Afghanistan’s Civil Society faces a perilous future

(Article published by "Oped News" on November 21, 2012

The resignation of General David Petraeus certainly brings to mind his role in the Afghanistan conflict and ought to stimulate us to focus  attention on  that country, which, beyond occasional reports of violence against civilians or NATO forces, nowadays tends to be ignored  by international commentators.

Ever since its  inception  the unfortunate Afghan venture appeared haunted by the risk  of a  hurried departure of the invading forces with no real, valid or credible “exit strategy”  having been planned. This  prospect  has recently emerged with particular vigour, and there is indeed a growing fear that Afghanistan, if left to its own devices, will be unable to avoid civil war and  virtual collapse.

As a consequence,  in the future memory of the Afghan people, the present invasion may well be  seen as  even more damaging than the   Soviet occupation of the 1980’s, which caused  extremely critical and hostile reactions in the West, to the point of the United States displaying its “moral outrage” by boycotting the Moscow Olympics of 1980.

Stripping  political rhetoric from all the statements and justifications put forth first from one side (The Soviet Union), then the other (NATO allies), the political and strategic “rasonnieren” behind the two invasions  have  much more in common than what could be normally suspected.

The initial phase of the Soviet invasion – ostensibly on the “request” of the Afghan government – appeared  particularly violent and brutal,  with the very Government which had allegedly  formulated the “request” being mowed down by firing squads, as a prelude to the formation of an adequately “obedient” regime.

NATO’s opening moves seemed more acceptable to the International Community, also because,  to a certain extent, the  “niceties” of international intercourse were respected: a formal, although obviously unacceptable ultimatum was issued,  and the invasion took place with a double asserted  purpose. One of these, the  elimination of the Al Qaeda headquarters,  had, at least, an aura of legitimacy. The  other motivation  was to bring about a “regime change” and install an obedient and docile government  in the place of the Taleban.

This goal was  not  all that different from the one pursued a couple of decades earlier by the Soviet Union, and is quite probably destined to a similar, ignominious  fate..

The two invasions were therefore both of dubious legality, with the  Soviet venture being very strongly stigmatized in the West and causing a major Cold War crisis with  long term effects far graver than the boycotting of the Moscow Olympics, such as a long and violent civil war and the creation of the Taleban, imagined then as a useful anti-Communist tool.  By contrast, in the general climate of  understandable indignation caused by the  September 11 attacks, the NATO invasion received little criticism, and was generally seen to be justified by the need to eliminate the  Al Qaeda power structure.

The apparently excessive brutality exercised against  civilian populations soon, however, attracted some  guarded criticism which, with the passage of time, grew into a mounting opposition  in the public opinion within the participating NATO countries. The governments of the  NATO powers involved, however, felt tied to an international commitment which, in their view,   had to be respected. Acceptance – sometimes wholehearted and enthusiastic – of NATO operations was encouraged by a vigorous press and propaganda campaign launched by ISAF, which  had the practical result of  creating a “de facto” complicity between the International Mainstream Media and NATO.

 On the occasion of its withdrawal,  the Soviet Union, until it lasted, remained essentially  supportive of the puppet government it had left behind, but this  served  only to delay and could not prevent the civil war which broke out almost immediately after its collapse.

Legitimate doubts arise on whether it will it be possible for NATO, upon its departure,  to avoid  the total disintegration of the fragile  socio-political structure left behind after  over a decade of  occupation. The signs point  to the inevitability of a chaotic outcome.

Many diverse  political scenarios  could arise as a consequence of this ill-fated military mission,  and in the little time left  greater attention should be focussed on the fate of the Afghan civilian population, victim of a present-day particularly cynical version of the “Great Game”.  Recent “disclosures” on the presence of  mineral wealth in Afghanistan’s soil will not help the situation, and, in reality, are a complicating factor.

For all its undeniable brutality, the Soviet occupation furthered the development of an already rather dynamic civil society, and growing numbers of children and young adults, particularly women,  continued to have access to educational and training facilities both at home and abroad, being thus moved away from the more extreme forms of religious fundamentalism. The hiatus caused first by the  civil war, and then by the years of  Taleban led regime was certainly a setback,  but  some ground was regained, though in a less systematic fashion, in the course of  the  present occupation. In spite of  all these decades of foreign occupation and internal conflict, and  notwithstanding  all the negative images we receive of the country, Afghan civil society continues to be a potential asset, indeed, perhaps the only real hope for  that country’s future development.

A critical analysis of the errors committed in these past years which have  handicapped  the full emergence of this civil society would be relatively easy, but  quite useless at this stage, while attempts to  foresee and to curtail the  damage that the NATO military withdrawal  will  cause  to the Afghan civilian population – particularly, but not exclusively the women – is certainly of much greater  urgency and interest.

It seems quite fair to state that the military situation in Afghanistan has not met its ill-defined goals, and is destined to a disappointing end. This, however lends even greater poignancy to the  basic question of whether  a way can be found of avoiding the tragic sequel which seems inevitable, and which will further damage a civilian population which certainly deserves a  better fate.

Although it is probably too late, efforts ought to be directed not so much in the strengthening of a corrupt and inept central government, but in the enhancement of  local autonomies, in which populations  flourish which have  little or no sympathy for Taleban inspired extremism, both for ideological reasons and for  ancient, deep-rooted tribal and ethnic differences. The risks are notable, especially in some regions in which the old “warlords” still wield influence, but attempts should be made to  concentrate the  future Taleban authority’s power and influence in areas  more sympathetic to their ideology and  ethnically closer to them.

If this approach had been adopted  some years ago, as suggested by some observers since early 2005, the Afghan problem would perhaps be more manageable today. Late as it is, some hope  could be held  for  a less disastrous outcome should it be adopted now.