This article has been published by "Open Democracy" with the title: "Italy’s “business as usual”
There is a certain kind of drift into a regime that has nothing to do with the introduction of paramilitary stances, Roman salutes or party uniforms: more to do with television
Carlo Ungaro
The year 2011 will mark the 150th anniversary of the unification of Italy. The most influential political party in the Italian ruling coalition – the “Northern League” – has publicly and flamboyantly indicated its lack of interest in the celebrations, and its leaders were conspicuously absent at the parade held for Italy’s National Day last June 2.
This is just one example of the malaise which permeates the Italian political scene today, even as many notice – with growing, impotent fascination – the country’s seemingly inexorable glide into what could be defined as a form of “bourgeois neo-fascism”, greeted with apathetic indifference by the vast majority of the population.
The roots of this unwholesome situation reach far back into the country’s history. At the very beginning of its reign, in 1861, the fledgling Italian Monarchy found itself confronted by a number of major problems which it failed to tackle, and which many decades later still persist. The lack of a really deep-seated sense of national unity; the great social and economic gap between North and South; together with the oppressive presence of the Pope and the Roman Catholic hierarchy on the national turf, were certainly three of the biggest concerns. Although partially tackled – with some success – both by the Fascist regime (1922-1943) and by subsequent republican governments, they have been, and still remain, major impediments to the country’s political and social progress.
The first two of these problems go hand in hand: and as the economic gap between north and south widens, so too does the intense rivalry between two very distinctive cultures, constantly eroding the sense of unity bound by the use of a common language with its historical and cultural resonances of belonging to the same nation. The “Northern League” tends to exasperate feelings of frustration which they insist are due to the useless handicap imposed on the regions of the North by a “thieving and lazy” South. Their request for a “federal” solution is often accompanied by empty and yet effective threats of “secession”.
There is a more than apparent contradiction in the situation: a strong government, with definite authoritarian tendencies, supported by a very large parliamentary majority is compelled, by its most prominent partner, to dedicate the bulk of its energies to the decentralisation of power and its devolution to regional authorities. The results can be chaotic and begin to show growing rifts within the majority itself.
The considerable, insidious weight of the Catholic Church constitutes, in itself, a fundamental factor in Italy’s failure to achieve a normal social status. At present, however, its influence appears secondary compared to the constant erosion of Constitutional guarantees on the part of the Government, as well as the growing centrifugal tendencies shown by the Northern League, easily the country’s most efficient and influential political party.
There is one fundamental factor, however, that is at the basis of the current crisis in Italian democracy, contributing directly to the gradual loss of democratic sensibility by the population: the Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, owns the three most relevant private national television channels. By grossly overreaching his powers as head of Government, he exerts undue influence on public channels as well. He does not attempt to hide this and has frequently stated that “in a civilised country” the “state television” (he never uses the correct term “public television”) does not broadcast programmes which are “critical of the Government”.
He has also openly reiterated that “since the people have given me such a large majority, I must be allowed to govern”. This statement signals a deep, oft-stated aspiration radically to modify the Constitution (which he has often and publicly dismissed as a “Soviet- inspired document”) in order to remove or fundamentally loosen those “checks and balances” which still work, albeit in ever more difficult circumstances.
He has repeatedly referred to himself as “the greatest Prime Minister in Italy’s history”, and his efficient propaganda machine keeps informing the Italian public of his popularity and triumphs on the international scene: a telephone call by Berlusconi to Angela Merkel, Italians have been told, brought about the success of the recent EU summit on the Greek crisis. There is no trace of this in the international media, but then, it is easy to take advantage of Italy’s cultural isolation. Most Italians are stubbornly monolingual and, for example, have never seen a foreign film if not badly translated and atrociously dubbed, nor do they follow international news on foreign channels. Their only source of information is television, because only a small minority read the vast number of Italian newspapers, most of which are of a high standard.
At the moment the Government appears to be losing a battle, thanks to the “defection” of some political allies, which would have had Parliament approving a law - which the press has almost unanimously dubbed “the muzzle law” - designed to silence most forms of investigative journalism and to undermine the powers of public prosecutors and judges. If the law should pass, the control of telephone conversations would be difficult and the reproduction of bugged conversations would be a crime: this would protect many leading politicians (the main object of the proposed legislation) but it would also be a boon for organised criminality.
According to the official propaganda “leitmotif”, virtually all Italians are subject to arbitrary telephone control, and the law is designed to safeguard the sacred right to privacy. In reality the number of legally established telephone controls (or other forms of electronic espionage) is extremely limited and applies only to people under investigation, or strongly suspected of very serious crimes, including Mafia activity.
In reality the law is designed to prevent the press from reporting precisely on those links between politics and criminality which are of great public interest, and the “privacy” which would be defended concerns highly placed political figures, who for some reason, often are involved in conversation with some of the people under investigation.
It is also true that some newspapers have very easily and freely published extracts from official transcripts which concerned prurient aspects of some politician's private life and had nothing to do with any criminal investigation: the point is to find a solution that can prevent these abuses without muzzling the press in its right to conduct investigative reporting.
The Government has had to back down from its initial demands, but the battle is still raging.
The path towards the transformation of the government into a “regime” is, far from complete, and is taking place in a “business as usual” atmosphere which does not plan the introduction of paramilitary stances, Roman salutes or party uniforms. This makes it all the more dangerous and menacing.
Some have described the period we are living through as “Italy’s Weimar” – referring to Germany’s ill-fated democratic experience between World War One and the Nazi regime. Others claim that if Italy, in its present state, were to apply for membership in the European Union, doubts would be expressed on its eligibility.
These, doubtless, are exaggerations: but there is a feeling here that Italian democracy is in real danger.
giovedì 1 luglio 2010
sabato 26 giugno 2010
Is Afghanistan’s Jirgah a way forward?
(Article published by “Open Democracy”)
These days the military intervention in Afghanistan has surpassed Viet Nam to become the longest lasting war effort in US history. It does not look like a coincidence that particularly deadly attacks are being carried out by the Taleban, while the repeated threats of an “all out attack” on Kandahar underlines the Sisyphean nature of NATO’s efforts.
These circumstances do not bode well for the success of the recently convened “Peace Jirgah”, and yet the idea deserves close scrutiny and should not be dismissed, out of hand, as yet another failed attempt by The Afghan Government .- with the support of its allies – to embark upon a political path instead of relying mainly on a military venture which shows no signs of imminent success.
My first memory of an Afghan Jirgah dates back to the years of World War II, when, as a child, I was living in Kabul with my parents: the British had issued strong demands that Afghanistan deport all Axis citizens, and close their Diplomatic Missions. A “Loya Jirgah” was convened and, after many days of debate, declared – to our great relief – that this would contravene Afghanistan’s laws of hospitality. A fundamentally important decision had been taken which would guarantee Afghanistan’s neutrality until the Soviet invasion of 1979.
The Jirgah has traditionally been an institute of primary importance in the Pathan tribal areas of Pakistan and the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. Although, traditionally, it gathered only Pashtun tribal elders, in modern times it has been extended also to include representatives of all the other areas.
It can be argued, as, indeed it has been argued, that this form of representation is much more suited to the Afghan political reality than a western-style Parliament, no matter how correct the electoral process. Afghanistan, as, indeed, Pakistan’s North-West, is, basically, a tribal society and peaceful coexistence among the tribes cannot be guaranteed by political processes which do not take this reality into account.
With the passage of time, the term “democracy” has acquired a rather dogmatic aspect, and is associated with certain particular rituals which have evolved, in the course of centuries, in some western societies, and which have then been applied, with success, also outside Europe and North America. An analysis, even a superficial one, of local interpretations of democracy would be completely out of context in an attempt to examine the Afghan situation, which is of grave and understandable concern, but serious thought ought to be given on how it would be possible to reconcile the need for stability in such a volatile and strategically important area with social and political realities which long predate the current insurgency, and all this without further eroding basic liberties.
It is, of course, probable that the Jirgah called by president Karzai will not have immediate, appreciable repercussions in the desired direction, mainly because, rightly or wrongly, the President no longer has the massive backing of the Afghan people, not even in his own tribal area. At the same time, his support among the leading international actors in Afghanistan has also sensibly declined. These circumstances, unfortunately, lend credibility to the accusations that this Jirgah is rigged and that it has been packed with Karzai supporters, thereby depriving it of the dignity essential to its success.
A future scenario could, however, be envisaged in which enhanced local autonomy would allow the application of “our” democratic rules in Towns and Provinces ready freely to choose such a solution (Herat comes to mind), while others could choose more traditional methods of local rule. The central Government, instead, with a role more of guidance and coordination rather than dominance or rule, would be more in tune with the traditions of the land. This arrangement has worked in the past, and could be an indication – with the necessary variations – of a way forward.
The calling of Jirgahs, and their composition and competences should not be left to the arbitrary will of the Head of State, but rather be regulated in a new, bold and imaginative attempt to reconcile respected and valid Afghan traditions to the country’s aspirations to be part of the modern family of nations.
Of course, the principal obstacle to any durable, credible negotiated settlement remains the massive and bellicose foreign military presence, whose support of the government is distasteful to many strata of Afghan opinion. The possibility of solutions along the lines suggested by the Jirgah would be greatly enhanced if agreements in that sense would coincide with a publicized, credible and accepted timetable for the withdrawal of the bulk of foreign troops.
As things stand, there are few alternative suitable solutions, and recourse to the Jirgah as a convincing instrument of negotiation should not be discarded..
These days the military intervention in Afghanistan has surpassed Viet Nam to become the longest lasting war effort in US history. It does not look like a coincidence that particularly deadly attacks are being carried out by the Taleban, while the repeated threats of an “all out attack” on Kandahar underlines the Sisyphean nature of NATO’s efforts.
These circumstances do not bode well for the success of the recently convened “Peace Jirgah”, and yet the idea deserves close scrutiny and should not be dismissed, out of hand, as yet another failed attempt by The Afghan Government .- with the support of its allies – to embark upon a political path instead of relying mainly on a military venture which shows no signs of imminent success.
My first memory of an Afghan Jirgah dates back to the years of World War II, when, as a child, I was living in Kabul with my parents: the British had issued strong demands that Afghanistan deport all Axis citizens, and close their Diplomatic Missions. A “Loya Jirgah” was convened and, after many days of debate, declared – to our great relief – that this would contravene Afghanistan’s laws of hospitality. A fundamentally important decision had been taken which would guarantee Afghanistan’s neutrality until the Soviet invasion of 1979.
The Jirgah has traditionally been an institute of primary importance in the Pathan tribal areas of Pakistan and the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. Although, traditionally, it gathered only Pashtun tribal elders, in modern times it has been extended also to include representatives of all the other areas.
It can be argued, as, indeed it has been argued, that this form of representation is much more suited to the Afghan political reality than a western-style Parliament, no matter how correct the electoral process. Afghanistan, as, indeed, Pakistan’s North-West, is, basically, a tribal society and peaceful coexistence among the tribes cannot be guaranteed by political processes which do not take this reality into account.
With the passage of time, the term “democracy” has acquired a rather dogmatic aspect, and is associated with certain particular rituals which have evolved, in the course of centuries, in some western societies, and which have then been applied, with success, also outside Europe and North America. An analysis, even a superficial one, of local interpretations of democracy would be completely out of context in an attempt to examine the Afghan situation, which is of grave and understandable concern, but serious thought ought to be given on how it would be possible to reconcile the need for stability in such a volatile and strategically important area with social and political realities which long predate the current insurgency, and all this without further eroding basic liberties.
It is, of course, probable that the Jirgah called by president Karzai will not have immediate, appreciable repercussions in the desired direction, mainly because, rightly or wrongly, the President no longer has the massive backing of the Afghan people, not even in his own tribal area. At the same time, his support among the leading international actors in Afghanistan has also sensibly declined. These circumstances, unfortunately, lend credibility to the accusations that this Jirgah is rigged and that it has been packed with Karzai supporters, thereby depriving it of the dignity essential to its success.
A future scenario could, however, be envisaged in which enhanced local autonomy would allow the application of “our” democratic rules in Towns and Provinces ready freely to choose such a solution (Herat comes to mind), while others could choose more traditional methods of local rule. The central Government, instead, with a role more of guidance and coordination rather than dominance or rule, would be more in tune with the traditions of the land. This arrangement has worked in the past, and could be an indication – with the necessary variations – of a way forward.
The calling of Jirgahs, and their composition and competences should not be left to the arbitrary will of the Head of State, but rather be regulated in a new, bold and imaginative attempt to reconcile respected and valid Afghan traditions to the country’s aspirations to be part of the modern family of nations.
Of course, the principal obstacle to any durable, credible negotiated settlement remains the massive and bellicose foreign military presence, whose support of the government is distasteful to many strata of Afghan opinion. The possibility of solutions along the lines suggested by the Jirgah would be greatly enhanced if agreements in that sense would coincide with a publicized, credible and accepted timetable for the withdrawal of the bulk of foreign troops.
As things stand, there are few alternative suitable solutions, and recourse to the Jirgah as a convincing instrument of negotiation should not be discarded..
The Central Asian Quandary
Rome, June 22 2010
The Central Asia quandary
In a recent article, published last April (See “Open Democracy”, April 27), I attempted to draw attention to a situation which, by and large, had been ignored by the mainstream media, i.e. that the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia, far from being havens of security, were actually more like volcanoes, once dormant and now smouldering and that, as a consequence, the then incipient troubles in Kirghizstan should not be viewed as an isolated episode but as part of a more general, and somewhat troubling, picture.
The rapid and dramatic – though by no means unexpected – escalation of the violence in Kirgizstan is forcing other players in the area (particularly Russia and Uzbekistan) if not to take action, at least publicly to assume a position. This is something they studiously avoided at the onset of the Kirghiz crisis.
For their part “Western” Governments, and with them the world’s mainstream media, have turned a blind eye to events – and potential developments – in Central Asia, and even the recent anniversary of the massacre of civilians in Andijan (Uzbekistan) by Government troops has been largely disregarded.
Such indifference is no longer really possible. The timing of the disclosure of the recent “discovery” (in reality known or suspected for some time) of mineral riches in remote frontier regions of Afghanistan adds an intriguing tassel to a scenario which, never simple, is becoming ever more complex.
The increasingly dangerous situation in Central Asia can perhaps be better understood by considering some basic facts which, then must be pieced together and properly analysed both from a political and an historical point of view.
The formal collapse of the Soviet Union caused less turmoil and bloodshed in Central Asia than would have been expected. With the exception of Tajikistan, which followed a more complex path, the remaining four republics remained more or less stagnant for many years, and even the unexpected demise of Turkmenistan’s “Turkmenbashi”, the object of an absolutely ludicrous personality cult, at first viewed with some concern (or some hope), caused scarcely a ripple.
In spite of growing human rights violations, these four republics are normally considered as valuable and, above all, reliable allies principally because their apparent internal calm and economic progress tend to lull outside observers into a mistaken sense of confidence and security.
When the extremely violent Andijan incidents broke out, the “West”, which by now relied on Uzbekistan in its Afghan military effort, after some hesitation and extremely mild remonstrations, accepted the Uzbek claim that the uprising had been the work of Islamic fundamentalist extremists. The fact that there may well have been some truth in a fundamentalist presence actually enhances the potential danger of the situation and also explains Uzbekistan’s reluctance to accept the massive influx of Uzbek refugees fleeing from the violence in Kirghizstan.
These regimes give an illusion of ruthless strength and lasting stability. This impression, however, covers a fragile and volatile reality, a weakness enhanced by the passage of time with the ageing Nomenklatura obviously on its way out. Historical reality has shown that nepotism and cronyism do not necessarily guarantee continuity, and while the death of one dictator (Turkmenistan) brought no change, it is difficult to imagine what the consequences will be of, for example, Islam Karimov’s eventual departure from the Uzbek scene.
There is, therefore a potential for chaos and uncertainty on the very border with Afghanistan. In ordinary circumstances this would be a situation which all interested parties and nearby powers would try to neutralise and bring under control, but the timing of the announcement of the “discovery” of “a trillion Dollars worth” of valuable minerals in the very regions of Afghanistan closest to this potential new area of conflict could bring about a change of attitude in all the parties concerned. The existence of these mineral deposits have been an open secret, but the official disclosure - possibly decided for an eventual justification of a prolonged Western military presence in Afghanistan - means that, from now on, “the gloves are off”, and even Iran – which has kept its distance from the Afghan conflict - could display an understandable interest.
Of course, no exploitation or even deeper exploration of the area will be possible unless the country and the region are pacified, and this could mean an intensification of the war effort by the sides engaged in the conflict, and a hand in muddying the waters on the part of those who would prefer not to see such riches fall exclusively into Western (i.e. American) hands. The Russians, in spite of having been badly burned in Afghanistan, have always considered that country as part of their sphere of influence (shades of the “Great Game”), and the Chinese have been quietly enhancing their presence in the area.
The real losers will most probably be the Afghan people.
Carlo Ungaro
Via Campagnano 51
00060 Sacrofano (Italy)
+39 06 9086098
+39 320 778 3160
carloungaro@gmail.com
(The author is a former – now retired – senior Italian diplomatic officer. He has spent twenty years in Central Asia – also as Italy’s first Ambassador to Uzbekistan – sixteen of which in Afghanistan)
The Central Asia quandary
In a recent article, published last April (See “Open Democracy”, April 27), I attempted to draw attention to a situation which, by and large, had been ignored by the mainstream media, i.e. that the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia, far from being havens of security, were actually more like volcanoes, once dormant and now smouldering and that, as a consequence, the then incipient troubles in Kirghizstan should not be viewed as an isolated episode but as part of a more general, and somewhat troubling, picture.
The rapid and dramatic – though by no means unexpected – escalation of the violence in Kirgizstan is forcing other players in the area (particularly Russia and Uzbekistan) if not to take action, at least publicly to assume a position. This is something they studiously avoided at the onset of the Kirghiz crisis.
For their part “Western” Governments, and with them the world’s mainstream media, have turned a blind eye to events – and potential developments – in Central Asia, and even the recent anniversary of the massacre of civilians in Andijan (Uzbekistan) by Government troops has been largely disregarded.
Such indifference is no longer really possible. The timing of the disclosure of the recent “discovery” (in reality known or suspected for some time) of mineral riches in remote frontier regions of Afghanistan adds an intriguing tassel to a scenario which, never simple, is becoming ever more complex.
The increasingly dangerous situation in Central Asia can perhaps be better understood by considering some basic facts which, then must be pieced together and properly analysed both from a political and an historical point of view.
The formal collapse of the Soviet Union caused less turmoil and bloodshed in Central Asia than would have been expected. With the exception of Tajikistan, which followed a more complex path, the remaining four republics remained more or less stagnant for many years, and even the unexpected demise of Turkmenistan’s “Turkmenbashi”, the object of an absolutely ludicrous personality cult, at first viewed with some concern (or some hope), caused scarcely a ripple.
In spite of growing human rights violations, these four republics are normally considered as valuable and, above all, reliable allies principally because their apparent internal calm and economic progress tend to lull outside observers into a mistaken sense of confidence and security.
When the extremely violent Andijan incidents broke out, the “West”, which by now relied on Uzbekistan in its Afghan military effort, after some hesitation and extremely mild remonstrations, accepted the Uzbek claim that the uprising had been the work of Islamic fundamentalist extremists. The fact that there may well have been some truth in a fundamentalist presence actually enhances the potential danger of the situation and also explains Uzbekistan’s reluctance to accept the massive influx of Uzbek refugees fleeing from the violence in Kirghizstan.
These regimes give an illusion of ruthless strength and lasting stability. This impression, however, covers a fragile and volatile reality, a weakness enhanced by the passage of time with the ageing Nomenklatura obviously on its way out. Historical reality has shown that nepotism and cronyism do not necessarily guarantee continuity, and while the death of one dictator (Turkmenistan) brought no change, it is difficult to imagine what the consequences will be of, for example, Islam Karimov’s eventual departure from the Uzbek scene.
There is, therefore a potential for chaos and uncertainty on the very border with Afghanistan. In ordinary circumstances this would be a situation which all interested parties and nearby powers would try to neutralise and bring under control, but the timing of the announcement of the “discovery” of “a trillion Dollars worth” of valuable minerals in the very regions of Afghanistan closest to this potential new area of conflict could bring about a change of attitude in all the parties concerned. The existence of these mineral deposits have been an open secret, but the official disclosure - possibly decided for an eventual justification of a prolonged Western military presence in Afghanistan - means that, from now on, “the gloves are off”, and even Iran – which has kept its distance from the Afghan conflict - could display an understandable interest.
Of course, no exploitation or even deeper exploration of the area will be possible unless the country and the region are pacified, and this could mean an intensification of the war effort by the sides engaged in the conflict, and a hand in muddying the waters on the part of those who would prefer not to see such riches fall exclusively into Western (i.e. American) hands. The Russians, in spite of having been badly burned in Afghanistan, have always considered that country as part of their sphere of influence (shades of the “Great Game”), and the Chinese have been quietly enhancing their presence in the area.
The real losers will most probably be the Afghan people.
Carlo Ungaro
Via Campagnano 51
00060 Sacrofano (Italy)
+39 06 9086098
+39 320 778 3160
carloungaro@gmail.com
(The author is a former – now retired – senior Italian diplomatic officer. He has spent twenty years in Central Asia – also as Italy’s first Ambassador to Uzbekistan – sixteen of which in Afghanistan)
giovedì 20 maggio 2010
THE AFGHAN LABYRINTH
An "exit strategy" is little use in the Afghan labyrinth
Carlo Ungaro, 19 May 2010
Subjects:
· Taliban insurgency in Pakistan and Afghanistan
We need to break old assumptions if Afghanistan and Pakistan are to be secured, argues Carlo Ungaro
About the author
Carlo Ungaro is a former Italian diplomat. He spent sixteen years serving in Afghanistan. Between 2000 and 2007, he served as political adviser to the Italian led ISAF forces in Herat.
The term “exit strategy” often signifies a tacit admission of basic mistakes committed upon entering a conflict. This is particularly true in the case of Afghanistan where an analogy can be drawn with the story of Theseus and his hunt for the Minotaur in the Labyrinth. In fact, just like the initial occupation of Afghanistan, entering the Labyrinth did not pose major problems for Theseus, but his twenty-first century’s successors – the NATO forces – although they quickly found the Minotaur’s lair, discovered that the beast had fled and that, lacking Ariadne’s clew, they remained trapped in the impenetrable maze of Afghan political and social reality.It would be useless, at this stage, to indulge in recrimination and to lament the fact that, at the time of the invasion and in its immediate aftermath, advice was apparently not sought, or perhaps it was obtained and not heeded, from those who could have foretold many of the problems, which so often have seemed to come as a surprise both to the NATO leadership and to many political commentators. It would be just as futile for those Cassandra's – among whom I include myself – to come out in triumphant “I told you so!” statements. The situation is far too serious to allow these attitudes.It was clear, already many months back, that a totally fresh assessment was needed, and that the reiteration of NATO’s oft intoned mantra’s would not bring the problem any closer to a solution. It appears, however, that the reluctance to “learn lessons” persists, and that NATO is preparing for another military “triumph”, this time with a dauntingly ambitious objective, Kandahar, a city of significant importance which, occupied countless times but never really conquered, has had an important role in Afghan history throughout the centuries. Granted that, with the massive armament and logistic abundance at their disposal, the NATO forces will manage to gain at least apparent control of Kandahar, would that in any way signify that final victory is at hand? And has a lucid and unequivocal idea ever been expressed as to what would really be meant by “victory”, other than the avoidance of obvious defeat?Clearly, a solution has to be sought somewhere between the alternative of precipitous withdrawal and dogged resistance. The only question that insistently comes to mind is whether there is still time for a radical rethinking process aimed both at halting, or at least diminishing the bloodshed, and at the search for a long term solution not conditioned by past prejudices.One of the eminently foreseeable – but apparently unforeseen – consequences of the military action in Afghanistan has been the extension of the conflict into Pakistan, a development which will leave deep scars, no matter what the outcome. This, in reality, and not the military conflict in Afghanistan itself, is the principal obstacle to any real and lasting solution. The fact is that the boundary existing between Afghanistan and Pakistan’s North West (the “Durand Line”) has never been recognised by any Afghan government since the creation of Pakistan, nor was it ever accepted by the tribal populations on the Pakistani side of the border. This situation, which should have been addressed with energy and decision as soon as the inevitability of Pakistan’s involvement became apparent, was instead allowed to fester, creating an area of permanent conflict, which shall remain so until reality is recognised. This is the key on which all future attempts competently to address the Afghan quandary will have to be based. As past experiences have shown, and the Soviet debacle comes readily to mind as the most recent example, throwing in more troops and vast additional sums of money destined for development projects would be a tragic waste, unless the underlying political problems are taken into unprejudiced consideration.A process of radical revision of war aims and future scenarios should be undertaken with great urgency. The opening phases should preferably take place in a third country, possibly neutral, and should begin by the bold eradication of two fundamentally flawed beliefs which doggedly persist in all present-day evaluations:1. That Afghanistan and Pakistan can be treated as two separate problems and that, after a militarily imposed “normalisation”, they will be able to coexist within the present geo-political framework;2. That Afghanistan can ever be ruled efficiently as a monolithic entity from a government – whether autocratic or “democratic” – situated in Kabul.These are complex and potentially dangerous issues, but until they are taken into careful consideration there will be no hope for any kind of satisfactory settlement.This may seem un-realistic, and our political leaders will prefer to continue in their belief that the repetition of well-tried platitudes can bring about the solution of problems.They ought to cast their minds back about twenty years and try to remember how many greatly respected personalities from the United States and Europe would come away from Belgrade swearing solemn oaths on the absolute inviolability of Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. It is also essential to recall where this kind of obstinacy finally led.It is furthermore important to consider that the visible growing war-weariness in the public opinion of many NATO allies, and the need for democratic Governments at least partially to heed the feelings of their electorate, add poignancy and urgency to the quest for a valid new approach.
Carlo Ungaro, 19 May 2010
Subjects:
· Taliban insurgency in Pakistan and Afghanistan
We need to break old assumptions if Afghanistan and Pakistan are to be secured, argues Carlo Ungaro
About the author
Carlo Ungaro is a former Italian diplomat. He spent sixteen years serving in Afghanistan. Between 2000 and 2007, he served as political adviser to the Italian led ISAF forces in Herat.
The term “exit strategy” often signifies a tacit admission of basic mistakes committed upon entering a conflict. This is particularly true in the case of Afghanistan where an analogy can be drawn with the story of Theseus and his hunt for the Minotaur in the Labyrinth. In fact, just like the initial occupation of Afghanistan, entering the Labyrinth did not pose major problems for Theseus, but his twenty-first century’s successors – the NATO forces – although they quickly found the Minotaur’s lair, discovered that the beast had fled and that, lacking Ariadne’s clew, they remained trapped in the impenetrable maze of Afghan political and social reality.It would be useless, at this stage, to indulge in recrimination and to lament the fact that, at the time of the invasion and in its immediate aftermath, advice was apparently not sought, or perhaps it was obtained and not heeded, from those who could have foretold many of the problems, which so often have seemed to come as a surprise both to the NATO leadership and to many political commentators. It would be just as futile for those Cassandra's – among whom I include myself – to come out in triumphant “I told you so!” statements. The situation is far too serious to allow these attitudes.It was clear, already many months back, that a totally fresh assessment was needed, and that the reiteration of NATO’s oft intoned mantra’s would not bring the problem any closer to a solution. It appears, however, that the reluctance to “learn lessons” persists, and that NATO is preparing for another military “triumph”, this time with a dauntingly ambitious objective, Kandahar, a city of significant importance which, occupied countless times but never really conquered, has had an important role in Afghan history throughout the centuries. Granted that, with the massive armament and logistic abundance at their disposal, the NATO forces will manage to gain at least apparent control of Kandahar, would that in any way signify that final victory is at hand? And has a lucid and unequivocal idea ever been expressed as to what would really be meant by “victory”, other than the avoidance of obvious defeat?Clearly, a solution has to be sought somewhere between the alternative of precipitous withdrawal and dogged resistance. The only question that insistently comes to mind is whether there is still time for a radical rethinking process aimed both at halting, or at least diminishing the bloodshed, and at the search for a long term solution not conditioned by past prejudices.One of the eminently foreseeable – but apparently unforeseen – consequences of the military action in Afghanistan has been the extension of the conflict into Pakistan, a development which will leave deep scars, no matter what the outcome. This, in reality, and not the military conflict in Afghanistan itself, is the principal obstacle to any real and lasting solution. The fact is that the boundary existing between Afghanistan and Pakistan’s North West (the “Durand Line”) has never been recognised by any Afghan government since the creation of Pakistan, nor was it ever accepted by the tribal populations on the Pakistani side of the border. This situation, which should have been addressed with energy and decision as soon as the inevitability of Pakistan’s involvement became apparent, was instead allowed to fester, creating an area of permanent conflict, which shall remain so until reality is recognised. This is the key on which all future attempts competently to address the Afghan quandary will have to be based. As past experiences have shown, and the Soviet debacle comes readily to mind as the most recent example, throwing in more troops and vast additional sums of money destined for development projects would be a tragic waste, unless the underlying political problems are taken into unprejudiced consideration.A process of radical revision of war aims and future scenarios should be undertaken with great urgency. The opening phases should preferably take place in a third country, possibly neutral, and should begin by the bold eradication of two fundamentally flawed beliefs which doggedly persist in all present-day evaluations:1. That Afghanistan and Pakistan can be treated as two separate problems and that, after a militarily imposed “normalisation”, they will be able to coexist within the present geo-political framework;2. That Afghanistan can ever be ruled efficiently as a monolithic entity from a government – whether autocratic or “democratic” – situated in Kabul.These are complex and potentially dangerous issues, but until they are taken into careful consideration there will be no hope for any kind of satisfactory settlement.This may seem un-realistic, and our political leaders will prefer to continue in their belief that the repetition of well-tried platitudes can bring about the solution of problems.They ought to cast their minds back about twenty years and try to remember how many greatly respected personalities from the United States and Europe would come away from Belgrade swearing solemn oaths on the absolute inviolability of Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. It is also essential to recall where this kind of obstinacy finally led.It is furthermore important to consider that the visible growing war-weariness in the public opinion of many NATO allies, and the need for democratic Governments at least partially to heed the feelings of their electorate, add poignancy and urgency to the quest for a valid new approach.
martedì 4 maggio 2010
THE POPE AND ITALY
THE POPE AND ITALY
The recent statements by the Vatican, recognising the criminal behaviour of the reverend Marcial Maciel Degollado, founder of the Legionnaires of Christ, could constitute an important step in a new approach by the Roman Catholic Church, in spite of some ambiguity in their content. This circumstance, coupled with the fact that there have been fewer and fewer items in the news about the recent Vatican paedophilia scandal should not, in however, generate the idea that the issue has blown over. The effects are still deeply felt in The United States and in Northern Europe, where the Catholic Church’s crisis is palpable. Much less so in Italy, which, having the Vatican Enclave on its soil, would theoretically appear to be the most directly and intimately involved.
The Vatican, it has to be said, is not a creation of Mussolini, as some would have it, but a long lasting historical reality, which has for many centuries conditioned life in Italy.
It has therefore been interesting to note, in these past weeks, how rare and feeble Italian reactions to the Vatican paedophilia scandal have been. When compared to the often indignant response given by Roman Catholics across Europe and in the Americas, it would seem that Italians have, by and large, viewed the situation with indifference, and the TV channels, both public and private, have actually been totally and uncritically supportive of the Pope and the Holy See, as, indeed, have the rare statements issued by political personalities both of the Right and of the Left.
In their news programmes and commentary, the public Radio and TV, which ought to be completely secular, have absolutely and unquestioningly accepted all the explanations issued by the Vatican. Thus the majority of Italians – culturally isolated because of a pernicious form of monolingual obstinacy, and with almost all of their information obtained through the National TV – are convinced, for example, that a small group of Jewish Law firms in the United States have inspired all this “idle gossip” for the double purpose of discrediting the Catholic Church – which, in Italian eyes, is the only “truly” Christian Church – and milking the “alleged victims” of lots of money in legal fees. They are told, as well, and appear to believe that the ordinary people of the world are all in sympathy with the “Holy Father”, as the public news channels insist on calling him, even having the speakers modulate their tone of voice upon mentioning his August name.
The Vatican statement on the reverend Maciel Degollado, for example, received no comment at all in public radio and television broadcasts, while much space was dedicated to the opening of the exhibition of the Shroud of Turin, with pious references being made to its miraculous origin, but no mention of any sceptical attitudes in the scientific community.
And yet, walking the streets of the Holy City (Rome), a vast number of empty – albeit beautiful – Churches meet the eye, and visible signs of devotion (e.g. the penance of the Holy steps at San Giovanni) are quite rare. Even the crowds in St. Peter’s square at the Papal benediction are, to a large extent foreign or, at least, from other parts of Italy (usually the North), with, of course, an appreciable number of tourists attracted by a spectacle so incongruous for the Twenty-first century.
Very few in Italy read Holy Scripture – the idea being that this is precisely what Priests are for – and even devout Church-goers show an appalling doctrinal and cultural ignorance on the meaning of most devotional rites and are likely to respond with indignant disbelief if told that Jesus was actually Jewish.
All the more surprising, then, to realise what a tremendous power the Vatican and the clergy wield in Italian politics. The fact is that any pronouncement by the Bishops on political matters have tangible effects on the Nation’s political and social life, as was shown in the recent local elections, in which some pointed statements about the “new” (for Italy) abortion pill is thought to have secured the victory of some key candidates, known to be obedient and to toe the line of Catholic orthodoxy, at least in their public postures and statements.
It could be argued that also in the United States religion has an important role in public life, but there on the one hand, no political candidates casts doubt on the firm tenet of separation between Church (any Church) and State, while on the other it is clear that Americans constitute one of the most deeply religious communities in the predominantly Christian world. Neither of these considerations apply in the Italian political and social scene, where the issue of exposing the Crucifix in public buildings (including schools and Tribunals) was treated with incredible emotion by politicians to the point that a Government Minister was seen on public TV, brandishing a Crucifix like an exorcist and issuing death threats to all those who oppose its continued exposition.
This is by no means a new or thoroughly modern situation. In many phases of their history Italians have mingled a show of affectionate pride in being, as it were, the custodians of the Holy See on their territory, with an open hostility which has also ended in episodes of assassination and rebellion.
There was a moment, in the Nineteenth Century, during the battles for Italy’s independence, when secular hostility to the Pope and the Church seemed to gain the upper hand (one can cite the short-lived “Roman Republic” in 1848 and, of course, the conquest of Rome by the Italian State in 1870), but after World War II, with the Catholic Party (“Christian Democrats”) seen as the only credible democratic alternative to Communism – or so, of course, their slogan ran – the take-over by the Church was relatively easy and has resulted in the present equivocal situation which has been further complicated by the fact that the collapse of the Christian Democrats has caused a veritable Diaspora of Catholic politicians who have joined almost every Party on the rather broad Italian political spectrum.
The image therefore emerges of a population with an essentially “pagan” view of Religion, generally limited to an almost Oedipal adoration of the Virgin as well as deep veneration for a selected number of Saints who frequently, sometimes even punctually, come across with the required miracles. It is therefore all the more remarkable that this same population should appear so totally subservient to a Church which is perhaps the most dogmatic religious body on Earth. This is a paradox which defies explanation, and which could be shrugged off with wry amusement, if it weren’t for the thoroughly negative effect Vatican interference has had and keeps having on Italy’s social and political structure, seriously hindering progress, even in Science and Medicine, whenever proposed innovations are deemed contrary to the strictest tenets of the Roman Catholic Catechism.
Italy is going through a crisis which could be almost defined as existential, with creeping forms of occult, but ever more evident, neo-fascist attitudes making frequent appearances.
In this context the growing influence of the Church in public affairs, as evidenced by the behaviour of the Public information services, seems like a justified cause for alarm.
(The Author is a retired senior Italian diplomatic officer)
The recent statements by the Vatican, recognising the criminal behaviour of the reverend Marcial Maciel Degollado, founder of the Legionnaires of Christ, could constitute an important step in a new approach by the Roman Catholic Church, in spite of some ambiguity in their content. This circumstance, coupled with the fact that there have been fewer and fewer items in the news about the recent Vatican paedophilia scandal should not, in however, generate the idea that the issue has blown over. The effects are still deeply felt in The United States and in Northern Europe, where the Catholic Church’s crisis is palpable. Much less so in Italy, which, having the Vatican Enclave on its soil, would theoretically appear to be the most directly and intimately involved.
The Vatican, it has to be said, is not a creation of Mussolini, as some would have it, but a long lasting historical reality, which has for many centuries conditioned life in Italy.
It has therefore been interesting to note, in these past weeks, how rare and feeble Italian reactions to the Vatican paedophilia scandal have been. When compared to the often indignant response given by Roman Catholics across Europe and in the Americas, it would seem that Italians have, by and large, viewed the situation with indifference, and the TV channels, both public and private, have actually been totally and uncritically supportive of the Pope and the Holy See, as, indeed, have the rare statements issued by political personalities both of the Right and of the Left.
In their news programmes and commentary, the public Radio and TV, which ought to be completely secular, have absolutely and unquestioningly accepted all the explanations issued by the Vatican. Thus the majority of Italians – culturally isolated because of a pernicious form of monolingual obstinacy, and with almost all of their information obtained through the National TV – are convinced, for example, that a small group of Jewish Law firms in the United States have inspired all this “idle gossip” for the double purpose of discrediting the Catholic Church – which, in Italian eyes, is the only “truly” Christian Church – and milking the “alleged victims” of lots of money in legal fees. They are told, as well, and appear to believe that the ordinary people of the world are all in sympathy with the “Holy Father”, as the public news channels insist on calling him, even having the speakers modulate their tone of voice upon mentioning his August name.
The Vatican statement on the reverend Maciel Degollado, for example, received no comment at all in public radio and television broadcasts, while much space was dedicated to the opening of the exhibition of the Shroud of Turin, with pious references being made to its miraculous origin, but no mention of any sceptical attitudes in the scientific community.
And yet, walking the streets of the Holy City (Rome), a vast number of empty – albeit beautiful – Churches meet the eye, and visible signs of devotion (e.g. the penance of the Holy steps at San Giovanni) are quite rare. Even the crowds in St. Peter’s square at the Papal benediction are, to a large extent foreign or, at least, from other parts of Italy (usually the North), with, of course, an appreciable number of tourists attracted by a spectacle so incongruous for the Twenty-first century.
Very few in Italy read Holy Scripture – the idea being that this is precisely what Priests are for – and even devout Church-goers show an appalling doctrinal and cultural ignorance on the meaning of most devotional rites and are likely to respond with indignant disbelief if told that Jesus was actually Jewish.
All the more surprising, then, to realise what a tremendous power the Vatican and the clergy wield in Italian politics. The fact is that any pronouncement by the Bishops on political matters have tangible effects on the Nation’s political and social life, as was shown in the recent local elections, in which some pointed statements about the “new” (for Italy) abortion pill is thought to have secured the victory of some key candidates, known to be obedient and to toe the line of Catholic orthodoxy, at least in their public postures and statements.
It could be argued that also in the United States religion has an important role in public life, but there on the one hand, no political candidates casts doubt on the firm tenet of separation between Church (any Church) and State, while on the other it is clear that Americans constitute one of the most deeply religious communities in the predominantly Christian world. Neither of these considerations apply in the Italian political and social scene, where the issue of exposing the Crucifix in public buildings (including schools and Tribunals) was treated with incredible emotion by politicians to the point that a Government Minister was seen on public TV, brandishing a Crucifix like an exorcist and issuing death threats to all those who oppose its continued exposition.
This is by no means a new or thoroughly modern situation. In many phases of their history Italians have mingled a show of affectionate pride in being, as it were, the custodians of the Holy See on their territory, with an open hostility which has also ended in episodes of assassination and rebellion.
There was a moment, in the Nineteenth Century, during the battles for Italy’s independence, when secular hostility to the Pope and the Church seemed to gain the upper hand (one can cite the short-lived “Roman Republic” in 1848 and, of course, the conquest of Rome by the Italian State in 1870), but after World War II, with the Catholic Party (“Christian Democrats”) seen as the only credible democratic alternative to Communism – or so, of course, their slogan ran – the take-over by the Church was relatively easy and has resulted in the present equivocal situation which has been further complicated by the fact that the collapse of the Christian Democrats has caused a veritable Diaspora of Catholic politicians who have joined almost every Party on the rather broad Italian political spectrum.
The image therefore emerges of a population with an essentially “pagan” view of Religion, generally limited to an almost Oedipal adoration of the Virgin as well as deep veneration for a selected number of Saints who frequently, sometimes even punctually, come across with the required miracles. It is therefore all the more remarkable that this same population should appear so totally subservient to a Church which is perhaps the most dogmatic religious body on Earth. This is a paradox which defies explanation, and which could be shrugged off with wry amusement, if it weren’t for the thoroughly negative effect Vatican interference has had and keeps having on Italy’s social and political structure, seriously hindering progress, even in Science and Medicine, whenever proposed innovations are deemed contrary to the strictest tenets of the Roman Catholic Catechism.
Italy is going through a crisis which could be almost defined as existential, with creeping forms of occult, but ever more evident, neo-fascist attitudes making frequent appearances.
In this context the growing influence of the Church in public affairs, as evidenced by the behaviour of the Public information services, seems like a justified cause for alarm.
(The Author is a retired senior Italian diplomatic officer)
CENTRAL ASIA - THE SMOULDERING VOLCANO
(This article was published on the site "Open Democracy" in April 2010)
Events in Kirghizstan seem to have crept up unexpectedly on an apparently unaware or inattentive international public opinion, principally and understandably focussed on other theatres, albeit in areas not all that distant, such as Afghanistan.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the former Central Asian Soviet Republics - with perhaps the exception of Tajikistan – have been rather superficially viewed as essentially calm. Occasional unrest has always seemed to be short-lived, and the very distance – both geographic and cultural – of these republics has kept them out of the western world’s attention.
Even long after the bygone days of the “great Game”, however, these Republics continue to have significant strategic importance either as producers of oil or natural gas, or for their geographic position which makes them essential partners in conveying these products to the West. These circumstances, in addition to the strategic military importance they have, especially in view of the Afghan conflict and the tensions between the West and Iran have been contributing factors in the endeavour, by the interested foreign Governments, to avoid the adoption of a hectoring attitude on delicate issues such as Democracy or the respect of Human Rights and political freedom.
The result of this rather cynical combination of indifference and covert encouragement has been the creation of an area which owes its stability principally to the inflexibility and virtual immovability of a leadership left over from the Soviet empire.
The only signs of movement have taken place in two of the smaller Republics, Kirghizstan and Turkmenistan, where the sudden death of a dictator whose behaviour could even have seemed comical in its extreme use of the personality cult, had given rise to some hopes of change, which, however have so far failed to take place. My feeling is that the very fact of their relatively small size, in terms of population, make it unlikely for the events there to have immediate far-reaching consequences, unless, of course, they would generate a spill-over effect in nearby Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan. At this time this is unlikely, because these two Republics, particularly the former, are very tightly run by a “nomenclatura” which has survived Soviet times and has flourished since, creating a sense of “Imperium in Imperio”, which, as things stand, appears totally secure, intangible and therefore, by our Western standards, “dependable”.
The question has been put as to whether the events in Bishkek were inspired, encouraged or even financed by outside influence. It is unlikely but not impossible, and some have seen a Russian hand in the events. It has to be clear, however that Russia, just like all the other nearby States, is not interested in destabilizing Kirghizstan, and if there was a Russian involvement it was probably aimed more simply to a regime change operation which, perhaps, got slightly out of control. Political turmoil and instability in those republics which some – with typical Eurocentric arrogance – insist on calling “the Stans”, is, at present in no-one’s interest. Not China, who has already a number of difficult and delicate border situations, certainly not Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan and, therefore, not even Russia, unless, of course there are splinter groups in the Russian services who still nurture imperial nostalgia.
This basically realistic overview, however, fails to take into account an inevitable process: the passage of time, and the resulting disappearance of these leaders from the scene: the nomenclatura is numerous and powerful, and these two aspects have held the key to the survival of these regimes, but it is also fast ageing, and has now been in power for a couple of decades. It is true that, especially through the wide, unscrupulous practice of nepotism, they feel that they have a reliable second generation waiting in the wings, but history tends to show that an inordinate trust in the products of nepotism can lead to disappointing results.
There are further reasons to fear a less than comforting future for these republics. On the one hand, of course, there is a growing population of political dissidents – who have shown their power in Kirgizstan and have been ruthlessly oppressed elsewhere, but in some of the Republics there are also signs of a growing and unyielding hostility on the part of Islamic “extremists”. Their presence, paradoxically, has actually been beneficial mainly because of the West’s instinctive reaction to this kind of threat, and the presence of these pockets of Islamic resistance has strengthened the case for support and encouragement of the repressive regimes in each of the former Soviet Central Asian Republics.
My experience in this part of the world makes me fear that we are dealing with a smouldering volcano, due to erupt in the not too distant future.
The uncertainty prevailing in Afghanistan, and, in spite of the continuous stream of official signs of optimism, in Pakistan should induce all the interested parties to take into careful consideration possible violent and destabilizing scenarios in the area under discussion: it is unrealistic to believe that the more or less benevolent neutrality of the Central Asian Republics can be counted on for an indefinite future.
This inevitably raises the question of how the Powers which are involved in the area can avoid being reduced to a role of passive spectators should events such as these take place. Even twenty years after the end of the Soviet Union, Russian interest and presence remain paramount, as, indeed, they were even in the days of the Tsarist Empire. It could, however be a grave error to think that, should the situation change radically, the defence of all the existing economic, political and strategic interests in any of the Republics could be entrusted to Russia, acting on its own. The danger does exist that the Russians would end up creating a false impression of “Law and Order” through military force placing then their own trusted allies at the head of Governments which would be, in every sense, puppet regimes. We cannot exclude that plans already exist in this sense and that a new “nomenclatura” is ready to emerge in case of severe trouble.
This, of course would not be an acceptable solution and could actually be the forerunner of grater tensions and violence.
It is my belief that - perhaps, for now, secretly and informally – the ground should be tested to ascertain to what extent Russian and “Western” interests coincide or diverge, and leverage should be put in place to persuade the Chinese to play a more visible role in the area. Perhaps, in lieu of “pre-emptive strikes”, a policy of “pre-emptive damage control” should be taken into consideration.
(The writer, a retired former Italian Diplomatic Officer, has spent about twenty years of his life in Central Asia – mainly in Afghanistan – and served as Italian Ambassador in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) between 1992 and 1995)
(This article was published on the site "Open Democracy" in April 2010)
Events in Kirghizstan seem to have crept up unexpectedly on an apparently unaware or inattentive international public opinion, principally and understandably focussed on other theatres, albeit in areas not all that distant, such as Afghanistan.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the former Central Asian Soviet Republics - with perhaps the exception of Tajikistan – have been rather superficially viewed as essentially calm. Occasional unrest has always seemed to be short-lived, and the very distance – both geographic and cultural – of these republics has kept them out of the western world’s attention.
Even long after the bygone days of the “great Game”, however, these Republics continue to have significant strategic importance either as producers of oil or natural gas, or for their geographic position which makes them essential partners in conveying these products to the West. These circumstances, in addition to the strategic military importance they have, especially in view of the Afghan conflict and the tensions between the West and Iran have been contributing factors in the endeavour, by the interested foreign Governments, to avoid the adoption of a hectoring attitude on delicate issues such as Democracy or the respect of Human Rights and political freedom.
The result of this rather cynical combination of indifference and covert encouragement has been the creation of an area which owes its stability principally to the inflexibility and virtual immovability of a leadership left over from the Soviet empire.
The only signs of movement have taken place in two of the smaller Republics, Kirghizstan and Turkmenistan, where the sudden death of a dictator whose behaviour could even have seemed comical in its extreme use of the personality cult, had given rise to some hopes of change, which, however have so far failed to take place. My feeling is that the very fact of their relatively small size, in terms of population, make it unlikely for the events there to have immediate far-reaching consequences, unless, of course, they would generate a spill-over effect in nearby Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan. At this time this is unlikely, because these two Republics, particularly the former, are very tightly run by a “nomenclatura” which has survived Soviet times and has flourished since, creating a sense of “Imperium in Imperio”, which, as things stand, appears totally secure, intangible and therefore, by our Western standards, “dependable”.
The question has been put as to whether the events in Bishkek were inspired, encouraged or even financed by outside influence. It is unlikely but not impossible, and some have seen a Russian hand in the events. It has to be clear, however that Russia, just like all the other nearby States, is not interested in destabilizing Kirghizstan, and if there was a Russian involvement it was probably aimed more simply to a regime change operation which, perhaps, got slightly out of control. Political turmoil and instability in those republics which some – with typical Eurocentric arrogance – insist on calling “the Stans”, is, at present in no-one’s interest. Not China, who has already a number of difficult and delicate border situations, certainly not Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan and, therefore, not even Russia, unless, of course there are splinter groups in the Russian services who still nurture imperial nostalgia.
This basically realistic overview, however, fails to take into account an inevitable process: the passage of time, and the resulting disappearance of these leaders from the scene: the nomenclatura is numerous and powerful, and these two aspects have held the key to the survival of these regimes, but it is also fast ageing, and has now been in power for a couple of decades. It is true that, especially through the wide, unscrupulous practice of nepotism, they feel that they have a reliable second generation waiting in the wings, but history tends to show that an inordinate trust in the products of nepotism can lead to disappointing results.
There are further reasons to fear a less than comforting future for these republics. On the one hand, of course, there is a growing population of political dissidents – who have shown their power in Kirgizstan and have been ruthlessly oppressed elsewhere, but in some of the Republics there are also signs of a growing and unyielding hostility on the part of Islamic “extremists”. Their presence, paradoxically, has actually been beneficial mainly because of the West’s instinctive reaction to this kind of threat, and the presence of these pockets of Islamic resistance has strengthened the case for support and encouragement of the repressive regimes in each of the former Soviet Central Asian Republics.
My experience in this part of the world makes me fear that we are dealing with a smouldering volcano, due to erupt in the not too distant future.
The uncertainty prevailing in Afghanistan, and, in spite of the continuous stream of official signs of optimism, in Pakistan should induce all the interested parties to take into careful consideration possible violent and destabilizing scenarios in the area under discussion: it is unrealistic to believe that the more or less benevolent neutrality of the Central Asian Republics can be counted on for an indefinite future.
This inevitably raises the question of how the Powers which are involved in the area can avoid being reduced to a role of passive spectators should events such as these take place. Even twenty years after the end of the Soviet Union, Russian interest and presence remain paramount, as, indeed, they were even in the days of the Tsarist Empire. It could, however be a grave error to think that, should the situation change radically, the defence of all the existing economic, political and strategic interests in any of the Republics could be entrusted to Russia, acting on its own. The danger does exist that the Russians would end up creating a false impression of “Law and Order” through military force placing then their own trusted allies at the head of Governments which would be, in every sense, puppet regimes. We cannot exclude that plans already exist in this sense and that a new “nomenclatura” is ready to emerge in case of severe trouble.
This, of course would not be an acceptable solution and could actually be the forerunner of grater tensions and violence.
It is my belief that - perhaps, for now, secretly and informally – the ground should be tested to ascertain to what extent Russian and “Western” interests coincide or diverge, and leverage should be put in place to persuade the Chinese to play a more visible role in the area. Perhaps, in lieu of “pre-emptive strikes”, a policy of “pre-emptive damage control” should be taken into consideration.
(The writer, a retired former Italian Diplomatic Officer, has spent about twenty years of his life in Central Asia – mainly in Afghanistan – and served as Italian Ambassador in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) between 1992 and 1995)
venerdì 4 dicembre 2009
Can Afghanistan be governed by Kabul?
NOTE: This article was published on the site "Open Democracy" on November 27th.
SUMMARY:
The Afghan problem appears insoluble, and the recently decided "surge" will not contribute to a solution. The issue of decentralization has not been sufficiently addressed, and ought to be taken into account.
TEXT
The inauguration of
The Afghans are a patient people: it took almost ninety years for them to convince the British that any attempt permanently to occupy the country would be futile, and they also fought the Soviet invasion for almost a decade. NATO has been there, now, for eight years, and has yet to consolidate its presence, even in the capital city, Kabul, which, at times, such as the day of this infamous inauguration, appears totally occupied and blockaded, with checkpoints every few hundred meters and military presence visible at every corner, but yet can be the theatre of frightful attacks on foreign troops and – unfortunately – afghan and foreign civilians.
The invasion of Afghanistan was greeted with approval and understanding by almost all the world’s Governments as an apparently justified reaction to an act of terrorism ostensibly masterminded in Afghanistan itself, but very lame and contradictory justification has been given on the maintaining of a massive military presence there after the expulsion of Al Qaida – the achievement of the initial “casus belli”.
Whether or not there were also covert reasons to encourage the United States and at least some of its NATO allies into extending the Afghan operation from a simple surgical strike against Al Qaida into a “regime change” venture is open to conjecture, and constitutes one of those subjects seldom approached by international commentators. It would be a mistake to ignore the fact that a “western oriented”
There is the suggestion that NATO’s presence in
At this moment negotiations with the Insurgents would be conducted from a position of relative weakness. The concept itself, however, has been evolving from being an absolutely unmentionable anathema to a seemingly realistic option. Some three years ago, instead, when I was in
Should the concept prevail that Western forces have to remain in
Is a centralized presidential republic really the ideal system for that country or, indeed, could it ever be made to work no matter how much effort is put into the attempt? This is an extremely complex problem which should involve careful analysis and much consultation with a credible cross-section of Afghan political and civil society. It is my idea, however, that by creating a number of more autonomous regions it would be possible to enhance the differences, which already exist, in the approach to some of the non-military problems (e.g. human rights, corruption, etc.) which seem to slip further and further away at this particularly dramatic moment in the history of the NATO and International operations in Afghanistan.
This, among other things would entail two very delicate issues, the necessary reformulating of the Afghan Constitution and the renewed involvement of at least some of the so-called “war lords”.
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has been prepared with great care and approved by the Afghan Parliament. It does not, however, fully take into account the Country’s peculiarities, nor does it seem founded on the basis of local and tribal traditions. A radical change in the Constitution need not be a traumatic event, as long as all sides are allowed to participate, and as long as preconceived ideas are abandoned.
As far as the “war-lords” are concerned, it is important to distinguish between those who have emerged from the violent civil war years and are little more than glorified gangsters, and those, instead, who obviously wield an authority greater than what can be imposed by fear of retribution, but which is based , instead, on family and tribal realities. Serious attempts could be undertaken to involve some of these local chiefs – rather than the
Carlo Ungaro
November 27 2009
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