A glance, however cursory, at most of the world’s press gives the chilling sensation that the situation has gone out of hand and that Governments are no longer fully in control, no matter how determined and well-intentioned. The prime example comes to us from the United States, and I express my doubts not in a critical “anti-American”, or even “anti-establishment” frame of mind, but rather with the anguished thought that if president Obama, with the support enjoyed by him at this time, gives an impression of impotency in the path of an advancing juggernaut, what hope do weaker, less prosperous and less efficient Governments have?
Some – and the Italian Government is among them – appear to be seeking alternative strategies, which, in the light of historical precedent, are potentially dangerous and rather frightening. The idea is simple and not at all novel, for it has been used in the distant and recent past. It consists of building up an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, convincing the people that only a “strong” government, untrammelled by the inevitable intricacies associated with the Rule of Law, can bring about the country’s salvation. Around 100 B.C. this tactic was successfully used by Sulla, who thus contributed in the destruction of centuries of Roman republican rule and opened the door for the Empire and absolutism. It has been repeated, with variations, on many occasions and in many different societies, including the United States (the McCarthy years, the “terrorist threat, etc.), and, of course, in Italy and Germany in the twentieth century, paving the way for Fascist and Nazi rule.
If I concentrate attention on the Italian situation it is simply because Italy has had a historical tendency to act as a leader in many trends both positive (the Renaissance, architecture) and negative (Fascism, organised crime).
The current Italian Government is headed by Mr. Silvio Berlusconi, who is the owner of all the private TV networks which have a strong nation-wide appeal (there is only one exception, and it is being strongly discriminated against). As head of the Government he of course also has some say in the running of the very drab, predominantly idiotic, but much followed public TV networks. It is not surprising, therefore, that an atmosphere of subdued panic has so skilfully been created, particular care being taken – after staunch denials of either xenophobia or racism – to ensure that, in the public eye, the principal responsibility for the current atmosphere of insecurity lies with the immigrant community.
Many legislative and administrative measures have either been passed or are planned, which will do much to transform the very nature of democracy and of Italian society, usually considered rather open and permissive. Here are some examples, out of dozens:
- Medical staff, even in emergency wards, will have the obligation to report “illegal foreigners” who require treatment;
- children born of foreigners without residence permits will not be registered and will therefore not get a birth certificate;
- bands or posses of “unarmed volunteers” will be formed to patrol towns and cities by night in defence of “public order”;
These are just a few of a growing number of projected measures most of which will probably pass thanks to the current Government’s overpowering majority in both Houses of Parliament.
Italy has thus become the country of prohibitions, some of which are mind-boggling or bordering on the ridiculou: in some public parks it is forbidden to form groups of more than three people (“sedition”), in others anyone sitting on a park bench will have to prove either that he (or she) is an invalid or over the age of seventy (park benches have traditionally been used as resting places by the jobless or homeless, ergo, in today’s Italy, by “foreigners”).
The media are quick and eager to contribute to the image that the responsibility for all this “insecurity”, lies squarely and exclusively on the shoulders of foreigners living in Italy – at this time particularly Romanians. This is giving rise to an ever increasing number of xenophobic or racist incidents, some of which are extremely violent (an Indian homeless person was almost burned alive and an Eritrean youth was brutally beaten) and which do not meet much public disapproval.
In all this the Catholic Church, which, in Italy, has practically unlimited access to the media, plays an unpleasantly populist waiting game, occasionally rapping the Government’s knuckles over some perceived minor “misdeeds” against immigrants or the poor, but this only to gain support among the Catholic members of the hapless opposition Democratic Party, thus transforming it into a passive accomplice in the creation of a growing climate of repressive legislation. As a result Laws will be approved in the near future denying a terminally ill patient the liberty to refuse artificial life support.
A note of hope, however, can be sounded. This “Nouvelle Vague” of Italian neo-fascism is not the result of a deeply thought-out plot, and there is no sinister hidden figure pulling the strings. The very transformation of Italy’s society into a new “regime” would have to overcome a fundamental obstacle in the legendary inefficiency of the Government apparatus and of all endeavours which rely on Government support. Therefore, just as the Italian Banking system was saved from major disaster mainly because of its inefficient, slow moving and ponderous inability to react, so it can be hoped that the creation of a frightening police state will be held back by bureaucratic obstacles and the incurable Italian attachment to improvised solutions..
giovedì 19 marzo 2009
martedì 3 marzo 2009
AFGHANISTAN: THE INEVITABILITY OF A GREEK TRAGEDY?
Summary
Afghanistan’s ancient history has Grecian - Macedonian elements, and some of its greatest cities (e.g. Herat) have been founded by Alexander the Great. Slight shifts in NATO and US policy seemed to offer a glimmer of hope, but recent developments paint a dark picture.
Text
Afghanistan keeps returning to the forefront of international attention, its prospects darker than ever. There can be no miracle cure and there will be no miracle worker, with the power and the ability of bringing about an appreciable change in a reasonably short term. The appointment of Richard Holbrooke does, however, justify some optimism, not only for his proven qualities as a tough negotiator, but also because of the backing he receives from an Administration whose utterances on the issue have been more pragmatic and less ideological than what we have been used to hearing. Further grounds for a more positive evaluation are the Afghan-Pakistani talks in Washington, even though the internal political situation in Pakistan gives little reason for excessive hope.
I met Ambassador Holbrooke in Afghanistan, some years ago, when I certainly had no idea that he would shortly be playing such an important role in the country. I was, at the time, very impressed at the idea of meeting him because I had spent six months in Bosnia from the beginning of January 1996: much of the Dayton agreement can and has been criticised, and the situation in Bosnia is certainly not solved, but, nevertheless, it was impressive to see people civilly seated round a table, who only a few weeks earlier had literally been at one another’s throats.
Ambassador Holbrooke has very probably understood that the first step in the attempt to find a solution to Afghanistan’s problems should, of course consist in trying to define what is meant by a “solution”, since a credible and realistic political plan, a “Nation Building” plan for Afghanistan, has never existed, certainly not since the unfortunate Soviet attempt to transform it into a Socialist Republic. At this stage it would seem much to late to implement one. The only plan left is to salvage what can be salvaged, in the attempt to put in place a structure which could somehow contain the activity of the Taliban, albeit without excluding them from the future power structure.
There are many pitfalls in this complex matter, and the greatest mistake of all would be to draw too many parallels between Iraq and Afghanistan: two totally different historical, political and military realities. It is a cause of particular apprehension that, citing the “success” (a debatable term, at best) of the “surge” in Iraq, some seem to persist in the belief that the numerical increase of the troops on the ground in Afghanistan by a few thousand units would actually help bring about a solution of the problem. In reality, this measure will probably only enhance US isolation, also in the eyes of the NATO partners who have shown no eagerness to contribute further combat units.
There, again, numbers do not tell the entire story. Many NATO countries justify their reluctance by pointing out that they already have a large number of troops on the ground, but, in reality, most of these are not combat troops, but basically units which serve as a security cover for civilian activities (The so-called “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” or PRT’s), and are seldom, if ever, by their own volition engaged in military confrontation with the insurgents.
Despite the insistence on the enhancement of the military presence, there seems to be, however, a growing consensus, both in the international media and among the principal world leaders, that a military solution in Afghanistan is practically impossible.
This is where strong international political leadership and guidance are greatly needed, because the situation, cannot be tackled without taking into urgent and serious consideration the following:
- Afghanistan is not a monolithic bloc but a very complex ethnic and tribal reality: this has to be kept in mind especially in matters concerning the future role of the Taliban, who are detested and feared in some areas (e.g. Herat and most of the North) and, instead, considered as rather representative in the East, in the neighborhood of the Pakistan border. In one way or another, however, they will have to be included in any political design for the future of Afghanistan.
- If it is true that the situation in Afghanistan depends very much on Pakistan’s ability to keep its own tribal areas in check, but the reverse is also true: Pakistan will not be able to maintain internal political stability unless the border issues with Afghanistan are finally tackled, to the point of always keeping in mind the question as to whether Pakistan can continue to exist as a Nation State within its present borders unless its is governed by a strong military dictatorship (which has been the case for most of Pakistan’s existence).
- The United States and NATO will not be able to solve the Afghan question without the cooperation of other interested parties. Should wider and stronger International involvement be called for, it would be sheer folly to exclude Iran, who is a major player – and not necessarily a negative player – on the Afghan scene. We must not forget that Persian – in a slightly modified version known as Dari – is one of Afghanistan’s two official languages.
- It will also be essential to tackle the problem of corruption with the greatest possible energy, because the level of corruption in today’s Afghanistan is actually creating a sense of nostalgia for the Taliban regime, which, though indubitably authoritarian and restrictive, had a reputation of incorruptibility.
Many other major problems - the Narcotics trade, just to mention one – remain on the table, but these cannot be taken into practical consideration until a decision is taken, and implemented, on the future status and position of Afghanistan.
These would be the words of advice that I would take the liberty of giving to Ambassador Holbrooke in the very unlikely event of meeting him again.
Afghanistan’s ancient history has Grecian - Macedonian elements, and some of its greatest cities (e.g. Herat) have been founded by Alexander the Great. Slight shifts in NATO and US policy seemed to offer a glimmer of hope, but recent developments paint a dark picture.
Text
Afghanistan keeps returning to the forefront of international attention, its prospects darker than ever. There can be no miracle cure and there will be no miracle worker, with the power and the ability of bringing about an appreciable change in a reasonably short term. The appointment of Richard Holbrooke does, however, justify some optimism, not only for his proven qualities as a tough negotiator, but also because of the backing he receives from an Administration whose utterances on the issue have been more pragmatic and less ideological than what we have been used to hearing. Further grounds for a more positive evaluation are the Afghan-Pakistani talks in Washington, even though the internal political situation in Pakistan gives little reason for excessive hope.
I met Ambassador Holbrooke in Afghanistan, some years ago, when I certainly had no idea that he would shortly be playing such an important role in the country. I was, at the time, very impressed at the idea of meeting him because I had spent six months in Bosnia from the beginning of January 1996: much of the Dayton agreement can and has been criticised, and the situation in Bosnia is certainly not solved, but, nevertheless, it was impressive to see people civilly seated round a table, who only a few weeks earlier had literally been at one another’s throats.
Ambassador Holbrooke has very probably understood that the first step in the attempt to find a solution to Afghanistan’s problems should, of course consist in trying to define what is meant by a “solution”, since a credible and realistic political plan, a “Nation Building” plan for Afghanistan, has never existed, certainly not since the unfortunate Soviet attempt to transform it into a Socialist Republic. At this stage it would seem much to late to implement one. The only plan left is to salvage what can be salvaged, in the attempt to put in place a structure which could somehow contain the activity of the Taliban, albeit without excluding them from the future power structure.
There are many pitfalls in this complex matter, and the greatest mistake of all would be to draw too many parallels between Iraq and Afghanistan: two totally different historical, political and military realities. It is a cause of particular apprehension that, citing the “success” (a debatable term, at best) of the “surge” in Iraq, some seem to persist in the belief that the numerical increase of the troops on the ground in Afghanistan by a few thousand units would actually help bring about a solution of the problem. In reality, this measure will probably only enhance US isolation, also in the eyes of the NATO partners who have shown no eagerness to contribute further combat units.
There, again, numbers do not tell the entire story. Many NATO countries justify their reluctance by pointing out that they already have a large number of troops on the ground, but, in reality, most of these are not combat troops, but basically units which serve as a security cover for civilian activities (The so-called “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” or PRT’s), and are seldom, if ever, by their own volition engaged in military confrontation with the insurgents.
Despite the insistence on the enhancement of the military presence, there seems to be, however, a growing consensus, both in the international media and among the principal world leaders, that a military solution in Afghanistan is practically impossible.
This is where strong international political leadership and guidance are greatly needed, because the situation, cannot be tackled without taking into urgent and serious consideration the following:
- Afghanistan is not a monolithic bloc but a very complex ethnic and tribal reality: this has to be kept in mind especially in matters concerning the future role of the Taliban, who are detested and feared in some areas (e.g. Herat and most of the North) and, instead, considered as rather representative in the East, in the neighborhood of the Pakistan border. In one way or another, however, they will have to be included in any political design for the future of Afghanistan.
- If it is true that the situation in Afghanistan depends very much on Pakistan’s ability to keep its own tribal areas in check, but the reverse is also true: Pakistan will not be able to maintain internal political stability unless the border issues with Afghanistan are finally tackled, to the point of always keeping in mind the question as to whether Pakistan can continue to exist as a Nation State within its present borders unless its is governed by a strong military dictatorship (which has been the case for most of Pakistan’s existence).
- The United States and NATO will not be able to solve the Afghan question without the cooperation of other interested parties. Should wider and stronger International involvement be called for, it would be sheer folly to exclude Iran, who is a major player – and not necessarily a negative player – on the Afghan scene. We must not forget that Persian – in a slightly modified version known as Dari – is one of Afghanistan’s two official languages.
- It will also be essential to tackle the problem of corruption with the greatest possible energy, because the level of corruption in today’s Afghanistan is actually creating a sense of nostalgia for the Taliban regime, which, though indubitably authoritarian and restrictive, had a reputation of incorruptibility.
Many other major problems - the Narcotics trade, just to mention one – remain on the table, but these cannot be taken into practical consideration until a decision is taken, and implemented, on the future status and position of Afghanistan.
These would be the words of advice that I would take the liberty of giving to Ambassador Holbrooke in the very unlikely event of meeting him again.
domenica 15 febbraio 2009
THE SHOPPING SEX, OR, WHERE DID DARWIN GO WRONG?
The winter sales are over, in Rome, and one sees many men who, by their prison pallor, show that they have just emerged from their bunkers or hide-outs and returned to a normal life. There is no doubt that men and women have two very different approaches to shopping, and this seems to hold true from Patagonia to Reykjavik, from Honolulu, due East, to Smolensk.
If a guy – for example me – needs a pair of shoes, he will amble down a less fashionable street and, having spotted a likely pair in a window will pop in to ask if these are available in black and in size so-and-so. If the answer is affirmative, he will try them on only to give the attendant something to do, and dash back home again in time for a cup of tea and a relaxing pipe.
The lady of the house, instead, will start fretting about footwear some ten days earlier, casting despondent glances in the closet where her 28 pairs of assorted shoes are stored, and then, catching the man unawares will drag him, kicking and screaming, to the poshest street in town. They will trudge from shop to shop, and an infinite number of shoes will be tried on, while, at the same time, a side sortie will be made to buy a necktie for the man, who really doesn’t want one. Finally, battle scarred and barely cognizant, the head of the family returns home and unburdens himself of parcels containing at least four pairs of shoes, two pairs of gloves, the much resisted necktie and sundry other items.
The question, which has Darwinian overtones is not whether this happens, nor, really, why, but actually when did this begin.
If we cast our minds back a few millennia, to, say, the stone age, we see that the man of the cave did the shopping: he would take his club, foray out, bash in the heads of some edible creatures and, possibly, of some obnoxious neighbours and, upon returning to his cave would explain exactly how he wanted his Tournedos Rossini, and they better be done right.
Nor do I think that Beatrice took Dante window shopping in the magnificent streets of Florence and the closest perusal of the correspondence between Abelard and Eloise will show no mention of winter or summer sales.
I believe that this tendency – one of the many symptoms of the end of civilization as we know it – began sometime in the second half of the Nineteenth Century, probably in England, when all the goods brought back from Imperial conquest made it imperative to create a consumer society and women, to whom so many pleasures were denied, seemed like the ideal candidates to fulfil the role of consumers, while their men were in the Tropics making the world a safer place by pacifying successive groups of natives, thus reducing their numbers and making them much more subservient and useful producers of ever more goods to be consumed.
Does anyone have a different theory?
If a guy – for example me – needs a pair of shoes, he will amble down a less fashionable street and, having spotted a likely pair in a window will pop in to ask if these are available in black and in size so-and-so. If the answer is affirmative, he will try them on only to give the attendant something to do, and dash back home again in time for a cup of tea and a relaxing pipe.
The lady of the house, instead, will start fretting about footwear some ten days earlier, casting despondent glances in the closet where her 28 pairs of assorted shoes are stored, and then, catching the man unawares will drag him, kicking and screaming, to the poshest street in town. They will trudge from shop to shop, and an infinite number of shoes will be tried on, while, at the same time, a side sortie will be made to buy a necktie for the man, who really doesn’t want one. Finally, battle scarred and barely cognizant, the head of the family returns home and unburdens himself of parcels containing at least four pairs of shoes, two pairs of gloves, the much resisted necktie and sundry other items.
The question, which has Darwinian overtones is not whether this happens, nor, really, why, but actually when did this begin.
If we cast our minds back a few millennia, to, say, the stone age, we see that the man of the cave did the shopping: he would take his club, foray out, bash in the heads of some edible creatures and, possibly, of some obnoxious neighbours and, upon returning to his cave would explain exactly how he wanted his Tournedos Rossini, and they better be done right.
Nor do I think that Beatrice took Dante window shopping in the magnificent streets of Florence and the closest perusal of the correspondence between Abelard and Eloise will show no mention of winter or summer sales.
I believe that this tendency – one of the many symptoms of the end of civilization as we know it – began sometime in the second half of the Nineteenth Century, probably in England, when all the goods brought back from Imperial conquest made it imperative to create a consumer society and women, to whom so many pleasures were denied, seemed like the ideal candidates to fulfil the role of consumers, while their men were in the Tropics making the world a safer place by pacifying successive groups of natives, thus reducing their numbers and making them much more subservient and useful producers of ever more goods to be consumed.
Does anyone have a different theory?
sabato 31 gennaio 2009
martedì 27 gennaio 2009
TOWARDS A NATO DEBACLE IN AFGHANISTAN
SUMMARY
Important recent events have pushed Afghanistan away from the limelight and the headlines, but the problems there are intense and growing. The NATO leadership is wrong if it believes that a purely military solution is possible, and it is also wrong in wanting, at all costs, to exclude an important player like Iran from any international discussion on the subject.
TEXT
In the past weeks the world has been dealing with events – Gaza and the inauguration of the U.S. President - weighty enough to push Afghanistan out of the limelight. This does not mean, however, that the Afghan situation has calmed down or improved, and, indeed, a recent attack in the very centre of Kabul shows a growing build-up of Taliban confidence and efficiency. Another attack in the Heart area, which up to some months ago was relatively secure shows that this surge in Taliban confidence and efficiency is not limited to the Capital but is spreading over the entire nation.
A fundamental refocusing of ideas therefore seems long overdue, and fresh thought has to be dedicated to unsolved problems which have long been maturing, and which will have to be tackled with cool, rational thinking to prevent a major Western debacle in Afghanistan. This new approach can only be achieved at the cost of showing sufficient courage to admit previous errors and radically to change political and military strategy.
It would be useful, in the first place, carefully to analyze the generally accepted opinion on what is seen as the “original” error, that is to have left the Afghan mission unaccomplished in order to invade Iraq, thus leaving the Al Qaeda command structure basically intact. This is only partially true: the failure to pursue the Al Qaeda command across the mountain passes and into Pakistani territory did indeed create basic political problems causing the West to lose momentum, and therefore credibility, in the so ineptly named “War on Terror”. It is, however open to question whether the Taliban, as a basically native party, could ever have been militarily defeated or neutralized. It is evident that this goal is impossible to accomplish now, but it probably would not have been possible to accomplish even then, given the historically and traditionally resilient character of Afghan resistance movements.
Instead of proceeding exclusively along the lines of a replication of the Iraqi “surge”, and asking all the NATO partners not only to increase their participation numerically, but also to send contingents with more unified, and, in any case more aggressive and combative rules of engagement, serious collective thought should be given to alternatives to military action which, in its present nature, is doomed to failure no matter how large or efficient the reinforcements.
There is no doubt that one of the main causes of the current institutional weakness in Afghanistan, and the subsequent rise of insurgency, can be found in the growing, and largely unpunished, corruption in all levels of Government (National, Provincial or Municipal), and of course in the entire Police and Justice system, with some notable, very brave, exceptions. Collective human memory tends to be selective and, within a growing sector of Afghan Civil Society memories of the harshness of the Taliban regime recede, substituted by those which enhance the unquestionable basic honesty and incorruptibility of the Taliban leadership.
If the expression “Hearts and Minds” is to make any sense at all, this is an issue which should be tackled with the greatest urgency and as ruthlessly as possible, at the risk of offending some of the Afghan leaders.
The International operators in Afghanistan should also pay closer attention to the complex web of geographic-ethnic-tribal relationships and undertake a serious attempt to understand Afghan realities, at the cost of having to jettison well meant but highly impractical preconceived ideas on the country’s democratic aspirations.
It would be a hopeless task to attempt to tackle Afghanistan’s problems without involving other Countries in the area. It is of course of paramount importance to reach some form of regional security, but also in this some basic rethinking is indispensable. It is received wisdom that Afghanistan’s security depends greatly on political stability in Pakistan. This is undoubtedly true, but so is the reverse: due to the complex ethnic and tribal nature of its frontier province, Pakistan cannot hope to achieve political harmony or stability if its Afghan neighbour is in turmoil. The time has certainly come to tackle the famous border issues squarely, seriously and with the greatest possible energy, to the point of considering the question as to whether Pakistan as a unified State with its present borders, is still a viable proposition without a strong military government.
These are serious and far reaching issues which cannot be solved by NATO with the cooperation of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Sooner or later an International Conference will have to be convened, bringing together all the interested parties: it is amazing that, at present, whenever the need of international intervention is mentioned the one most interested and most influential party is never taken into consideration. While the names of India, Iraq, the Emirates, Turkey and others are freely offered, any mention of Iran is studiously avoided and this gives a measure of how unprepared the International Community is on this issue.
Iran is a neighbour whose historical, political and cultural influence should not be underestimated: it should be enough to remember that Persian, in a slight variant known as “Dari”, is one of Afghanistan’s two national languages. There are, furthermore, strong and credible indications that Afghanistan is one of the issues which could be used to come to more general agreements with Iran allowing it to fulfil its natural regional role, and finally putting to rest the shameful, ridiculous “Axis of Evil” epithet.
Important recent events have pushed Afghanistan away from the limelight and the headlines, but the problems there are intense and growing. The NATO leadership is wrong if it believes that a purely military solution is possible, and it is also wrong in wanting, at all costs, to exclude an important player like Iran from any international discussion on the subject.
TEXT
In the past weeks the world has been dealing with events – Gaza and the inauguration of the U.S. President - weighty enough to push Afghanistan out of the limelight. This does not mean, however, that the Afghan situation has calmed down or improved, and, indeed, a recent attack in the very centre of Kabul shows a growing build-up of Taliban confidence and efficiency. Another attack in the Heart area, which up to some months ago was relatively secure shows that this surge in Taliban confidence and efficiency is not limited to the Capital but is spreading over the entire nation.
A fundamental refocusing of ideas therefore seems long overdue, and fresh thought has to be dedicated to unsolved problems which have long been maturing, and which will have to be tackled with cool, rational thinking to prevent a major Western debacle in Afghanistan. This new approach can only be achieved at the cost of showing sufficient courage to admit previous errors and radically to change political and military strategy.
It would be useful, in the first place, carefully to analyze the generally accepted opinion on what is seen as the “original” error, that is to have left the Afghan mission unaccomplished in order to invade Iraq, thus leaving the Al Qaeda command structure basically intact. This is only partially true: the failure to pursue the Al Qaeda command across the mountain passes and into Pakistani territory did indeed create basic political problems causing the West to lose momentum, and therefore credibility, in the so ineptly named “War on Terror”. It is, however open to question whether the Taliban, as a basically native party, could ever have been militarily defeated or neutralized. It is evident that this goal is impossible to accomplish now, but it probably would not have been possible to accomplish even then, given the historically and traditionally resilient character of Afghan resistance movements.
Instead of proceeding exclusively along the lines of a replication of the Iraqi “surge”, and asking all the NATO partners not only to increase their participation numerically, but also to send contingents with more unified, and, in any case more aggressive and combative rules of engagement, serious collective thought should be given to alternatives to military action which, in its present nature, is doomed to failure no matter how large or efficient the reinforcements.
There is no doubt that one of the main causes of the current institutional weakness in Afghanistan, and the subsequent rise of insurgency, can be found in the growing, and largely unpunished, corruption in all levels of Government (National, Provincial or Municipal), and of course in the entire Police and Justice system, with some notable, very brave, exceptions. Collective human memory tends to be selective and, within a growing sector of Afghan Civil Society memories of the harshness of the Taliban regime recede, substituted by those which enhance the unquestionable basic honesty and incorruptibility of the Taliban leadership.
If the expression “Hearts and Minds” is to make any sense at all, this is an issue which should be tackled with the greatest urgency and as ruthlessly as possible, at the risk of offending some of the Afghan leaders.
The International operators in Afghanistan should also pay closer attention to the complex web of geographic-ethnic-tribal relationships and undertake a serious attempt to understand Afghan realities, at the cost of having to jettison well meant but highly impractical preconceived ideas on the country’s democratic aspirations.
It would be a hopeless task to attempt to tackle Afghanistan’s problems without involving other Countries in the area. It is of course of paramount importance to reach some form of regional security, but also in this some basic rethinking is indispensable. It is received wisdom that Afghanistan’s security depends greatly on political stability in Pakistan. This is undoubtedly true, but so is the reverse: due to the complex ethnic and tribal nature of its frontier province, Pakistan cannot hope to achieve political harmony or stability if its Afghan neighbour is in turmoil. The time has certainly come to tackle the famous border issues squarely, seriously and with the greatest possible energy, to the point of considering the question as to whether Pakistan as a unified State with its present borders, is still a viable proposition without a strong military government.
These are serious and far reaching issues which cannot be solved by NATO with the cooperation of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Sooner or later an International Conference will have to be convened, bringing together all the interested parties: it is amazing that, at present, whenever the need of international intervention is mentioned the one most interested and most influential party is never taken into consideration. While the names of India, Iraq, the Emirates, Turkey and others are freely offered, any mention of Iran is studiously avoided and this gives a measure of how unprepared the International Community is on this issue.
Iran is a neighbour whose historical, political and cultural influence should not be underestimated: it should be enough to remember that Persian, in a slight variant known as “Dari”, is one of Afghanistan’s two national languages. There are, furthermore, strong and credible indications that Afghanistan is one of the issues which could be used to come to more general agreements with Iran allowing it to fulfil its natural regional role, and finally putting to rest the shameful, ridiculous “Axis of Evil” epithet.
domenica 18 gennaio 2009
THE AXIS OF EVIL REVISITED: IRAN
SUMMARY.
The uncertain outcome of the Gaza war, as well as the political changes in the United States and in Israel, should facilitate an essential rethinking of Iran's role, clearing the air of all the old clichés and allowing Iran to play its obvious and essential role in the Gulf Region.
TEXT.
There is some hope – albeit very slight - that the murderous events currently taking place in Gaza will contribute to clear the air around the only remaining active member of the “Axis of Evil”; I refer, of course, to Iran. The conventional wisdom about Iran, carefully nurtured in the United States and now adopted by many obedient Governments around the world depicts that country and its regime as a diabolically wicked historical enemy of the “Democratic West” and its values, armed to the teeth and ready to strike at our vital interests with ruthless efficiency. This, according to the same scenario, is compelling us to build “star wars” type barriers, which, of course by sheer coincidence, pose a direct threat to Russia, at the moment on the borderline and about to cross into – or, rather, return to - the “Evil” family of Nations.
This circumstance throws my mind back to the build-up for the invasion of Iraq, when Prime Minister Tony Blair could be seen wildly pacing the Parliament floor, hair flying in disarray ranting about Saddam’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and not hesitating to compare the situation to the infamous appeasement associated with Munich, 1938. I was amazed, at the time, that not one of the major commentators or columnists came out with a simple assertion, just to say: “Mr. Blair, you are not Winston Churchill, and President Bush is definitely not FDR. Iraq is not Germany. Saddam is not Hitler, and, above all, the Iraqi army is not the Wehrmacht, nor is Saddam’s Republican Guard comparable to the Waffen SS.”
The mainstream international press remained stunningly and obsequiously silent, while leading columnists, perhaps fully convinced by the spin doctors, all seemed ready to rewrite the history of World War II. As a result the new Crusaders enthusiastically went to war, in a Quixotic endeavour to eliminate nonexistent Weapons of Mass Destructions and to eradicate imaginary terrorist bases.
There are striking parallels between those attitudes and the ones prevailing today In spite of the recent lesson of Iraq, none of the major international Newspapers or Periodicals have undertaken serious attempts at a cool, detached analysis of the Iranian situation, before embarking on grandiloquent tirades against the arch-enemy of the moment (things were easier during the Cold War when the arch-enemy’s identity didn’t change so often). This constant, mantra-like repetition of clichés, once the speciality of totalitarian regimes, once again seems to be an accepted substitute to investigation and research as an instrument for bringing correct information to the general public.
It is, for example, absurd to depict Iran as a military threat to Israel, the Middle East or Europe, for the simple reason that Iran’s military capacity is actually rather limited in comparison to most of the other countries in the area such as Saudi Arabia, The Emirates, Egypt and, of course, Israel itself. This can be deduced by the relatively low military expenditure in Iran, both in terms of total amount spent and in terms of percentage of National Product.
Iran is also depicted as an authoritarian dictatorship, while, of course, the above mentioned countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt are models of Democracy. In reality, the Iranian Government is one of the most democratic in the area, in spite of its theocratic origins and superstructure, and Iranian leaders are much more accountable to public opinion than the leaders in many other countries in the area, as can be witnessed by the political changes which occur at almost every general election.
Is Iran, finally, such an implacable and intractable enemy of the West? I would say that the situation is quite the reverse. At the onset of the 2001 military action in Afghanistan, Iran offered its assistance in combating the Taliban, of which it does not approve, and, similarly, Iran has offered to help stabilize the situation in post-invasion Iraq, an offer which was refused with contempt. It is probable that what Iran was hoping to obtain in exchange was nothing unacceptable to the West, but rather a recognition of the legitimate role it has to play in the Gulf area and of its interest in being bordered by a stable and peaceful Iraq and Afghanistan. It is even possible that important concessions could have been obtained in terms of a weaker support to organisations such as Hezbollah and Hamas, but this, of course, is only speculation.
It is perhaps not too late to engage Teheran in serious negotiations, which will not be easy, but will certainly alleviate the tensions which exist in the area and which have been exacerbated by the recent events in Gaza, which, if nothing else, with the impending political change in Israel, could have considerably diminished the political clout and the prestige both of the Fatah leadership and of some of the nearby Governments who chose to ignore popular feeling in their respective countries..
The uncertain outcome of the Gaza war, as well as the political changes in the United States and in Israel, should facilitate an essential rethinking of Iran's role, clearing the air of all the old clichés and allowing Iran to play its obvious and essential role in the Gulf Region.
TEXT.
There is some hope – albeit very slight - that the murderous events currently taking place in Gaza will contribute to clear the air around the only remaining active member of the “Axis of Evil”; I refer, of course, to Iran. The conventional wisdom about Iran, carefully nurtured in the United States and now adopted by many obedient Governments around the world depicts that country and its regime as a diabolically wicked historical enemy of the “Democratic West” and its values, armed to the teeth and ready to strike at our vital interests with ruthless efficiency. This, according to the same scenario, is compelling us to build “star wars” type barriers, which, of course by sheer coincidence, pose a direct threat to Russia, at the moment on the borderline and about to cross into – or, rather, return to - the “Evil” family of Nations.
This circumstance throws my mind back to the build-up for the invasion of Iraq, when Prime Minister Tony Blair could be seen wildly pacing the Parliament floor, hair flying in disarray ranting about Saddam’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and not hesitating to compare the situation to the infamous appeasement associated with Munich, 1938. I was amazed, at the time, that not one of the major commentators or columnists came out with a simple assertion, just to say: “Mr. Blair, you are not Winston Churchill, and President Bush is definitely not FDR. Iraq is not Germany. Saddam is not Hitler, and, above all, the Iraqi army is not the Wehrmacht, nor is Saddam’s Republican Guard comparable to the Waffen SS.”
The mainstream international press remained stunningly and obsequiously silent, while leading columnists, perhaps fully convinced by the spin doctors, all seemed ready to rewrite the history of World War II. As a result the new Crusaders enthusiastically went to war, in a Quixotic endeavour to eliminate nonexistent Weapons of Mass Destructions and to eradicate imaginary terrorist bases.
There are striking parallels between those attitudes and the ones prevailing today In spite of the recent lesson of Iraq, none of the major international Newspapers or Periodicals have undertaken serious attempts at a cool, detached analysis of the Iranian situation, before embarking on grandiloquent tirades against the arch-enemy of the moment (things were easier during the Cold War when the arch-enemy’s identity didn’t change so often). This constant, mantra-like repetition of clichés, once the speciality of totalitarian regimes, once again seems to be an accepted substitute to investigation and research as an instrument for bringing correct information to the general public.
It is, for example, absurd to depict Iran as a military threat to Israel, the Middle East or Europe, for the simple reason that Iran’s military capacity is actually rather limited in comparison to most of the other countries in the area such as Saudi Arabia, The Emirates, Egypt and, of course, Israel itself. This can be deduced by the relatively low military expenditure in Iran, both in terms of total amount spent and in terms of percentage of National Product.
Iran is also depicted as an authoritarian dictatorship, while, of course, the above mentioned countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt are models of Democracy. In reality, the Iranian Government is one of the most democratic in the area, in spite of its theocratic origins and superstructure, and Iranian leaders are much more accountable to public opinion than the leaders in many other countries in the area, as can be witnessed by the political changes which occur at almost every general election.
Is Iran, finally, such an implacable and intractable enemy of the West? I would say that the situation is quite the reverse. At the onset of the 2001 military action in Afghanistan, Iran offered its assistance in combating the Taliban, of which it does not approve, and, similarly, Iran has offered to help stabilize the situation in post-invasion Iraq, an offer which was refused with contempt. It is probable that what Iran was hoping to obtain in exchange was nothing unacceptable to the West, but rather a recognition of the legitimate role it has to play in the Gulf area and of its interest in being bordered by a stable and peaceful Iraq and Afghanistan. It is even possible that important concessions could have been obtained in terms of a weaker support to organisations such as Hezbollah and Hamas, but this, of course, is only speculation.
It is perhaps not too late to engage Teheran in serious negotiations, which will not be easy, but will certainly alleviate the tensions which exist in the area and which have been exacerbated by the recent events in Gaza, which, if nothing else, with the impending political change in Israel, could have considerably diminished the political clout and the prestige both of the Fatah leadership and of some of the nearby Governments who chose to ignore popular feeling in their respective countries..
lunedì 12 gennaio 2009
RELIGION AND FUNDAMENTALISM, AN INEVITABLE COMBINATION?
The flourishing of fundamentalist tendencies within many of the World’s great Religions arouses fear, disapproval and some amazement.
Much of this derives from the misuse of the term “fundamentalist”, which has somehow come to be associated with intolerance and violence, whereas, in reality, it refers mainly to a strong attachment to the basic tenets of the religious belief to which the “fundamentalist” belongs, and above all to the persuasion that this, and only this particular Religion or Sect has the definite answer to all the Transcendental questions.
From a strictly logical perspective, it is utter nonsense to assert that “all Religions are true”, because there is only one possible alternative: either all Religions are false or one, and only one Religion is true, and from this assertion we could conclude that, actually, again from a strictly logical point of view, fundamentalism makes much better sense than ecumenicalism.
Whether we like it or not, this perception seems to be growing and fundamentalism is the leading trend. People in the West, however, should not limit themselves into considering – and therefore fearing – only Islamic Fundamentalism, and ignoring, instead, the fundamentalist strains in other leading Sects and Religious Movements.
These tendencies are less evident to us because we have got used to them and they blend into our environment, but nonetheless they exist and present tangible dangers. The Roman Catholic Church, for example, which in the early sixties set an ecumenical example with Pope John XXIII, has been led by fundamentalist Pontiffs since 1978, although, it has to be said, John-Paul’s striking political acumen, as well as his great personal charisma and charm, hid his basically fundamentalist policies rather efficiently. The present Pope, instead, is openly and aggressively fundamentalist and obviously ill at ease when talking to leaders of other religious sects, be they Christian or otherwise.
Signs of unrest emerge also in the East, and we are confronted today with a phenomenon which would have been unbelievable only a few years back: i.e. Hindu fundamentalism.
I believe that the phenomenon deserves investigation and comment, and I would be curious to know if any of my Facebook friends or readers of my blog have come to similar, or absolutely opposite, conclusions.
Much of this derives from the misuse of the term “fundamentalist”, which has somehow come to be associated with intolerance and violence, whereas, in reality, it refers mainly to a strong attachment to the basic tenets of the religious belief to which the “fundamentalist” belongs, and above all to the persuasion that this, and only this particular Religion or Sect has the definite answer to all the Transcendental questions.
From a strictly logical perspective, it is utter nonsense to assert that “all Religions are true”, because there is only one possible alternative: either all Religions are false or one, and only one Religion is true, and from this assertion we could conclude that, actually, again from a strictly logical point of view, fundamentalism makes much better sense than ecumenicalism.
Whether we like it or not, this perception seems to be growing and fundamentalism is the leading trend. People in the West, however, should not limit themselves into considering – and therefore fearing – only Islamic Fundamentalism, and ignoring, instead, the fundamentalist strains in other leading Sects and Religious Movements.
These tendencies are less evident to us because we have got used to them and they blend into our environment, but nonetheless they exist and present tangible dangers. The Roman Catholic Church, for example, which in the early sixties set an ecumenical example with Pope John XXIII, has been led by fundamentalist Pontiffs since 1978, although, it has to be said, John-Paul’s striking political acumen, as well as his great personal charisma and charm, hid his basically fundamentalist policies rather efficiently. The present Pope, instead, is openly and aggressively fundamentalist and obviously ill at ease when talking to leaders of other religious sects, be they Christian or otherwise.
Signs of unrest emerge also in the East, and we are confronted today with a phenomenon which would have been unbelievable only a few years back: i.e. Hindu fundamentalism.
I believe that the phenomenon deserves investigation and comment, and I would be curious to know if any of my Facebook friends or readers of my blog have come to similar, or absolutely opposite, conclusions.
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