, some criticism was raised for the really small number of female ministers (only three) that it includes, but it is easy to point out that the three women in the Monti cabinet are figures of undisputed competence and are at the head of key Ministries, while Berlusconi’s female cabinet ministers were essentially decorative, patently incompetent and certainly did not enhance the role of Women in Italy.
There are other points on which this Government is already receiving critical comments, but most of these criticisms can be rebuffed. Some, for example, point out the extremely conservative stance shown by most of the leading ministers, and it has even been hinted that, finally, some of Berlusconi’s erstwhile campaign promises could end up being fulfilled by Monti (or “the Professor” as he prefers to be called): this is quite true, but it has to be considered that Parliament is still dominated by those elected in the Berlusconi landslide of 2008, and that any legislation going in a more “progressive” direction would fail to pass. Some have also been saying that what took place was against all democratic rules, and was, actually, a business and finance oriented “coup d’état”, placing, in key government positions, bankers, businessmen, and high ranking officials (an Admiral and an Ambassador), thus neglecting the weaker sectors of civil society. This particular complaint is making the rounds in the international media, but it is unjustified: there was no “coup” and constitutional legality has been and is being respected.
There are further considerations, however, that need to be more fully analysed, also because they are basically intertwined. Berlusconi, in reality, has not been “defeated”, and though his party has pledged support for the new Government, it still is, at least apparently, in control of both houses of Parliament, and Berlusconi has been alternating pledges of support with dire threats of withdrawing support should the government deviate from its initial programme. The potential fragility of the Government, however, appears tempered in the light of the re-emergence of the Catholic Church, which, after many years in the shadows, appears again as a determining factor in Italian politics.
The Church never could approve of Berlusconi’s flamboyant style, but it did lend its support in exchange for a growing number of benefits: this, in the long run, upset the rank-and-file faithful, and, after the governing parties’ defeat last May, it seemed inevitable that the Catholic Hierarchy would look elsewhere for a political force worthy of its support. The signals were many, far too numerous to go into at this stage, and became ever more obvious at the growing number of defections from Berlusconi’s party in the waning weeks of his government. These defections, which at the time were very visible mainly because they tended to undermine Berlusconi’s parliamentary majority, have probably continued virtually unobserved, strongly limiting the likelihood of Berlusconi making good his threat of toppling the Monti government “with a snap of the fingers”.
The perceived drift of “Catholic” members of Berlusconi’s erstwhile party to the centre, is likely to leave the Church as ultimate, albeit indirect, arbiter of the Government’s future.
It is significant that the very first international leader met by Italy’s new Prime Minister has been Pope Benedict XVI . The Catholic Church is evidently beginning to seize the advantage offered by the debacle suffered by almost all the Italian political parties in May 2011, and therefore appears set to play a growing role in Italy’s political life, ending up as the principal, though perhaps occult, arbiter of future decisions and orientations.
The decisive role of the Church in Italian politics is not new, and the Vatican's interference in Italian politics has prevailed since the early Carolingian days.
As Niccolò Machiavelli wrote, in his “Discourses” in the early Sixteenth Century: “Our first debt to the Church and her priests is that, thanks to them, Italians have become irreligious and wicked. But we owe still a greater debt, for the Church has kept and still keeps this country divided”.
Half a millennium on, this reality still obtains.
Carlo Ungaro
Rome, November 28 2011
In the months of May and June of the current year, a political upheaval – scarcely noticed abroad – took place in Italy. A grossly disobedient electorate ignored warnings, threats and blandishments from the four main political forces (Berlusconi’s Party and the Northern League on the right, the Centrist coalition and the Democratic Party on the left), casting massive majority votes for candidates outside the political mainstream in both the Neapolitan and Milanese municipal elections. That same electorate, a scarce two weeks later, repeated its defiance on a national scale by voting – again with a massive majority – in favour of four referenda openly opposed by the Right and only tepidly supported by the Centre and Left.
Some commentators – in reality very few indeed – speculated that the Roman Catholic Church, slightly marginalised by the secular right wing parties in power, would seize the opportunity offered by this debacle of organized politics to regain the central role it has habitually played in Italian politics.
As the Berlusconi administration wound to its unhappy end, many of the party faithful started abandoning ship. This growing erosion was significant enough, but even more so was the circumstance that most of the defectors, including one of the most glamorous and “faithful” of Mr. Berlusconi’s political gynaecaeum, appeared to be drifting towards the one centrist party – the “U.D.C.” – which has constantly asserted its staunch Catholic obedience, under the leadership of darkly handsome Pier Ferdinando Casini. Some comment was also raised by the sudden reappearance on the public scene of old stalwarts of the so-called “First Republic”, long dormant relicts of the defunct “Christian Democratic Party”, which led Italy for over four decades after World War II. They also seemed to be attracted by Casini, on whom, perhaps, the Church is pinning its political hopes for the future.
The analysis of Italian politics always reveals situations of far greater complexity than expected. The fall of Berlusconi and the possible end of “Berlusconismo” or even of the “Second Republic” are important events, but even more significant are the medium and long term consequences of Mr. Berlusconi’s long awaited downfall and the creation of a competent but potentially fragile “technical” Government.
The stark contrast between the rigid sobriety of the Monti government and its predecessor seems to have overawed some commentators who - with the exception of the “Northern League”, and a group of diehard Berlusconi nostalgics – are pouring praise, largely deserved but rather extravagant and premature, on the newborn cabinet. True, some criticism was raised for the really small number of female ministers (only three) that it includes, but it is easy to point out that the three women in the Monti cabinet are figures of undisputed competence and are at the head of key Ministries, while Berlusconi’s female cabinet ministers were essentially decorative, patently incompetent and certainly did not enhance the role of Women in Italy.
There are other points on which this Government is already receiving critical comments, but most of these criticisms can be rebuffed. Some, for example, point out the extremely conservative stance shown by most of the leading ministers, and it has even been hinted that, finally, some of Berlusconi’s erstwhile campaign promises could end up being fulfilled by Monti (or “the Professor” as he prefers to be called): this is quite true, but it has to be considered that Parliament is still dominated by those elected in the Berlusconi landslide of 2008, and that any legislation going in a more “progressive” direction would fail to pass. Some have also been saying that what took place was against all democratic rules, and was, actually, a business and finance oriented “coup d’état”, placing, in key government positions, bankers, businessmen, and high ranking officials (an Admiral and an Ambassador), thus neglecting the weaker sectors of civil society. This particular complaint is making the rounds in the international media, but it is unjustified: there was no “coup” and constitutional legality has been and is being respected.
There are further considerations, however, that need to be more fully analysed, also because they are basically intertwined. Berlusconi, in reality, has not been “defeated”, and though his party has pledged support for the new Government, it still is, at least apparently, in control of both houses of Parliament, and Berlusconi has been alternating pledges of support with dire threats of withdrawing support should the government deviate from its initial programme. The potential fragility of the Government, however, appears tempered in the light of the re-emergence of the Catholic Church, which, after many years in the shadows, appears again as a determining factor in Italian politics.
The Church never could approve of Berlusconi’s flamboyant style, but it did lend its support in exchange for a growing number of benefits: this, in the long run, upset the rank-and-file faithful, and, after the governing parties’ defeat last May, it seemed inevitable that the Catholic Hierarchy would look elsewhere for a political force worthy of its support. The signals were many, far too numerous to go into at this stage, and became ever more obvious at the growing number of defections from Berlusconi’s party in the waning weeks of his government. These defections, which at the time were very visible mainly because they tended to undermine Berlusconi’s parliamentary majority, have probably continued virtually unobserved, strongly limiting the likelihood of Berlusconi making good his threat of toppling the Monti government “with a snap of the fingers”.
The perceived drift of “Catholic” members of Berlusconi’s erstwhile party to the centre, is likely to leave the Church as ultimate, albeit indirect, arbiter of the Government’s future.
It is significant that the very first international leader met by Italy’s new Prime Minister has been Pope Benedict XVI . The Catholic Church is evidently beginning to seize the advantage offered by the debacle suffered by almost all the Italian political parties in May 2011, and therefore appears set to play a growing role in Italy’s political life, ending up as the principal, though perhaps occult, arbiter of future decisions and orientations.
The decisive role of the Church in Italian politics is not new, and the Vatican's interference in Italian politics has prevailed since the early Carolingian days.
As Niccolò Machiavelli wrote, in his “Discourses” in the early Sixteenth Century: “Our first debt to the Church and her priests is that, thanks to them, Italians have become irreligious and wicked. But we owe still a greater debt, for the Church has kept and still keeps this country divided”.
Half a millennium on, this reality still obtains.
Carlo Ungaro
sabato 15 ottobre 2011
THE CRISIS IN ITALY: WHO WILL REAP THE BENEFITS?
Rome, October 13, 2011
Who will benefit from the Italian crisis?
Text:
Last May saw an unprecedented revolt by the Italian electorate, from which the governing majority emerged visibly humiliated and greatly weakened. The Opposition parties – excepting those at the fringe – did not benefit, and what emerged was a political void waiting to be filled. Some observers believed that this would be an occasion for the Roman Catholic Church to re-establish its political supremacy in Italy. Recent events seem to indicate that this is, indeed, happening, and. the Church has recently come out – with surprising clarity and energy – against the Berlusconi Government. This could be a direct consequence of what some have called the “Italian Spring”, referring to the remarkable “voters rebellion” in May of this year.
The long statement issued by the president of the Italian Bishops Conference (CEI), though never mentioning Mr. Berlusconi by name, was a clear and eloquent denunciation of the Prime Minister’s lifestyle as well as the Government’s inaction on issues of vital importance, The statement caused a considerable flurry, and few commentators gave any credit to the ruling party’s (and the public Television’s) version according to which the Bishops’ criticisms were levelled at “all political actors”.
Italy’s financial and economic situation, is extremely fragile and constantly worsening in spite of (or perhaps precisely because of) hasty and uncoordinated corrective measures steamrollered through Parliament by an already beleaguered Government. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister’s legal problems have been accumulating to the point of sending him scurrying around Europe to avoid confrontation with the Judicial system. His Government recently lost a crucial vote in Parliament and will have to seek a “vote of confidence” the outcome of which is far from secure.
All this has raised the question on whether the all too brief “Italian Spring”, which many thought would soon fall victim to a political situation which, in these past weeks has been visibly drifting from Italian comedy to Greek tragedy..
It is generally assumed, in Italy and abroad, that the Berlusconi government, as well as the political organization he created and its allies are in deep trouble and risk either losing their majority in Parliament or, at least, facing the next political elections (possibly in 2012, and at the latest in 2013) from a position of great disadvantage.
The natural corollary to this axiom should be that the main opposition parties of the Left and the Centre are rejoicing, planning for an early overthrow of the Government and already savouring the satisfaction of returning to power.
Both the axiom and its corollary, however, are flawed, and also the opposition, following last May’s events, is facing a growing credibility gap with the electorate. Uncritical acceptance of such truisms, therefore, can only end up distorting the view of the Italian crisis.
Some observers had ventured to suggest that, after these unexpected political events, so much more significant than many understood, the Roman Catholic Church, ever present in the Italian political scene, would probably be the first to step into the resulting political void.
This, indeed, seems to be happening although it must be understood that the Roman Catholic hierarchy always acts with measured calm and never with undue haste. The clarity and vehemence of the CEI’s statement are exceptional enough, but it would be a mistake to believe in an immediate follow-up.
This new development adds yet another skein to the already complex tissue of Italian politics, which, never easy to analyse, now appear permeated with even greater complexity. It also raises a rather paradoxical question in that the intervention of the Church, not exactly a model of liberal democracy, could actually end up saving the democratic structure of the Italian Republic from the risk of Italy's sliding into a form of “soft”, bourgeois neo-fascism. This danger appeared quite real some months back and has not yet totally subsided, now that this Government, with its virtual monopoly on the media, feels itself cornered and victim of internal and international “plots”. With all the real and urgent problems facing the country, the Government is currently pushing a Bill through Parliament which would significantly curtail freedom of the press. This law is exclusively designed to protect the Prime Minister from excessive media exposure, and has nothing to do with the ongoing financial, economic and political crisis.
One of the current majority’s rearguard actions consists in the issuance of dire warnings to the tone of “if not Berlusconi, who?”, implying that the Italian electorate is irretrievably “right wing”, and that, therefore, an electoral process taking place in an atmosphere of institutional crisis, could lead to the election of right-wing adventures and populists.
The Italian electorate, however, was not “right wing” in the past (it is enough to remember that for over four decades Italy hosted the largest European Communist Party outside of the Soviet Bloc) and cannot be defined as such now: the May events referred to above (massive anti-establishment vote at four referenda and mayoral elections in Milan and Naples) were inspired by the left and not the right.
Elections, whether held in 2012 or in 2013, certainly will be unpredictable, and the drift of political events in Italy over the next months will be interesting to observe. The only prediction that can safely be made is that the “Catholic” electorate will make its presence felt, perhaps even with the creation of a political party or organization of its own and that the Italian political scene, static for such a long time, will return to its dynamic traditions.
Carlo Ungaro
Published by “Open Democracy” – October 14 2011
Who will benefit from the Italian crisis?
Text:
Last May saw an unprecedented revolt by the Italian electorate, from which the governing majority emerged visibly humiliated and greatly weakened. The Opposition parties – excepting those at the fringe – did not benefit, and what emerged was a political void waiting to be filled. Some observers believed that this would be an occasion for the Roman Catholic Church to re-establish its political supremacy in Italy. Recent events seem to indicate that this is, indeed, happening, and. the Church has recently come out – with surprising clarity and energy – against the Berlusconi Government. This could be a direct consequence of what some have called the “Italian Spring”, referring to the remarkable “voters rebellion” in May of this year.
The long statement issued by the president of the Italian Bishops Conference (CEI), though never mentioning Mr. Berlusconi by name, was a clear and eloquent denunciation of the Prime Minister’s lifestyle as well as the Government’s inaction on issues of vital importance, The statement caused a considerable flurry, and few commentators gave any credit to the ruling party’s (and the public Television’s) version according to which the Bishops’ criticisms were levelled at “all political actors”.
Italy’s financial and economic situation, is extremely fragile and constantly worsening in spite of (or perhaps precisely because of) hasty and uncoordinated corrective measures steamrollered through Parliament by an already beleaguered Government. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister’s legal problems have been accumulating to the point of sending him scurrying around Europe to avoid confrontation with the Judicial system. His Government recently lost a crucial vote in Parliament and will have to seek a “vote of confidence” the outcome of which is far from secure.
All this has raised the question on whether the all too brief “Italian Spring”, which many thought would soon fall victim to a political situation which, in these past weeks has been visibly drifting from Italian comedy to Greek tragedy..
It is generally assumed, in Italy and abroad, that the Berlusconi government, as well as the political organization he created and its allies are in deep trouble and risk either losing their majority in Parliament or, at least, facing the next political elections (possibly in 2012, and at the latest in 2013) from a position of great disadvantage.
The natural corollary to this axiom should be that the main opposition parties of the Left and the Centre are rejoicing, planning for an early overthrow of the Government and already savouring the satisfaction of returning to power.
Both the axiom and its corollary, however, are flawed, and also the opposition, following last May’s events, is facing a growing credibility gap with the electorate. Uncritical acceptance of such truisms, therefore, can only end up distorting the view of the Italian crisis.
Some observers had ventured to suggest that, after these unexpected political events, so much more significant than many understood, the Roman Catholic Church, ever present in the Italian political scene, would probably be the first to step into the resulting political void.
This, indeed, seems to be happening although it must be understood that the Roman Catholic hierarchy always acts with measured calm and never with undue haste. The clarity and vehemence of the CEI’s statement are exceptional enough, but it would be a mistake to believe in an immediate follow-up.
This new development adds yet another skein to the already complex tissue of Italian politics, which, never easy to analyse, now appear permeated with even greater complexity. It also raises a rather paradoxical question in that the intervention of the Church, not exactly a model of liberal democracy, could actually end up saving the democratic structure of the Italian Republic from the risk of Italy's sliding into a form of “soft”, bourgeois neo-fascism. This danger appeared quite real some months back and has not yet totally subsided, now that this Government, with its virtual monopoly on the media, feels itself cornered and victim of internal and international “plots”. With all the real and urgent problems facing the country, the Government is currently pushing a Bill through Parliament which would significantly curtail freedom of the press. This law is exclusively designed to protect the Prime Minister from excessive media exposure, and has nothing to do with the ongoing financial, economic and political crisis.
One of the current majority’s rearguard actions consists in the issuance of dire warnings to the tone of “if not Berlusconi, who?”, implying that the Italian electorate is irretrievably “right wing”, and that, therefore, an electoral process taking place in an atmosphere of institutional crisis, could lead to the election of right-wing adventures and populists.
The Italian electorate, however, was not “right wing” in the past (it is enough to remember that for over four decades Italy hosted the largest European Communist Party outside of the Soviet Bloc) and cannot be defined as such now: the May events referred to above (massive anti-establishment vote at four referenda and mayoral elections in Milan and Naples) were inspired by the left and not the right.
Elections, whether held in 2012 or in 2013, certainly will be unpredictable, and the drift of political events in Italy over the next months will be interesting to observe. The only prediction that can safely be made is that the “Catholic” electorate will make its presence felt, perhaps even with the creation of a political party or organization of its own and that the Italian political scene, static for such a long time, will return to its dynamic traditions.
Carlo Ungaro
Published by “Open Democracy” – October 14 2011
mercoledì 12 ottobre 2011
DECLINE AND FALL: THE WEST'S POST 9/11 MISTAKES
Rome (Italy) October 12, 2011
Afghanistan and Iraq: the “War on Terror” ten years on.
The long, poignant period of reminiscence which led up to and beyond the tenth anniversary of “9/11”, and, of course, the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, could have been an occasion for objective analysis of that event’s impact, and an evaluation of its consequences after a decade. Unfortunately the circumstance also gave rise to a renewed spate of statements still imbued with whining and/or truculent rhetoric, understandable perhaps in the immediate aftermath, but totally useless and, indeed, perilous today.
Few have pointed out that, by transforming what was basically a criminal act of enormous impact into an “act of war”, our leaders contributed to the creation of an authentic “Clash of Civilizations” atmosphere of which we shall continue to pay the consequences for many years to come.
The Empire of Japan's 1941 attack on Pearl Harbour was certainly an act of much greater international relevance and significance than the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers. Ten years later, however, in December 1951, I do not recall President Truman officiating a ceremony on the site of the attack. For this reason I strongly fear that by underscoring the “dastardly deed” aspects of the event, and thus fanning a generalised feeling of distrust and hatred towards Islam and its adherents, no progress will be made towards what, in reality, ought to be uppermost on most peoples’ minds nowadays: no longer “revenge”, but “dignified exit” from a stagnant and potentially dangerous situation.
There have been some attempts at analyzing the mistakes committed by the “West” after September 11th. It is difficult to single out the one greatest error, but it is easy to recall the sense of horrified disbelief when “respected” western leaders , referring to the ill - fated Afghan campaign, and, with even greater emphasis, to the totally unrelated and unjustified invasion of Iraq, coined and used the expression “war on terror”, apparently unaware of its irrationality and of the potential risks such superficiality entailed.
It is not without a sense of deep embarrassment that one recalls the clumsy attempts made to equate the post 9/11 situation to the events of September 1939, pointing to public ignominy those who favoured “appeasement” with Saddam Hussein – who had nothing to do with the attacks – and subtly (and not always subtly) comparing the active western leaders to Churchill or Roosevelt, often getting historical facts grievously mixed up in the process.
An estimated 100,000 civilian and over 6000 “allied” combatant deaths later, it would appear difficult to draw anything but a bleak picture of the damage brought about by the unbelievable hubris which animated those who took such fateful, unwarranted and unwise decisions after the Twin Towers’ attack. The fact is that a military struggle so rashly named as a “war on terror” can never be won: the last terrorist will not appear out of nowhere, hands up shouting for mercy in the best Hollywood war movie tradition.
Above all, the assertion that, thanks to this military folly, the world is a “safer place” today is substantially false and totally misleading.
Indeed, the military action both in Afghanistan and in Iraq led to terrorist attacks in Spain, in the United Kingdom, in India and elsewhere, and if greater tragedies have been prevented it is due not to the results of military victories but to the greater attention on security made necessary by a visibly growing danger of terrorist attacks.
The answer lies in trying to understand where all this has brought us, and to attempt to identify the least damaging way forward..
There have recently been several well targeted and certainly deftly timed attacks in Kabul, including those on the U.S. Embassy and the “C.I.A.. Headquarters”, as well as the assassination of former president Rabbani. These acts, carried out by the Taliban or by other probably more aggressive and better organised entities, are clear messages aimed at those NATO countries most active in Afghanistan indicating that the time is long overdue for a level-headed, unemotional analysis of all the fundamental mistakes made both in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 shock and in later moves aimed at enhancing the Western military presence where it is neither needed nor welcomed.
The escalation of Drone attacks, and the building up of “secret” Drone centres in this and other areas will enhance the aggressive stance of the insurgents and create a legacy of resentment which will endure long after the actual fighting has ceased. As the balance of initiative keeps shifting in favour of the insurgents, and public opinion in the NATO countries develops a growing hostility towards the expense and the human sacrifice this military action entails, the latitude for a satisfactory negotiated settlement keeps diminishing, and the unanswerable question remains on what the original “war aims” were to begin with and what they have in common with today’s confused enumeration of asserted objectives.
It is astounding that none of the strategists involved in this ill-conceived effort realised that by subjecting Pakistan to attack, would be seen as an attempt to reach the very heart of Islam, which for some centuries has ceased to be in the Middle East and has taken firm hold on the Indian Subcontinent. Just leafing through a book on the Mogul dynasty would have been enough, especially if coupled with an analysis of events tied to the Partition of 1947.
The developments in Iraq, years after the infamous “Mission Accomplished” banner, are just as discouraging, and have the feel of a disaster waiting to happen. It is enough to ponder on recent statements by the Shiite leader Sayyid Muqtada el Sadr, once very much in the limelight and now conveniently ignored by the media: His call to his followers to desist from hostile activities until the final departure of the occupying forces is an eloquent indication of the obvious need to remain there for an indeterminate further period, during which inter-sectarian acts of violence will keep multiplying.
The consideration that these two military ventures have not made the world a “safer place” – indeed, it would be closer to the truth to assert the contrary – enhances the need urgently to find a way out, without being distracted by unrelated events and situations, particularly of an electoral nature.
The Afghan situation is made all the more dramatic by the virtual absence of a political counterpart with whom to conduct serious, meaningful negotiations, and the efforts to form responsible and reliable Afghan security forces have been having uneven success, especially considering that they have been going on for several years. Difficult as it is to look into the future, it seems legitimate to feel that the ultimate situation which the West will leave in Afghanistan will be in many aspects identical to the one left by the Soviet forces in 1989, with the added weight of even greater destruction and resentment.
“OpEd News il 12 ottobre)
Afghanistan and Iraq: the “War on Terror” ten years on.
The long, poignant period of reminiscence which led up to and beyond the tenth anniversary of “9/11”, and, of course, the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, could have been an occasion for objective analysis of that event’s impact, and an evaluation of its consequences after a decade. Unfortunately the circumstance also gave rise to a renewed spate of statements still imbued with whining and/or truculent rhetoric, understandable perhaps in the immediate aftermath, but totally useless and, indeed, perilous today.
Few have pointed out that, by transforming what was basically a criminal act of enormous impact into an “act of war”, our leaders contributed to the creation of an authentic “Clash of Civilizations” atmosphere of which we shall continue to pay the consequences for many years to come.
The Empire of Japan's 1941 attack on Pearl Harbour was certainly an act of much greater international relevance and significance than the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers. Ten years later, however, in December 1951, I do not recall President Truman officiating a ceremony on the site of the attack. For this reason I strongly fear that by underscoring the “dastardly deed” aspects of the event, and thus fanning a generalised feeling of distrust and hatred towards Islam and its adherents, no progress will be made towards what, in reality, ought to be uppermost on most peoples’ minds nowadays: no longer “revenge”, but “dignified exit” from a stagnant and potentially dangerous situation.
There have been some attempts at analyzing the mistakes committed by the “West” after September 11th. It is difficult to single out the one greatest error, but it is easy to recall the sense of horrified disbelief when “respected” western leaders , referring to the ill - fated Afghan campaign, and, with even greater emphasis, to the totally unrelated and unjustified invasion of Iraq, coined and used the expression “war on terror”, apparently unaware of its irrationality and of the potential risks such superficiality entailed.
It is not without a sense of deep embarrassment that one recalls the clumsy attempts made to equate the post 9/11 situation to the events of September 1939, pointing to public ignominy those who favoured “appeasement” with Saddam Hussein – who had nothing to do with the attacks – and subtly (and not always subtly) comparing the active western leaders to Churchill or Roosevelt, often getting historical facts grievously mixed up in the process.
An estimated 100,000 civilian and over 6000 “allied” combatant deaths later, it would appear difficult to draw anything but a bleak picture of the damage brought about by the unbelievable hubris which animated those who took such fateful, unwarranted and unwise decisions after the Twin Towers’ attack. The fact is that a military struggle so rashly named as a “war on terror” can never be won: the last terrorist will not appear out of nowhere, hands up shouting for mercy in the best Hollywood war movie tradition.
Above all, the assertion that, thanks to this military folly, the world is a “safer place” today is substantially false and totally misleading.
Indeed, the military action both in Afghanistan and in Iraq led to terrorist attacks in Spain, in the United Kingdom, in India and elsewhere, and if greater tragedies have been prevented it is due not to the results of military victories but to the greater attention on security made necessary by a visibly growing danger of terrorist attacks.
The answer lies in trying to understand where all this has brought us, and to attempt to identify the least damaging way forward..
There have recently been several well targeted and certainly deftly timed attacks in Kabul, including those on the U.S. Embassy and the “C.I.A.. Headquarters”, as well as the assassination of former president Rabbani. These acts, carried out by the Taliban or by other probably more aggressive and better organised entities, are clear messages aimed at those NATO countries most active in Afghanistan indicating that the time is long overdue for a level-headed, unemotional analysis of all the fundamental mistakes made both in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 shock and in later moves aimed at enhancing the Western military presence where it is neither needed nor welcomed.
The escalation of Drone attacks, and the building up of “secret” Drone centres in this and other areas will enhance the aggressive stance of the insurgents and create a legacy of resentment which will endure long after the actual fighting has ceased. As the balance of initiative keeps shifting in favour of the insurgents, and public opinion in the NATO countries develops a growing hostility towards the expense and the human sacrifice this military action entails, the latitude for a satisfactory negotiated settlement keeps diminishing, and the unanswerable question remains on what the original “war aims” were to begin with and what they have in common with today’s confused enumeration of asserted objectives.
It is astounding that none of the strategists involved in this ill-conceived effort realised that by subjecting Pakistan to attack, would be seen as an attempt to reach the very heart of Islam, which for some centuries has ceased to be in the Middle East and has taken firm hold on the Indian Subcontinent. Just leafing through a book on the Mogul dynasty would have been enough, especially if coupled with an analysis of events tied to the Partition of 1947.
The developments in Iraq, years after the infamous “Mission Accomplished” banner, are just as discouraging, and have the feel of a disaster waiting to happen. It is enough to ponder on recent statements by the Shiite leader Sayyid Muqtada el Sadr, once very much in the limelight and now conveniently ignored by the media: His call to his followers to desist from hostile activities until the final departure of the occupying forces is an eloquent indication of the obvious need to remain there for an indeterminate further period, during which inter-sectarian acts of violence will keep multiplying.
The consideration that these two military ventures have not made the world a “safer place” – indeed, it would be closer to the truth to assert the contrary – enhances the need urgently to find a way out, without being distracted by unrelated events and situations, particularly of an electoral nature.
The Afghan situation is made all the more dramatic by the virtual absence of a political counterpart with whom to conduct serious, meaningful negotiations, and the efforts to form responsible and reliable Afghan security forces have been having uneven success, especially considering that they have been going on for several years. Difficult as it is to look into the future, it seems legitimate to feel that the ultimate situation which the West will leave in Afghanistan will be in many aspects identical to the one left by the Soviet forces in 1989, with the added weight of even greater destruction and resentment.
“OpEd News il 12 ottobre)
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