With their typical and incurable penchant for over dramatisation, the Italian media and many political commentators had dubbed December 14, 2010, as “the day of reckoning”. Many, in fact – but not all – firmly believed that, on that fateful day, the Berlusconi Government would lose a vote of confidence and be compelled to resign, thus finally ushering in a new political era.
The Prime Minister, instead, using tactics which many decried as “shameful”, was able to attract a sufficient number of vacillating parliamentarians to his cause and survived the vote of confidence by the narrow margin of three votes. This was remarkable, considering that his majority, just a few months back, had seemed virtually unassailable.
The really important events, however, took place not within the “Palazzo” – as Italians contemptuously call the seats of power – but rather in the streets of Rome where a protest demonstration called by students exposed the City centre to episodes of violence unheard of since the seventies, and which caught the nation by surprise revealing, as it did, the extreme anger of the younger generations as well as their growing disaffection with the Machiavellian manoeuvrings which typify the Italian political scene.
Whatever his shortcomings, real or perceived, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, in power for the most part of the past sixteen years, has succeeded in forging much of Italy’s social reality and perceptions to his own image. If, on the one hand, recent events had led some to believe that he had come to the end of his remarkable political career, others did not hesitate to assert that it would be a bit early to start trotting out his political obituary, since he had given signs of a remarkable survival instinct several times in the past.
There is however no doubt that, even up to a few days before the vote, Berlusconi and his closest entourage appeared nervous, ill at ease, more irritable than usual and even beset by a sense of panic, as shown by their renewed and ever more violent attacks on hostile media, allegedly “communist inspired”, whose criticism of the Government has been defined as “anti-Italian” by the Prime Minister himself. Frequent references were also made to an alleged “international anti-Italian conspiracy” supported by the international media. To prove the existence of this supposed “foreign conspiracy” a variety of allegations were brought into play, such as the insistence, by the international press, to publicize “negative” stories about Italy, for example the garbage scandal in Naples or the Prime Minister’s sexual escapades.
It could be entertaining, but, in the long run, fatuous and useless, to sift through all the events and statements which have typified these days, some verging on the farcical, such as the shouting match, using raunchy epithets in the Neapolitan dialect, held between Alessandra Mussolini, the “Duce’s” granddaughter, and one of Berlusconi's former beauty queen cabinet ministers, recently dubbed by “Der Spiegel” as “the world’s most beautiful minister”. This, as well as other episodes, could indicate that there is trouble brewing in Berlusconi’s gynaeceum, for beauty queens, as a rule, seem unwilling obediently to toe the party line.
The basic situation, though apparently complex, can be defined by a few fundamental guidelines: The opposition parties, loud in their disapproval of Berlusconi, would, in reality, prefer to see the Government last a while longer, because they feel politically insecure and fear defeat should early elections be called.
The Prime Minister himself, though quite sure of victory, would also prefer to avoid elections, fearing the apparent surge in the popularity of his allied party, the Northern League, which, for its part, would, instead be very glad to see the fall of the Government, knowing that they would emerge with renewed strength in case of early elections.
At least three possible scenarios could emerge from this unpleasantly chaotic atmosphere:
By very aggressively continuing in his campaign to pursue and purchase the votes of insecure parliamentarians, Berlusconi could weather the storm and continue until 2014. At that date a successor will have to be found for president Napolitano, who will have reached the end of his mandate, and Berlusconi would have a good chance to be elected President by a joint session of the Italian Parliament. This solution may seem rather unlikely, but is certainly not impossible.
A more likely scenario, the one pursued, sometimes obliquely, more often openly, by the Prime Minister’s main ally, the Northern League, would have Berlusconi handing in his resignation to president Napolitano, acting on the assumption that the President will call for the dissolution of Parliament and new elections. Those very opposition political forces who are clamouring for Berlusconi's resignation fear this outcome because they feel that a coalition between Berlusconi and the xenophobic, racist “Northern League” would almost certainly win, bringing Berlusconi back into power, albeit under the Leagues' thrall.
The only way in which Berlusconi can be defeated would be through the creation of a “national unity“ caretaker transitional Government, perhaps under the leadership of a non-political figure, to last out the remaining years of the legislature. This is probably the solution also favoured by president Napolitano – for there is no love lost between him and Berlusconi – but it risks being stymied by the divisions which beset the opposition political parties, who seem intent in an almost suicidal campaign destined to discourage any attempt at unity. Berlusconi’s attitude is ambiguous: on the one hand he has repeated his opposition to early elections, but, at the same time, he has been multiplying his appearances on Television and has refurbished all his old electoral slogans against “Communists in Cashmere sweaters” who have infiltrated the Judicial system and are out to get him.
In this volatile, unpredictable and perhaps ultimately dangerous situation, it would be useful to shift the focus of analysis on the role played by the Roman Catholic Church, embodied by the Italian Episcopal Conference (CEI), whose interference in Italian political life has become increasingly pervasive and forceful, filling, as it were, a preoccupying political and institutional void.
The Vatican, viewed from Rome, appears far more intriguing and interesting – some would even say sinister - than is generally recognized. Outsiders – even journalists and commentators who have lived in Rome for some time - seldom fully appreciate the burdensome weight that the Vatican, the Holy See and the Church (three quite distinct realities) represent in the complex, sometimes comically ritualised Italian political game. A review of the attitudes and moves of the Roman Catholic Authorities over the past months and years could bring about a deeper understanding of the grave – some would say epochal – current state of political upheaval in Italy.
The suffocating grip that the Catholic Hierarchy has and keeps on the Italian political and social scene, beginning, of course, with the main sources of information, needs to be understood. Italian public radio and television, even in the very rare programs which are critical of the Government, dare not contradict or critically comment the Vatican’s line on the principal and most sensitive issues. This is of particular significance in a monoglot society in which foreign sources of information are ignored.
It should be understood that, by his erratic behaviour (i.e. affairs with young girls of dubious reputation, occasional use of blasphemous language, etc.), Berlusconi has actually played into the hands of the Catholic Church, which, by shifting from attitudes of condemnation to expressions of support has been able to obtain privileges and to prevent the discussion of sensitive topics in Parliament.
At this stage, in an attitude chillingly reminiscent of the early years of Fascism, the Church seems rather inclined to favour the continuation of the present Government, using the votes of one of the opposition parties, the U.D.C,, whose leader, Ferdinando Casini, with the shy smile of an unfrocked priest, could well be the political personality most favoured by the Church to take over from Berlusconi when the time is ripe.
The Northern League has practically issued an ultimatum: if the Government cannot obtain a credible majority by the end of January, it would be best to have new elections. The tough, competent Minister for the Economy has indirectly made it clear that no money would be available further to purchase favours and votes, and this seems to put Berlusconi in a weakened position, unless Casini, encouraged by the Vatican, should step in, abandoning his opposition allies and thus ensuring a solid majority.
This solution also has risks, because the Northern League has stated that it would not be ready to share power with the U.D.C. unless Casini’s party gives assurances that it will make vital concessions in the League’s struggle to pass laws transforming Italy’s structure into a federal system.
The situation is far from clear and seems to get murkier by the day. Perhaps by the end of January a solution will be found, but the ensuing political scene will be more fragile and volatile than ever.
Published by Open Democracy on January 12 2012
giovedì 13 gennaio 2011
sabato 11 dicembre 2010
AFGHANISTAN’S TRIBAL STRUCTURE NEEDS TO BE RESPECTED
The recent Conference held in Rome on “the way forward” in Afghanistan, has laid bare the basic unwillingness – or inability - of the International Community to consider a change in its stance on the complex process of “transition”. The only positive aspect of the conference was the belated, and rather passive, presence of Iran.
Of much greater import is the news that, in the forthcoming Lisbon summit, the “withdrawal date” may be moved forward another four years, thus scrapping the growingly unrealistic target date of July 2011, and, at the same time, creating internal political problems to many of the participating countries, not excluding the United States.
By now the statements coming from ISAF spokespersons on the alleged military progress seem totally otiose, and can easily be disregarded. Further thought should be given to the civilian issues which have been either overlooked or wrongly approached.
Many commentators on Afghanistan have recently concentrated their attention on the tribalism and nepotism which appear to dominate Karzai’s presidential style. Few, however, have bothered to point out that tribalism and nepotism, in some social and cultural contexts, can actually become extremely strong foundations on which to construct a credible and successful government. This has often been the way in Afghanistan, as well as in other similar societies, whenever a free choice of governance was available. Most likely only a system based on these principles could possibly ensure relative peace in Afghanistan after the departure of foreign troops.
Those who were interested in Afghanistan’s political structure in the peaceful and relatively prosperous years of the Zahir Shah Monarchy (1932 – 1973) will recall that while, to all appearances, Afghanistan was a unified Kingdom ruled by a benevolent, unassuming and rather Western oriented Monarch, in reality the King owed his power exclusively to the combined goodwill of the Pashto tribes (he was a Mohammedzai), and was treated with respect, but certainly not with undue reverence, by the non-Pashto Provinces, in the North and in the West.
Any attempt to plaster over this centuries old reality with a flimsy veneer of Western political philosophy, however well-intentioned, is doomed to failure. The very words – “tribalism” and “nepotism” – have negative connotations for us, but we ought to realise that these are fundamental social truths which, in past centuries, were driving forces even behind the construction of modern Europe, kept in check mainly by strong unifying forces such as the Empire, the Papacy and the rising Monarchies and Baronies eventually to become today’s Nation States. These basic factors in human social development actually still have an important role in some European areas.
This fundamental character of Afghan society has to be understood and respected in order to avoid errors of the past, even those committed during the Monarchy and in the following years which can be summarised as a futile attempt to accelerate history by imposing alien social and political models unsuited to the fabric of Afghan society.
The recent news of “secret” talks between the insurgency and the Karzai Government, with the seeming support of the NATO Command, although, as yet, rather ambiguous, could be a positive signal, indicating a way out of the Afghan labyrinth without excessive further damage to the Civil Society. There is reason to fear, however, that, even if successful, these negotiations may terminate the foreign occupation of Afghanistan but will not lead the country to a peaceful future, and will not avoid the seemingly inevitable inter-ethnic and tribal violence which will follow NATO withdrawal. There is, in fact, a substantial risk that any agreement would, in reality, be limited to the Pashto ethnicity, with only some formal concern shown for the other parts of the population, and this will have tragic effects on the fragile social structure left over from all these years of foreign occupation.
A serious attempt ought to be made, instead, for a greater involvement of tribal and other traditional leaders. The somewhat discredited Karzai leadership and the Taleban insurgency should not be left alone in determining Afghanistan’s future. Perhaps a second great Jirga, this time convened in the traditional manner and not limited to leaders faithful to the Karzai line, could lay the initial groundwork for the creation of an Afghan state able to elicit the loyalty of the entire population.
If, however, present policies are going to be stubbornly pursued, the end of foreign occupation will most probably be followed by tribal and ethnic conflicts, basically a “civil war”, which will leave the country subject to even greater divisions than those left by the Soviet Union in 1989. It is absurd to believe that, in the space of a few months, a unified army and a reliable police force can be formed through patchy training programmes in a Country historically divided along ethnic and tribal lines, and which has been either in a state of virtual anarchy or under foreign domination for over three decades.
As long as the International community, responsible for Afghanistan’s future after long years of occupation, keeps talking of “transition” in irresponsibly unenlightened terms, even the most slender remaining hopes for peaceful development will prove vain.
Of much greater import is the news that, in the forthcoming Lisbon summit, the “withdrawal date” may be moved forward another four years, thus scrapping the growingly unrealistic target date of July 2011, and, at the same time, creating internal political problems to many of the participating countries, not excluding the United States.
By now the statements coming from ISAF spokespersons on the alleged military progress seem totally otiose, and can easily be disregarded. Further thought should be given to the civilian issues which have been either overlooked or wrongly approached.
Many commentators on Afghanistan have recently concentrated their attention on the tribalism and nepotism which appear to dominate Karzai’s presidential style. Few, however, have bothered to point out that tribalism and nepotism, in some social and cultural contexts, can actually become extremely strong foundations on which to construct a credible and successful government. This has often been the way in Afghanistan, as well as in other similar societies, whenever a free choice of governance was available. Most likely only a system based on these principles could possibly ensure relative peace in Afghanistan after the departure of foreign troops.
Those who were interested in Afghanistan’s political structure in the peaceful and relatively prosperous years of the Zahir Shah Monarchy (1932 – 1973) will recall that while, to all appearances, Afghanistan was a unified Kingdom ruled by a benevolent, unassuming and rather Western oriented Monarch, in reality the King owed his power exclusively to the combined goodwill of the Pashto tribes (he was a Mohammedzai), and was treated with respect, but certainly not with undue reverence, by the non-Pashto Provinces, in the North and in the West.
Any attempt to plaster over this centuries old reality with a flimsy veneer of Western political philosophy, however well-intentioned, is doomed to failure. The very words – “tribalism” and “nepotism” – have negative connotations for us, but we ought to realise that these are fundamental social truths which, in past centuries, were driving forces even behind the construction of modern Europe, kept in check mainly by strong unifying forces such as the Empire, the Papacy and the rising Monarchies and Baronies eventually to become today’s Nation States. These basic factors in human social development actually still have an important role in some European areas.
This fundamental character of Afghan society has to be understood and respected in order to avoid errors of the past, even those committed during the Monarchy and in the following years which can be summarised as a futile attempt to accelerate history by imposing alien social and political models unsuited to the fabric of Afghan society.
The recent news of “secret” talks between the insurgency and the Karzai Government, with the seeming support of the NATO Command, although, as yet, rather ambiguous, could be a positive signal, indicating a way out of the Afghan labyrinth without excessive further damage to the Civil Society. There is reason to fear, however, that, even if successful, these negotiations may terminate the foreign occupation of Afghanistan but will not lead the country to a peaceful future, and will not avoid the seemingly inevitable inter-ethnic and tribal violence which will follow NATO withdrawal. There is, in fact, a substantial risk that any agreement would, in reality, be limited to the Pashto ethnicity, with only some formal concern shown for the other parts of the population, and this will have tragic effects on the fragile social structure left over from all these years of foreign occupation.
A serious attempt ought to be made, instead, for a greater involvement of tribal and other traditional leaders. The somewhat discredited Karzai leadership and the Taleban insurgency should not be left alone in determining Afghanistan’s future. Perhaps a second great Jirga, this time convened in the traditional manner and not limited to leaders faithful to the Karzai line, could lay the initial groundwork for the creation of an Afghan state able to elicit the loyalty of the entire population.
If, however, present policies are going to be stubbornly pursued, the end of foreign occupation will most probably be followed by tribal and ethnic conflicts, basically a “civil war”, which will leave the country subject to even greater divisions than those left by the Soviet Union in 1989. It is absurd to believe that, in the space of a few months, a unified army and a reliable police force can be formed through patchy training programmes in a Country historically divided along ethnic and tribal lines, and which has been either in a state of virtual anarchy or under foreign domination for over three decades.
As long as the International community, responsible for Afghanistan’s future after long years of occupation, keeps talking of “transition” in irresponsibly unenlightened terms, even the most slender remaining hopes for peaceful development will prove vain.
IS BERLUSCONI ITALY'S "COME-BACK KID"?
Whatever his shortcomings, and, indeed, there are many, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has succeeded in forging much of Italy’s social reality and perceptions to his own image. If, on the one hand, recent events could appear as threatening an end to his remarkable political career, there are also reasons to believe that it could be a bit early to start trotting out his political obituary.
There is no doubt that Berlusconi and his closest entourage do appear nervous, ill at ease, more irritable than usual and even beset by a sense of panic, as shown by their renewed and ever more violent attacks on hostile media, allegedly “communist inspired”, whose criticism of the Government has been defined as “anti-Italian” by the Prime Minister himself. The latest symptom of panic has been a succession of remarks, at first veiled and then increasingly overt, by Berlusconi and his Foreign Minister, on a presumed “anti-Italian conspiracy” supported by the international media. To prove the existence of this assumed “foreign conspiracy” a variety of allegations are brought into play. Reference is often made on the insistence, by the international press, to publicize “negative” stories about Italy, such as the garbage scandal in Naples or the Prime Minister’s sexual escapades. More recently, the damaging files published by Wikileaks have also been repeatedly mentioned, in an attempt to cast Wikileaks as a co-conspirator, while at the same time minimizing the import of the published material, defined, by the Prime Minister and the obedient public Television, as “gossip, lifted from the opposition newspapers”.
All this, in conjunction with an apparently growing pressure from large segments of the Italian political scene, including former allies, urging Berlusconi to resign would seem to confirm the approaching Gotterdammerung, which, as usual in Italy, is not devoid of comic-opera settings. A recent example was given by a publicly televised heated exchange of insults, in the Neapolitan dialect, between a former beauty queen, now a Cabinet Minister (dubbed by some as the “world’s most beautiful Minister”), and the Duce’s grand-daughter, Alessandra Mussolini, both part of Berlusconi’s majority. The insults were of an extremely vulgar variety and had to be translated into Italian, giving the public a welcome respite from the grey, nebulous and ever less understandable statements by other political leaders..
Berlusconi, however, has shown in the past to be an incredible political survivor, and it may be a mistake to consider his political career as being over. He could actually benefit from the state of utter confusion in which the Italian political scene finds itself, and end up as one of the two beneficiaries of the ongoing crisis (the other beneficiary being his closest political ally, the “Northern League”).
This is no ordinary political crisis. Berlusconi is dominated by two very strong ambitions: firstly to avoid appearing in Court to face a number of prosecutions which could even end up with prison sentences, and, secondly, to be elected President of the Republic and triumphantly enter the Quirinale Palace, official home of Popes, Kings and Presidents since the sixteenth century.
The date of December 14 could well indicate the future trends. On that day there will be two simultaneous votes in Parliament (something unheard of in Italian republican history): a “vote of confidence” in the Government, called by Berlusconi's allies, in the Senate, and a “vote of no confidence”, presented by a loose collection of his rivals, in the Lower House. On that same day, in one of those dramatic coincidences so dear to the Italian political sensibility, the Constitutional Court was scheduled to rule on the constitutionality of one of the many legal shields which the Berlusconi Government has enacted to protect the Prime Minister from prosecution. This last event has been postponed and will take place in January, thus giving the Prime Minister some further breathing space.
At least three possible scenarios could emerge:
By very aggressively pursuing and purchasing the votes of insecure parliamentarians, Berlusconi could well win both confidence votes and thus weather the storm and continue until 2014, when, as Prime Minister, he could have a good chance to be elected President by a joint session of the Italian Parliament. This solution may seem rather unlikely, but is certainly not impossible.
After either losing one of the confidence votes, or winning by a very thin margin, Berlusconi could decide to hand in his resignation to president Napolitano, acting on the assumption that the President will call for the dissolution of Parliament and new elections. Those very opposition political forces who are clamouring for Berlusconi's resignation fear this outcome because they feel that a coalition between Berlusconi and the xenophobic, racist “Northern League” would almost certainly win, bringing Berlusconi back into power, albeit under the Leagues' thrall.
The only way in which Berlusconi can be defeated would be through the creation of a “national unity“ caretaker transitional Government, perhaps under the leadership of a non-political figure, to last out the remaining years of the legislature (i.e. until the year 2014). This is probably the solution also favoured by president Napolitano – for there is no love lost between him and Berlusconi – but it risks being stymied by the divisions which beset the opposition political parties, who seem intent in an almost suicidal campaign destined to discourage any attempt at unity.
In politics, and even more so in Italian politics, a week is a very long time, and much can happen before December 14, including the forging of alliances among groups or parties which at this stage seem anchored to irreconcilable positions. Close attention will also have to be paid to the actions of the Catholic Church which has been interfering in Italian politics with growing forcefulness, and which could well become the deciding factor either by abandoning Berlusconi because of his “immoral” behaviour, or by endorsing him thus encouraging the “Catholic” political leaders to signify their support and save the government from a crisis which would otherwise seem inevitable.
There is no doubt that Berlusconi and his closest entourage do appear nervous, ill at ease, more irritable than usual and even beset by a sense of panic, as shown by their renewed and ever more violent attacks on hostile media, allegedly “communist inspired”, whose criticism of the Government has been defined as “anti-Italian” by the Prime Minister himself. The latest symptom of panic has been a succession of remarks, at first veiled and then increasingly overt, by Berlusconi and his Foreign Minister, on a presumed “anti-Italian conspiracy” supported by the international media. To prove the existence of this assumed “foreign conspiracy” a variety of allegations are brought into play. Reference is often made on the insistence, by the international press, to publicize “negative” stories about Italy, such as the garbage scandal in Naples or the Prime Minister’s sexual escapades. More recently, the damaging files published by Wikileaks have also been repeatedly mentioned, in an attempt to cast Wikileaks as a co-conspirator, while at the same time minimizing the import of the published material, defined, by the Prime Minister and the obedient public Television, as “gossip, lifted from the opposition newspapers”.
All this, in conjunction with an apparently growing pressure from large segments of the Italian political scene, including former allies, urging Berlusconi to resign would seem to confirm the approaching Gotterdammerung, which, as usual in Italy, is not devoid of comic-opera settings. A recent example was given by a publicly televised heated exchange of insults, in the Neapolitan dialect, between a former beauty queen, now a Cabinet Minister (dubbed by some as the “world’s most beautiful Minister”), and the Duce’s grand-daughter, Alessandra Mussolini, both part of Berlusconi’s majority. The insults were of an extremely vulgar variety and had to be translated into Italian, giving the public a welcome respite from the grey, nebulous and ever less understandable statements by other political leaders..
Berlusconi, however, has shown in the past to be an incredible political survivor, and it may be a mistake to consider his political career as being over. He could actually benefit from the state of utter confusion in which the Italian political scene finds itself, and end up as one of the two beneficiaries of the ongoing crisis (the other beneficiary being his closest political ally, the “Northern League”).
This is no ordinary political crisis. Berlusconi is dominated by two very strong ambitions: firstly to avoid appearing in Court to face a number of prosecutions which could even end up with prison sentences, and, secondly, to be elected President of the Republic and triumphantly enter the Quirinale Palace, official home of Popes, Kings and Presidents since the sixteenth century.
The date of December 14 could well indicate the future trends. On that day there will be two simultaneous votes in Parliament (something unheard of in Italian republican history): a “vote of confidence” in the Government, called by Berlusconi's allies, in the Senate, and a “vote of no confidence”, presented by a loose collection of his rivals, in the Lower House. On that same day, in one of those dramatic coincidences so dear to the Italian political sensibility, the Constitutional Court was scheduled to rule on the constitutionality of one of the many legal shields which the Berlusconi Government has enacted to protect the Prime Minister from prosecution. This last event has been postponed and will take place in January, thus giving the Prime Minister some further breathing space.
At least three possible scenarios could emerge:
By very aggressively pursuing and purchasing the votes of insecure parliamentarians, Berlusconi could well win both confidence votes and thus weather the storm and continue until 2014, when, as Prime Minister, he could have a good chance to be elected President by a joint session of the Italian Parliament. This solution may seem rather unlikely, but is certainly not impossible.
After either losing one of the confidence votes, or winning by a very thin margin, Berlusconi could decide to hand in his resignation to president Napolitano, acting on the assumption that the President will call for the dissolution of Parliament and new elections. Those very opposition political forces who are clamouring for Berlusconi's resignation fear this outcome because they feel that a coalition between Berlusconi and the xenophobic, racist “Northern League” would almost certainly win, bringing Berlusconi back into power, albeit under the Leagues' thrall.
The only way in which Berlusconi can be defeated would be through the creation of a “national unity“ caretaker transitional Government, perhaps under the leadership of a non-political figure, to last out the remaining years of the legislature (i.e. until the year 2014). This is probably the solution also favoured by president Napolitano – for there is no love lost between him and Berlusconi – but it risks being stymied by the divisions which beset the opposition political parties, who seem intent in an almost suicidal campaign destined to discourage any attempt at unity.
In politics, and even more so in Italian politics, a week is a very long time, and much can happen before December 14, including the forging of alliances among groups or parties which at this stage seem anchored to irreconcilable positions. Close attention will also have to be paid to the actions of the Catholic Church which has been interfering in Italian politics with growing forcefulness, and which could well become the deciding factor either by abandoning Berlusconi because of his “immoral” behaviour, or by endorsing him thus encouraging the “Catholic” political leaders to signify their support and save the government from a crisis which would otherwise seem inevitable.
sabato 9 ottobre 2010
AFGHANISTAN BETRAYED
(This article was published in "Open Democracy" on October 9, 2010)
The approach of winter has usually indicated a respite in the Afghan conflict. This year, however, there seems to be no pause in the continuous litany of bad news emerging from there. Pakistan, for its part, seems relatively quiet. Perhaps the tragic floods, greeted with some indifference by the outside world, have contributed in quieting down insurgent and military activity there, since both the Army and the insurgent forces have been occupied in rescue operations. The Western Alliance’s most visible contribution has been the continuation of the destruction of villages by Drone attacks, thus probably hastening the demise of this “democratic” government in favour of a military administration as well as accumulating further anti-Western resentment for the immediate future.
The tense and violent atmosphere in which the recent Afghan parliamentary elections have taken place is a prime indication of how the situation is fast deteriorating. Dishonestly triumphant proclamations would have us compare these elections – in terms of turnout and number of violent episodes - to the recent, disastrous, almost farcical presidential vote. A different image emerges if a comparison is made with the previous parliamentary elections, in the fall of 2005, which I witnessed as an international monitor and which took place, by and large, in a peaceful and even good-humoured atmosphere.
At this stage, it is difficult to express an informed evaluation of the news that “secret” negotiations are taking place between the Taleban and the Afghan Government. The very tribal structure of the latter, and the apparent absolute condition set by the Taleban that no agreement can be reached with foreign troops still in occupation seem to indicate some fragility in the proceedings.
In any historical analysis, it is not always easy to identify turning points, in which right or wrong decisions can be viewed as fundamental in determining the course of events. This is all the more arduous when the events are chronologically close and fresh in the memory of protagonists and witnesses.
Those fateful months, between 2005 and 2006, may well have constituted one of those watershed moments, in which a less obtuse mentality on the part of the Allies could possibly have prevented the road to what now seems like an inevitable disaster.
It is a well-known axiom that negotiations with insurgent, or “guerrilla” forces have to be undertaken from a position of unquestionable strength, unless, as in the case of the Soviet forces in 1989, their aim is to secure retreat. This, I believe, was the basic reasoning behind the much publicised intentions to “liberate” Kandahar, and thus be able to confront the insurgency in the wake of a resounding military success. Of course, wiser counsels having prevailed, the offensive never took place, and there has been no visible shift of the situation in NATO’s favour.
The Western forces, however, most certainly were in a position of strength in 2006, and even the sporadic suicide attacks in the name of the Taleban insurgency were usually perpetrated by Arabs or Pakistanis, showing that the movement was not all that strong on the ground. At that stage, albeit in indirect, oblique ways, overtures were being made by some of the Taleban leaders, including the Mullah Omar. Suggestions to the effect that it would be a good idea to respond to these approaches were, however, slapped down unceremoniously with the specious (and contradictory) motivations that “we don’t negotiate with terrorists” and that “the Taleban don’t want to talk”.
It was apparently believed that, with a “democratically elected” Parliament and President, the Afghans had become masters of their own fate. According to a childishly dangerous thinking, the holding of elections in occupied territories invariably constitutes a panacea and should subsequently discourage complaints on the part of the population. I really don’t know what would have happened if “free and democratic” elections had been held in Italy in 1944. Elections should come after pacification, not as an early step towards peace and normality.
It is no coincidence, therefore, that the situation began to deteriorate rapidly in the spring of 2007 when the sum of allied mistakes, miscalculations and cynical unconcern seemed to give the insurgency – no longer exclusively “Taleban” – renewed vigour, allowing it to expand and to infiltrate the population with ease.
All this paved the way for the present situation, in which it has become acceptable, indeed fashionable to assert that there is no satisfactory explanation to justify NATO’s continued presence in Afghanistan on these terms, that the war is unwinnable no matter how many “surges” can be added, and that we are on our way to the third betrayal or abandonment of the Afghan people by the West in the space of two short decades.
In 1989, after ten years of occupation, the Soviet Union bought its way out of Afghanistan, leaving behind a country torn by civil war which most often involved those very “war lords”, as well as the Taleban, who had been armed and financed by the West to resist Soviet occupation. At this stage the country needed outside help and was instead abandoned to itself. The chief victim of this short-sighted policy was, of course, the charismatic figure of Ahmed Shah Massoud, who was to be assassinated on the eve of the September 11 attacks. Massoud had tried to alert Western public opinion, even addressing the European Parliament, but meeting polite indifference. He has been quoted as lamenting the fact that Europeans and Americans did not realise that his fight against the Taleban was also in our interest.
The Afghan people were again betrayed and abandoned right after the 2001 invasion. At first it was really believed that NATO’s invasion of Afghanistan would serve many purposes: the eradication of Al Qaeda, the defeat of the Taleban, and the encouragement of reform. None of this was true, and the Afghan invasion served principally as a dress rehearsal for the invasion of Iraq, which had far greater weight on the western agendas.
The third betrayal is imminent, and will occur when, after having destroyed much of what was left of the country’s fragile social structure , we shall again leave the Afghanistan to itself, expressing totally insincere and unrealistic confidence in its “democratic” institutions..
It is tragically easy to foresee the consequences.
The approach of winter has usually indicated a respite in the Afghan conflict. This year, however, there seems to be no pause in the continuous litany of bad news emerging from there. Pakistan, for its part, seems relatively quiet. Perhaps the tragic floods, greeted with some indifference by the outside world, have contributed in quieting down insurgent and military activity there, since both the Army and the insurgent forces have been occupied in rescue operations. The Western Alliance’s most visible contribution has been the continuation of the destruction of villages by Drone attacks, thus probably hastening the demise of this “democratic” government in favour of a military administration as well as accumulating further anti-Western resentment for the immediate future.
The tense and violent atmosphere in which the recent Afghan parliamentary elections have taken place is a prime indication of how the situation is fast deteriorating. Dishonestly triumphant proclamations would have us compare these elections – in terms of turnout and number of violent episodes - to the recent, disastrous, almost farcical presidential vote. A different image emerges if a comparison is made with the previous parliamentary elections, in the fall of 2005, which I witnessed as an international monitor and which took place, by and large, in a peaceful and even good-humoured atmosphere.
At this stage, it is difficult to express an informed evaluation of the news that “secret” negotiations are taking place between the Taleban and the Afghan Government. The very tribal structure of the latter, and the apparent absolute condition set by the Taleban that no agreement can be reached with foreign troops still in occupation seem to indicate some fragility in the proceedings.
In any historical analysis, it is not always easy to identify turning points, in which right or wrong decisions can be viewed as fundamental in determining the course of events. This is all the more arduous when the events are chronologically close and fresh in the memory of protagonists and witnesses.
Those fateful months, between 2005 and 2006, may well have constituted one of those watershed moments, in which a less obtuse mentality on the part of the Allies could possibly have prevented the road to what now seems like an inevitable disaster.
It is a well-known axiom that negotiations with insurgent, or “guerrilla” forces have to be undertaken from a position of unquestionable strength, unless, as in the case of the Soviet forces in 1989, their aim is to secure retreat. This, I believe, was the basic reasoning behind the much publicised intentions to “liberate” Kandahar, and thus be able to confront the insurgency in the wake of a resounding military success. Of course, wiser counsels having prevailed, the offensive never took place, and there has been no visible shift of the situation in NATO’s favour.
The Western forces, however, most certainly were in a position of strength in 2006, and even the sporadic suicide attacks in the name of the Taleban insurgency were usually perpetrated by Arabs or Pakistanis, showing that the movement was not all that strong on the ground. At that stage, albeit in indirect, oblique ways, overtures were being made by some of the Taleban leaders, including the Mullah Omar. Suggestions to the effect that it would be a good idea to respond to these approaches were, however, slapped down unceremoniously with the specious (and contradictory) motivations that “we don’t negotiate with terrorists” and that “the Taleban don’t want to talk”.
It was apparently believed that, with a “democratically elected” Parliament and President, the Afghans had become masters of their own fate. According to a childishly dangerous thinking, the holding of elections in occupied territories invariably constitutes a panacea and should subsequently discourage complaints on the part of the population. I really don’t know what would have happened if “free and democratic” elections had been held in Italy in 1944. Elections should come after pacification, not as an early step towards peace and normality.
It is no coincidence, therefore, that the situation began to deteriorate rapidly in the spring of 2007 when the sum of allied mistakes, miscalculations and cynical unconcern seemed to give the insurgency – no longer exclusively “Taleban” – renewed vigour, allowing it to expand and to infiltrate the population with ease.
All this paved the way for the present situation, in which it has become acceptable, indeed fashionable to assert that there is no satisfactory explanation to justify NATO’s continued presence in Afghanistan on these terms, that the war is unwinnable no matter how many “surges” can be added, and that we are on our way to the third betrayal or abandonment of the Afghan people by the West in the space of two short decades.
In 1989, after ten years of occupation, the Soviet Union bought its way out of Afghanistan, leaving behind a country torn by civil war which most often involved those very “war lords”, as well as the Taleban, who had been armed and financed by the West to resist Soviet occupation. At this stage the country needed outside help and was instead abandoned to itself. The chief victim of this short-sighted policy was, of course, the charismatic figure of Ahmed Shah Massoud, who was to be assassinated on the eve of the September 11 attacks. Massoud had tried to alert Western public opinion, even addressing the European Parliament, but meeting polite indifference. He has been quoted as lamenting the fact that Europeans and Americans did not realise that his fight against the Taleban was also in our interest.
The Afghan people were again betrayed and abandoned right after the 2001 invasion. At first it was really believed that NATO’s invasion of Afghanistan would serve many purposes: the eradication of Al Qaeda, the defeat of the Taleban, and the encouragement of reform. None of this was true, and the Afghan invasion served principally as a dress rehearsal for the invasion of Iraq, which had far greater weight on the western agendas.
The third betrayal is imminent, and will occur when, after having destroyed much of what was left of the country’s fragile social structure , we shall again leave the Afghanistan to itself, expressing totally insincere and unrealistic confidence in its “democratic” institutions..
It is tragically easy to foresee the consequences.
sabato 4 settembre 2010
An Italian "Gotterdammerung"
(This article was published by "Open Democracy" on September 2, 2010)
Has Berlusconi reached the end of the road?
Italians, as the Romans before them, have never really taken their Gods seriously. Even the Greek deities, with all their psychological complexities, were rather trivialized when they entered the Roman Olympus, losing most of their awe-inspiring qualities and becoming, rather, paternal (or maternal) figures – with occasional, conveniently timed, miraculous manifestations - to whom one could entrust one’s health, prosperity or loved ones. Indeed, their qualities greatly resembled those attributed to present day Saints in Italy, keeping in mind in the particularly pagan-oriented Catholicism of most Italians.
A very similar treatment is reserved for political leaders. Even the Pope, as temporal leader for about fifteen centuries, was chased out of Rome amid popular jubilation more than once, only to be welcomed back just as jubilantly. The last time this happened was rather recently, in 1849, at the proclamation of the glorious but short-lived Roman Republic.
This perhaps explains the success of populist, paternalistic leaders – the last one, Bettino Craxi, ending his days a fugitive from justice in Tunisia, after a long stint as Prime Minister. The same public which had welcomed him tumultuously, finally threw coins at him in the street: a gesture of ultimate contempt for a theatre loving people like the Italians.
This also explains the complexities and paradoxes of Italian political life. Voter turnout in Italy is one of the world’s highest, but the concept of “anti-politica” repeatedly appears. This appeal to the jaded palate of Italian voters was most recently exploited by the popular Genoese comedian, Beppe Grillo who, in the name of “anti-politica”, has had some success at the polls.
Recent events, as reported also in a recent article in Open Democracy, seemed to indicate a growing rift in Mr. Berlusconi’s ruling coalition, mainly at the hands of the Lower House president, Gianfranco Fini. There was much talk of a Government crisis and the need to call early elections, though at the moment all this seems to have been overcome. But has it? I believe that an attempt could be made to analyze the situation and to try to fathom what is really going on , what the motivations of the main actors are and what the short term outcome of the crisis could be.
It has to be understood, firstly, that in Italy success at the polls does not imply stability or, for that matter, efficiency in Government, no matter how large a majority has been achieved.
In no context other than Italy, would a Government in the hands of a popular, rather charismatic figure, with undeniable authoritarian ambitions and a virtual monopoly on sources of information, who can count on what we call a “Bulgarian majority” in Parliament appear unable to govern and face the possible imminent disintegration of a structure which seemed indestructible only two years ago.
It would be mistaken to attribute this to the work of the political opposition, which is divided and ineffectual, still involved in ideological disputes reminiscent of the Cold War years and which fears a government crisis even more than Berlusconi. In fact, if the Prime Minister could call a snap election, he would most probably beat them with one hand tied behind his back (As Fiorello La Guardia, legendary Mayor of New York, once said “I could run on a laundry ticket and beat these political bums any time”).
It would seem, therefore, that, actually, Berlusconi himself would not be all that opposed to an early election, also keeping in mind his firm hold – a virtual monopoly – on almost all the Television channels, but he is not constitutionally allowed to call for one, unless his Government is defeated in a vote of Confidence. Even then, however, the President of the Republic, Napolitano, would have to ask the political parties to attempt the formation of a “transitional” Government, which would be a “de facto” defeat for the Prime Minister..
The situation would appear confused unless one keeps in mind that Italian politics are conducted along lines reminiscent of the “Commedia dell’Arte”, in which set characters, or “masks” (e.g. Arlecchino, Pulcinella etc., the cultural forebears of “Punch and Judy”) play preordained roles which leave little or no room for diversion. In this framework, while trying to understand whether Berlusconi has really reached the end of the road, one has to keep an eye on all the other characters, firstly, of course, the sycophants in his own entourage, each of whom is ready to stab him in the back, but also among the mainstream opposition and coalition figures.
The larger – more or less centrist – opposition groups are loud in their condemnation of the “regime”, but when it comes to action they fall short of causing a Government crisis, because, they say, of the “difficult” economic situation. In reality, they fear an electoral confrontation because they feel that in spite of Berlusconi’s obvious weakness, he could still come out on top, and, even if at the head of a weak Government could rule the country for years to come..
Who would benefit, then, from a Government crisis? Certainly, among the Governing coalition, the “Northern League”. Counting on its simplistic xenophobic, racist, anti-Muslim and, above all, “federalist” message this incredibly successful political party would, as in all past occasions, show large gains and thus increase its grip on the apparently powerful but in reality hapless Prime Minister. Among the outsiders, a maverick personality such as Beppe Grillo could benefit, as well as the pugnacious former Public Prosecutor, Antonio Di Pietro whose actions, some twenty years back, triggered the “Clean Hands” movement and brought about the end of the so-called “First Republic”.
Within the coalition Berlusconi’s one time principal ally, Gianfranco Fini, currently in a position roughly equivalent to that of “Speaker of the House”, and therefore carrying considerable institutional weight, has been the prime promoter of the crisis. He has to tread carefully, however, because elections called too early would damage his position perhaps irrevocably and he would be added to the vast number of political have-beens fallen in the wake of Berlusconi’s irrepressible political personality.
What about Berlusconi himself? In any other country he would be politically finished, beleaguered as he is by corruption charges and episodes of sexual misconduct, with many of his closest allies facing trial or having actually been handed prison sentences.
It has to be added that, Italy being the unique political puzzle that it is, many are trying to read the signs and attempt to understand the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church, which, in reality, has been issuing mixed signals, many of them, however, critical of Berlusconi.
The unspoken question, however is “after Berlusconi, who?”
The feeling is that Berlusconi could survive, and that, quite possibly, nothing will happen simply because none of the protagonists will want to cast the first stone. There is also an additional fact which is seldom mentioned: to claim a retirement pension – a not indifferent sum of money for life – parliamentarians have to serve for thirty consecutive months, and some time must still elapse for them to reach that goal..
If Berlusconi is finally brought down, he will not go quietly, but in all his glory, leaving behind a fondly nostalgic memory of high living, low politics and a bevy of stunning ex-starlets, some in Cabinet positions. As they say in Show Business, a difficult act to follow.
In Italy, even the Twilight of the Gods has a Comic Opera setting.
Has Berlusconi reached the end of the road?
Italians, as the Romans before them, have never really taken their Gods seriously. Even the Greek deities, with all their psychological complexities, were rather trivialized when they entered the Roman Olympus, losing most of their awe-inspiring qualities and becoming, rather, paternal (or maternal) figures – with occasional, conveniently timed, miraculous manifestations - to whom one could entrust one’s health, prosperity or loved ones. Indeed, their qualities greatly resembled those attributed to present day Saints in Italy, keeping in mind in the particularly pagan-oriented Catholicism of most Italians.
A very similar treatment is reserved for political leaders. Even the Pope, as temporal leader for about fifteen centuries, was chased out of Rome amid popular jubilation more than once, only to be welcomed back just as jubilantly. The last time this happened was rather recently, in 1849, at the proclamation of the glorious but short-lived Roman Republic.
This perhaps explains the success of populist, paternalistic leaders – the last one, Bettino Craxi, ending his days a fugitive from justice in Tunisia, after a long stint as Prime Minister. The same public which had welcomed him tumultuously, finally threw coins at him in the street: a gesture of ultimate contempt for a theatre loving people like the Italians.
This also explains the complexities and paradoxes of Italian political life. Voter turnout in Italy is one of the world’s highest, but the concept of “anti-politica” repeatedly appears. This appeal to the jaded palate of Italian voters was most recently exploited by the popular Genoese comedian, Beppe Grillo who, in the name of “anti-politica”, has had some success at the polls.
Recent events, as reported also in a recent article in Open Democracy, seemed to indicate a growing rift in Mr. Berlusconi’s ruling coalition, mainly at the hands of the Lower House president, Gianfranco Fini. There was much talk of a Government crisis and the need to call early elections, though at the moment all this seems to have been overcome. But has it? I believe that an attempt could be made to analyze the situation and to try to fathom what is really going on , what the motivations of the main actors are and what the short term outcome of the crisis could be.
It has to be understood, firstly, that in Italy success at the polls does not imply stability or, for that matter, efficiency in Government, no matter how large a majority has been achieved.
In no context other than Italy, would a Government in the hands of a popular, rather charismatic figure, with undeniable authoritarian ambitions and a virtual monopoly on sources of information, who can count on what we call a “Bulgarian majority” in Parliament appear unable to govern and face the possible imminent disintegration of a structure which seemed indestructible only two years ago.
It would be mistaken to attribute this to the work of the political opposition, which is divided and ineffectual, still involved in ideological disputes reminiscent of the Cold War years and which fears a government crisis even more than Berlusconi. In fact, if the Prime Minister could call a snap election, he would most probably beat them with one hand tied behind his back (As Fiorello La Guardia, legendary Mayor of New York, once said “I could run on a laundry ticket and beat these political bums any time”).
It would seem, therefore, that, actually, Berlusconi himself would not be all that opposed to an early election, also keeping in mind his firm hold – a virtual monopoly – on almost all the Television channels, but he is not constitutionally allowed to call for one, unless his Government is defeated in a vote of Confidence. Even then, however, the President of the Republic, Napolitano, would have to ask the political parties to attempt the formation of a “transitional” Government, which would be a “de facto” defeat for the Prime Minister..
The situation would appear confused unless one keeps in mind that Italian politics are conducted along lines reminiscent of the “Commedia dell’Arte”, in which set characters, or “masks” (e.g. Arlecchino, Pulcinella etc., the cultural forebears of “Punch and Judy”) play preordained roles which leave little or no room for diversion. In this framework, while trying to understand whether Berlusconi has really reached the end of the road, one has to keep an eye on all the other characters, firstly, of course, the sycophants in his own entourage, each of whom is ready to stab him in the back, but also among the mainstream opposition and coalition figures.
The larger – more or less centrist – opposition groups are loud in their condemnation of the “regime”, but when it comes to action they fall short of causing a Government crisis, because, they say, of the “difficult” economic situation. In reality, they fear an electoral confrontation because they feel that in spite of Berlusconi’s obvious weakness, he could still come out on top, and, even if at the head of a weak Government could rule the country for years to come..
Who would benefit, then, from a Government crisis? Certainly, among the Governing coalition, the “Northern League”. Counting on its simplistic xenophobic, racist, anti-Muslim and, above all, “federalist” message this incredibly successful political party would, as in all past occasions, show large gains and thus increase its grip on the apparently powerful but in reality hapless Prime Minister. Among the outsiders, a maverick personality such as Beppe Grillo could benefit, as well as the pugnacious former Public Prosecutor, Antonio Di Pietro whose actions, some twenty years back, triggered the “Clean Hands” movement and brought about the end of the so-called “First Republic”.
Within the coalition Berlusconi’s one time principal ally, Gianfranco Fini, currently in a position roughly equivalent to that of “Speaker of the House”, and therefore carrying considerable institutional weight, has been the prime promoter of the crisis. He has to tread carefully, however, because elections called too early would damage his position perhaps irrevocably and he would be added to the vast number of political have-beens fallen in the wake of Berlusconi’s irrepressible political personality.
What about Berlusconi himself? In any other country he would be politically finished, beleaguered as he is by corruption charges and episodes of sexual misconduct, with many of his closest allies facing trial or having actually been handed prison sentences.
It has to be added that, Italy being the unique political puzzle that it is, many are trying to read the signs and attempt to understand the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church, which, in reality, has been issuing mixed signals, many of them, however, critical of Berlusconi.
The unspoken question, however is “after Berlusconi, who?”
The feeling is that Berlusconi could survive, and that, quite possibly, nothing will happen simply because none of the protagonists will want to cast the first stone. There is also an additional fact which is seldom mentioned: to claim a retirement pension – a not indifferent sum of money for life – parliamentarians have to serve for thirty consecutive months, and some time must still elapse for them to reach that goal..
If Berlusconi is finally brought down, he will not go quietly, but in all his glory, leaving behind a fondly nostalgic memory of high living, low politics and a bevy of stunning ex-starlets, some in Cabinet positions. As they say in Show Business, a difficult act to follow.
In Italy, even the Twilight of the Gods has a Comic Opera setting.
martedì 31 agosto 2010
The Kabul Conference: a formula for failure.
(Article published by “Open Democracy” on August 31, 2010)
More than a month has gone by since the much heralded Kabul Conference on “The Future of Afghanistan”, which was held on July 20, in the course of one of the deadliest months in this long Afghan venture.
Already in the weeks preceding the Conference, the signals coming from Kabul had appeared contradictory and indicative of a state of disarray among the recognised decision-makers, in Afghanistan, in Brussels and in the principal interested capitals. For its part, the International Conference did little or nothing to clarify the situation.
Taking into account both the potential importance of the event, as well as the advance publicity it received, it seemed reasonable to assume that the Conference could become a defining moment in the tormented history of Afghanistan’s present conflict. These expectations were doomed to disappointment and, if anything, the entire situation appears to be unravelling at an alarming rate.
There was a time when experts were fond of warning us of the fundamental differences between Iraq and Afghanistan. This basic truth appears to have been forgotten, and no lessons at all have been learned either from Iraq or from Afghanistan itself.
There is a need to examine these differences further: if the “surge” worked in Iraq – and even that is debatable - there are good reasons to believe that a similar numerical increase of troops will not work at all in Afghanistan, and if the training of military and security forces, as well as the civil service, proceeds, as we are repeatedly told, with some success in Iraq, the same process, applied to Afghanistan, will not reach even remotely acceptable levels by 2014 or further in the future.
Setting aside the issues of the legality or the wisdom of the invasion of Iraq, or whether the outcome can be deemed a “success”, it has to be remembered that, at least at the onset, the operation was very much more like like a conventional war, compared to the Afghan mission that had preceded it. A regular army was rather easily defeated, and the country totally and readily invaded. The “enemy” then, of course, as many had predicted, was substituted by an identifiable set of deadly, ruthless insurgent forces which, however, ended up being isolated, attacked and at least temporarily worn down.
A very different situation presented itself in Afghanistan, where the attack was aimed at a specific target (the Al Qaeda headquarters and training camp), but never encountered the opposition of a regular army. The insurgents, as traditional there, melted away and took refuge in surroundings which worked as a perfect camouflage, while their leadership – such as it was – took refuge in a neighbouring country.
The hopelessness of a “surge” could be further confirmed by a brief reminder of the failure of the Soviet invasion, where a massive regular army, not a coalition of heterogeneous forces each with its own political agenda and rules of engagement, was unable to overcome the local resistance, in spite of a lengthy, costly and much more ruthless campaign.
It is true that the resistance, then, was aided and financed by outside help (United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia), but the same, quite evidently, holds true now, and this was quite evident even before the recent Wikileaks revelations.
Similar considerations must be made regarding the formation of a workable civil service: Iraq, when invaded, did have a Government and a Government structure – some say even rather efficient. Afghanistan, after decades of conflict – starting with the Soviet invasion of December 1979 - was already what could be termed a “failed State”, and the cream of its middle class, traditionally the backbone of a civil service, had either been killed or dispersed, or, if luckier, had fled to more hospitable foreign countries.
The formation of military and security forces presents even greater obstacles, most of which are seldom mentioned in dispatches and reports issuing from Afghanistan. Two of the main obstacles are, on the one hand, the massive percentage of illiteracy among the personnel which, in the future, should be upholding the law, and, on the other hand, the necessity to respect ethnic and tribal differences which could create considerable problems in the formation of a professional military force. It was particularly disturbing to hear, from General Petraeus himself, the idea that the problem could be circumvented by training and arming local militias. This, of course, was the policy which did contribute to the defeat of the Soviet invaders, but also brought the country into a savage civil war, which could easily be repeated.
Not only is there no obvious, short-term solution to the Afghan problem in sight, but, and this is far worse, there is no clear definition of what would be meant by a “solution”, and what the real war aims are at this moment, except for survival and the protection of the by now fully fortified and garrisoned city of Kabul.
The real pity is that, away from the triumphalism of our military and political rhetoric, some real progress is being made in civilian sectors, thanks to many Afghan and foreign NGOs, and, of course the traditional International and National Organisations. The tragic events of the past days illustrate the dangers involved, which will increase as the occupation continues, in a country almost totally outside the control of its government or of the invaders..
In this context, defining a target date for an ill-defined “handover” is basically unrealistic and, perhaps, not a little dishonest, smacking, as it does, of prefabricating an alibi and, above all, a cynical betrayal of expectations we ourselves have contributed in forming within Afghanistan’s civil society.
More than a month has gone by since the much heralded Kabul Conference on “The Future of Afghanistan”, which was held on July 20, in the course of one of the deadliest months in this long Afghan venture.
Already in the weeks preceding the Conference, the signals coming from Kabul had appeared contradictory and indicative of a state of disarray among the recognised decision-makers, in Afghanistan, in Brussels and in the principal interested capitals. For its part, the International Conference did little or nothing to clarify the situation.
Taking into account both the potential importance of the event, as well as the advance publicity it received, it seemed reasonable to assume that the Conference could become a defining moment in the tormented history of Afghanistan’s present conflict. These expectations were doomed to disappointment and, if anything, the entire situation appears to be unravelling at an alarming rate.
There was a time when experts were fond of warning us of the fundamental differences between Iraq and Afghanistan. This basic truth appears to have been forgotten, and no lessons at all have been learned either from Iraq or from Afghanistan itself.
There is a need to examine these differences further: if the “surge” worked in Iraq – and even that is debatable - there are good reasons to believe that a similar numerical increase of troops will not work at all in Afghanistan, and if the training of military and security forces, as well as the civil service, proceeds, as we are repeatedly told, with some success in Iraq, the same process, applied to Afghanistan, will not reach even remotely acceptable levels by 2014 or further in the future.
Setting aside the issues of the legality or the wisdom of the invasion of Iraq, or whether the outcome can be deemed a “success”, it has to be remembered that, at least at the onset, the operation was very much more like like a conventional war, compared to the Afghan mission that had preceded it. A regular army was rather easily defeated, and the country totally and readily invaded. The “enemy” then, of course, as many had predicted, was substituted by an identifiable set of deadly, ruthless insurgent forces which, however, ended up being isolated, attacked and at least temporarily worn down.
A very different situation presented itself in Afghanistan, where the attack was aimed at a specific target (the Al Qaeda headquarters and training camp), but never encountered the opposition of a regular army. The insurgents, as traditional there, melted away and took refuge in surroundings which worked as a perfect camouflage, while their leadership – such as it was – took refuge in a neighbouring country.
The hopelessness of a “surge” could be further confirmed by a brief reminder of the failure of the Soviet invasion, where a massive regular army, not a coalition of heterogeneous forces each with its own political agenda and rules of engagement, was unable to overcome the local resistance, in spite of a lengthy, costly and much more ruthless campaign.
It is true that the resistance, then, was aided and financed by outside help (United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia), but the same, quite evidently, holds true now, and this was quite evident even before the recent Wikileaks revelations.
Similar considerations must be made regarding the formation of a workable civil service: Iraq, when invaded, did have a Government and a Government structure – some say even rather efficient. Afghanistan, after decades of conflict – starting with the Soviet invasion of December 1979 - was already what could be termed a “failed State”, and the cream of its middle class, traditionally the backbone of a civil service, had either been killed or dispersed, or, if luckier, had fled to more hospitable foreign countries.
The formation of military and security forces presents even greater obstacles, most of which are seldom mentioned in dispatches and reports issuing from Afghanistan. Two of the main obstacles are, on the one hand, the massive percentage of illiteracy among the personnel which, in the future, should be upholding the law, and, on the other hand, the necessity to respect ethnic and tribal differences which could create considerable problems in the formation of a professional military force. It was particularly disturbing to hear, from General Petraeus himself, the idea that the problem could be circumvented by training and arming local militias. This, of course, was the policy which did contribute to the defeat of the Soviet invaders, but also brought the country into a savage civil war, which could easily be repeated.
Not only is there no obvious, short-term solution to the Afghan problem in sight, but, and this is far worse, there is no clear definition of what would be meant by a “solution”, and what the real war aims are at this moment, except for survival and the protection of the by now fully fortified and garrisoned city of Kabul.
The real pity is that, away from the triumphalism of our military and political rhetoric, some real progress is being made in civilian sectors, thanks to many Afghan and foreign NGOs, and, of course the traditional International and National Organisations. The tragic events of the past days illustrate the dangers involved, which will increase as the occupation continues, in a country almost totally outside the control of its government or of the invaders..
In this context, defining a target date for an ill-defined “handover” is basically unrealistic and, perhaps, not a little dishonest, smacking, as it does, of prefabricating an alibi and, above all, a cynical betrayal of expectations we ourselves have contributed in forming within Afghanistan’s civil society.
lunedì 30 agosto 2010
The Clash of Civilizations revisited
Rome, Italy, August 24, 2010
(Article published by "Open Democracy" - August 24 2010)
A decade and a half ago Samuel P. Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations” made a considerable impact on Western public opinion, but was soon relegated to an all-purpose catch-phrase, with the result that the message itself became confused and, to a certain extent, discredited. At a grass-roots level, however, the concept has taken on a rather disturbing aspect in the form of growing, seemingly irreversible Islamophobia.
The impact of Huntington’s book appeared to reside more in the title than in the content, and the term itself was more often than not trivialized and misused by those who had not read the original work.
Many famed pundits and intellectuals, perhaps in the name of “political correctness”, took to attacking the concept and comparing it unfavourably to the much more optimistic future promised by Fukuyama (“The End of History”): some – and I trust that the irony of this will not be lost – indicated the “friendship” between the United States and Saudi Arabia as a sure sign that the Clash of Civilizations would not occur.
The events of September 11th 2001 radically changed the general perspective, with the “War on Terror” monopolizing the attention, while the “Clash of Civilizations” was seldom brought up if not in a bellicose, truculent tone very far indeed from the letter and the spirit of the original text.
I had a taste of this early in 2002, talking to a Northern European Diplomat from whom I heard, for the first time, that we – i.e. “The West” – should not only recognize but actually welcome the existence of the “Clash of Civilizations” (he actually used the term) and prepare for a war of annihilation against Islam, in which, he assured me, “hundreds of millions” of Hindus and Buddhists would be on our side and help defeat the enemy.
At the time, I dismissed these ideas as merely the delirious rant from a slightly tipsy older colleague, and thus much too far-fetched to be taken seriously.
Since then, however, events both in Europe and in the United States have been indicating the existence of an ingrained and deepening hostility to Islam. Some episodes should have sounded a warning but they seemed the work of small, isolated, extremist minorities, and irreconcilable with the spirit of tolerance which was thought to reign in Western democracies.
Such episodes and events, however, have recently shown an alarming cumulative effect and Islamophobia is gaining ground, more often than not abetted by those very Political institutions which should normally guard against such potentially dangerous developments.
A perplexing dichotomy seems to have emerged. On the one hand, in most countries, the political and cultural leadership seem intent to show that current military struggles, though they oppose the Western Powers to Islamic organizations, are in no way directed against Islam. Concurrently, however, and with growing vigour and ever shriller language, in the same countries grass roots movements are growing which portray Islam as a philosophy of violence and a traditional and dangerous enemy of Western civilization.
At times, this wave of hostility has caught political leaders off guard, as happened recently in Switzerland when a referendum banned the construction of minarets. Often, however, more populist political leaders seem rather inclined to seize upon this prime example of generalised fear and to increase tensions through statements and actions which many consider irresponsible.
Geert Wilders, in the Netherlands is the first example which springs to mind. His popular success is all the more surprising in that it takes place in a Country generally known for its tolerance of foreign ideals and religions. He is also spreading the message on an international level.
In Italy, in much of the “Northern League’s” territory, one of the political slogans is “White and Christian”. Requests by Muslim communities (there are over a million Muslims in Italy) for Mosques are met with refusal, sometimes expressed with civility, most often with violent hostility and sarcasm (“All you people need to pray is a mat!”). Times have really changed since the Rome Mosque – the largest in Europe – was inaugurated by the Foreign Minister, Susanna Agnelli.
Even in the United States, where the concept of religious freedom has always constituted one of the mainstays, the polemic around the Ground Zero Mosque has brought to light widespread hostility, throughout the country, to the opening of new Mosques. President Barak Obama is again being “accused” of being a Muslim, although being a Muslim is not a crime, and a leader’s religious beliefs should not have that great an impact in a democratic context.
Huntington depicted a situation which, in his view, had to be taken into consideration for a valid analysis of international political developments. Perhaps the case was overstated, for even the Iranian president Khatami was on record stating that he did not believe in the inevitability of such a clash. At present, it is disturbing to note that the concept is becoming a battle-cry, used to inflame western opinion by giving an historical and philosophical justification to the budding and growing Islamophobia visible in the U.S. and in so many European societies. The “Clash”, from a situation to be feared and neutralised, seems to be evolving into a desirable development, as envisaged, many years ago, by my tipsy colleague.
In over a quarter of a century spent in Muslim countries, I have come across anti-American and anti-Western feelings, especially after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, but, even in recent years, I have not noted a basic widespread revulsion against Christianity and its Faithful, comparable to the growing, often irrational and misinformed animosity of western public opinion against Islam.
These tendencies must therefore not be underestimated, and need to be addressed rationally and comprehensively. Otherwise they could end up fomenting a similar, mirror image, hostility to Christianity in a number of Muslim countries. The “Clash of Civilizations” could then become a reality.
.Carlo Ungaro
Via Campagnano 51
00060 Sacrofano (Italy)
+39 06 90 86098
+39 320 778 3160
carloungaro@gmail.com
(Article published by "Open Democracy" - August 24 2010)
A decade and a half ago Samuel P. Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations” made a considerable impact on Western public opinion, but was soon relegated to an all-purpose catch-phrase, with the result that the message itself became confused and, to a certain extent, discredited. At a grass-roots level, however, the concept has taken on a rather disturbing aspect in the form of growing, seemingly irreversible Islamophobia.
The impact of Huntington’s book appeared to reside more in the title than in the content, and the term itself was more often than not trivialized and misused by those who had not read the original work.
Many famed pundits and intellectuals, perhaps in the name of “political correctness”, took to attacking the concept and comparing it unfavourably to the much more optimistic future promised by Fukuyama (“The End of History”): some – and I trust that the irony of this will not be lost – indicated the “friendship” between the United States and Saudi Arabia as a sure sign that the Clash of Civilizations would not occur.
The events of September 11th 2001 radically changed the general perspective, with the “War on Terror” monopolizing the attention, while the “Clash of Civilizations” was seldom brought up if not in a bellicose, truculent tone very far indeed from the letter and the spirit of the original text.
I had a taste of this early in 2002, talking to a Northern European Diplomat from whom I heard, for the first time, that we – i.e. “The West” – should not only recognize but actually welcome the existence of the “Clash of Civilizations” (he actually used the term) and prepare for a war of annihilation against Islam, in which, he assured me, “hundreds of millions” of Hindus and Buddhists would be on our side and help defeat the enemy.
At the time, I dismissed these ideas as merely the delirious rant from a slightly tipsy older colleague, and thus much too far-fetched to be taken seriously.
Since then, however, events both in Europe and in the United States have been indicating the existence of an ingrained and deepening hostility to Islam. Some episodes should have sounded a warning but they seemed the work of small, isolated, extremist minorities, and irreconcilable with the spirit of tolerance which was thought to reign in Western democracies.
Such episodes and events, however, have recently shown an alarming cumulative effect and Islamophobia is gaining ground, more often than not abetted by those very Political institutions which should normally guard against such potentially dangerous developments.
A perplexing dichotomy seems to have emerged. On the one hand, in most countries, the political and cultural leadership seem intent to show that current military struggles, though they oppose the Western Powers to Islamic organizations, are in no way directed against Islam. Concurrently, however, and with growing vigour and ever shriller language, in the same countries grass roots movements are growing which portray Islam as a philosophy of violence and a traditional and dangerous enemy of Western civilization.
At times, this wave of hostility has caught political leaders off guard, as happened recently in Switzerland when a referendum banned the construction of minarets. Often, however, more populist political leaders seem rather inclined to seize upon this prime example of generalised fear and to increase tensions through statements and actions which many consider irresponsible.
Geert Wilders, in the Netherlands is the first example which springs to mind. His popular success is all the more surprising in that it takes place in a Country generally known for its tolerance of foreign ideals and religions. He is also spreading the message on an international level.
In Italy, in much of the “Northern League’s” territory, one of the political slogans is “White and Christian”. Requests by Muslim communities (there are over a million Muslims in Italy) for Mosques are met with refusal, sometimes expressed with civility, most often with violent hostility and sarcasm (“All you people need to pray is a mat!”). Times have really changed since the Rome Mosque – the largest in Europe – was inaugurated by the Foreign Minister, Susanna Agnelli.
Even in the United States, where the concept of religious freedom has always constituted one of the mainstays, the polemic around the Ground Zero Mosque has brought to light widespread hostility, throughout the country, to the opening of new Mosques. President Barak Obama is again being “accused” of being a Muslim, although being a Muslim is not a crime, and a leader’s religious beliefs should not have that great an impact in a democratic context.
Huntington depicted a situation which, in his view, had to be taken into consideration for a valid analysis of international political developments. Perhaps the case was overstated, for even the Iranian president Khatami was on record stating that he did not believe in the inevitability of such a clash. At present, it is disturbing to note that the concept is becoming a battle-cry, used to inflame western opinion by giving an historical and philosophical justification to the budding and growing Islamophobia visible in the U.S. and in so many European societies. The “Clash”, from a situation to be feared and neutralised, seems to be evolving into a desirable development, as envisaged, many years ago, by my tipsy colleague.
In over a quarter of a century spent in Muslim countries, I have come across anti-American and anti-Western feelings, especially after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, but, even in recent years, I have not noted a basic widespread revulsion against Christianity and its Faithful, comparable to the growing, often irrational and misinformed animosity of western public opinion against Islam.
These tendencies must therefore not be underestimated, and need to be addressed rationally and comprehensively. Otherwise they could end up fomenting a similar, mirror image, hostility to Christianity in a number of Muslim countries. The “Clash of Civilizations” could then become a reality.
.Carlo Ungaro
Via Campagnano 51
00060 Sacrofano (Italy)
+39 06 90 86098
+39 320 778 3160
carloungaro@gmail.com
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