AFGHANISTAN’S TRIBAL STRUCTURE NEEDS TO BE RESPECTED

The recent Conference held in Rome on “the way forward” in Afghanistan, has laid bare the basic unwillingness – or inability - of the International Community to consider a change in its stance on the complex process of “transition”. The only positive aspect of the conference was the belated, and rather passive, presence of Iran.
Of much greater import is the news that, in the forthcoming Lisbon summit, the “withdrawal date” may be moved forward another four years, thus scrapping the growingly unrealistic target date of July 2011, and, at the same time, creating internal political problems to many of the participating countries, not excluding the United States.
By now the statements coming from ISAF spokespersons on the alleged military progress seem totally otiose, and can easily be disregarded. Further thought should be given to the civilian issues which have been either overlooked or wrongly approached.
Many commentators on Afghanistan have recently concentrated their attention on the tribalism and nepotism which appear to dominate Karzai’s presidential style. Few, however, have bothered to point out that tribalism and nepotism, in some social and cultural contexts, can actually become extremely strong foundations on which to construct a credible and successful government. This has often been the way in Afghanistan, as well as in other similar societies, whenever a free choice of governance was available. Most likely only a system based on these principles could possibly ensure relative peace in Afghanistan after the departure of foreign troops.
Those who were interested in Afghanistan’s political structure in the peaceful and relatively prosperous years of the Zahir Shah Monarchy (1932 – 1973) will recall that while, to all appearances, Afghanistan was a unified Kingdom ruled by a benevolent, unassuming and rather Western oriented Monarch, in reality the King owed his power exclusively to the combined goodwill of the Pashto tribes (he was a Mohammedzai), and was treated with respect, but certainly not with undue reverence, by the non-Pashto Provinces, in the North and in the West.
Any attempt to plaster over this centuries old reality with a flimsy veneer of Western political philosophy, however well-intentioned, is doomed to failure. The very words – “tribalism” and “nepotism” – have negative connotations for us, but we ought to realise that these are fundamental social truths which, in past centuries, were driving forces even behind the construction of modern Europe, kept in check mainly by strong unifying forces such as the Empire, the Papacy and the rising Monarchies and Baronies eventually to become today’s Nation States. These basic factors in human social development actually still have an important role in some European areas.
This fundamental character of Afghan society has to be understood and respected in order to avoid errors of the past, even those committed during the Monarchy and in the following years which can be summarised as a futile attempt to accelerate history by imposing alien social and political models unsuited to the fabric of Afghan society.
The recent news of “secret” talks between the insurgency and the Karzai Government, with the seeming support of the NATO Command, although, as yet, rather ambiguous, could be a positive signal, indicating a way out of the Afghan labyrinth without excessive further damage to the Civil Society. There is reason to fear, however, that, even if successful, these negotiations may terminate the foreign occupation of Afghanistan but will not lead the country to a peaceful future, and will not avoid the seemingly inevitable inter-ethnic and tribal violence which will follow NATO withdrawal. There is, in fact, a substantial risk that any agreement would, in reality, be limited to the Pashto ethnicity, with only some formal concern shown for the other parts of the population, and this will have tragic effects on the fragile social structure left over from all these years of foreign occupation.
A serious attempt ought to be made, instead, for a greater involvement of tribal and other traditional leaders. The somewhat discredited Karzai leadership and the Taleban insurgency should not be left alone in determining Afghanistan’s future. Perhaps a second great Jirga, this time convened in the traditional manner and not limited to leaders faithful to the Karzai line, could lay the initial groundwork for the creation of an Afghan state able to elicit the loyalty of the entire population.
If, however, present policies are going to be stubbornly pursued, the end of foreign occupation will most probably be followed by tribal and ethnic conflicts, basically a “civil war”, which will leave the country subject to even greater divisions than those left by the Soviet Union in 1989. It is absurd to believe that, in the space of a few months, a unified army and a reliable police force can be formed through patchy training programmes in a Country historically divided along ethnic and tribal lines, and which has been either in a state of virtual anarchy or under foreign domination for over three decades.
As long as the International community, responsible for Afghanistan’s future after long years of occupation, keeps talking of “transition” in irresponsibly unenlightened terms, even the most slender remaining hopes for peaceful development will prove vain.

IS BERLUSCONI ITALY'S "COME-BACK KID"?

Whatever his shortcomings, and, indeed, there are many, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has succeeded in forging much of Italy’s social reality and perceptions to his own image. If, on the one hand, recent events could appear as threatening an end to his remarkable political career, there are also reasons to believe that it could be a bit early to start trotting out his political obituary.
There is no doubt that Berlusconi and his closest entourage do appear nervous, ill at ease, more irritable than usual and even beset by a sense of panic, as shown by their renewed and ever more violent attacks on hostile media, allegedly “communist inspired”, whose criticism of the Government has been defined as “anti-Italian” by the Prime Minister himself. The latest symptom of panic has been a succession of remarks, at first veiled and then increasingly overt, by Berlusconi and his Foreign Minister, on a presumed “anti-Italian conspiracy” supported by the international media. To prove the existence of this assumed “foreign conspiracy” a variety of allegations are brought into play. Reference is often made on the insistence, by the international press, to publicize “negative” stories about Italy, such as the garbage scandal in Naples or the Prime Minister’s sexual escapades. More recently, the damaging files published by Wikileaks have also been repeatedly mentioned, in an attempt to cast Wikileaks as a co-conspirator, while at the same time minimizing the import of the published material, defined, by the Prime Minister and the obedient public Television, as “gossip, lifted from the opposition newspapers”.
All this, in conjunction with an apparently growing pressure from large segments of the Italian political scene, including former allies, urging Berlusconi to resign would seem to confirm the approaching Gotterdammerung, which, as usual in Italy, is not devoid of comic-opera settings. A recent example was given by a publicly televised heated exchange of insults, in the Neapolitan dialect, between a former beauty queen, now a Cabinet Minister (dubbed by some as the “world’s most beautiful Minister”), and the Duce’s grand-daughter, Alessandra Mussolini, both part of Berlusconi’s majority. The insults were of an extremely vulgar variety and had to be translated into Italian, giving the public a welcome respite from the grey, nebulous and ever less understandable statements by other political leaders..
Berlusconi, however, has shown in the past to be an incredible political survivor, and it may be a mistake to consider his political career as being over. He could actually benefit from the state of utter confusion in which the Italian political scene finds itself, and end up as one of the two beneficiaries of the ongoing crisis (the other beneficiary being his closest political ally, the “Northern League”).
This is no ordinary political crisis. Berlusconi is dominated by two very strong ambitions: firstly to avoid appearing in Court to face a number of prosecutions which could even end up with prison sentences, and, secondly, to be elected President of the Republic and triumphantly enter the Quirinale Palace, official home of Popes, Kings and Presidents since the sixteenth century.
The date of December 14 could well indicate the future trends. On that day there will be two simultaneous votes in Parliament (something unheard of in Italian republican history): a “vote of confidence” in the Government, called by Berlusconi's allies, in the Senate, and a “vote of no confidence”, presented by a loose collection of his rivals, in the Lower House. On that same day, in one of those dramatic coincidences so dear to the Italian political sensibility, the Constitutional Court was scheduled to rule on the constitutionality of one of the many legal shields which the Berlusconi Government has enacted to protect the Prime Minister from prosecution. This last event has been postponed and will take place in January, thus giving the Prime Minister some further breathing space.
At least three possible scenarios could emerge:
By very aggressively pursuing and purchasing the votes of insecure parliamentarians, Berlusconi could well win both confidence votes and thus weather the storm and continue until 2014, when, as Prime Minister, he could have a good chance to be elected President by a joint session of the Italian Parliament. This solution may seem rather unlikely, but is certainly not impossible.
After either losing one of the confidence votes, or winning by a very thin margin, Berlusconi could decide to hand in his resignation to president Napolitano, acting on the assumption that the President will call for the dissolution of Parliament and new elections. Those very opposition political forces who are clamouring for Berlusconi's resignation fear this outcome because they feel that a coalition between Berlusconi and the xenophobic, racist “Northern League” would almost certainly win, bringing Berlusconi back into power, albeit under the Leagues' thrall.
The only way in which Berlusconi can be defeated would be through the creation of a “national unity“ caretaker transitional Government, perhaps under the leadership of a non-political figure, to last out the remaining years of the legislature (i.e. until the year 2014). This is probably the solution also favoured by president Napolitano – for there is no love lost between him and Berlusconi – but it risks being stymied by the divisions which beset the opposition political parties, who seem intent in an almost suicidal campaign destined to discourage any attempt at unity.
In politics, and even more so in Italian politics, a week is a very long time, and much can happen before December 14, including the forging of alliances among groups or parties which at this stage seem anchored to irreconcilable positions. Close attention will also have to be paid to the actions of the Catholic Church which has been interfering in Italian politics with growing forcefulness, and which could well become the deciding factor either by abandoning Berlusconi because of his “immoral” behaviour, or by endorsing him thus encouraging the “Catholic” political leaders to signify their support and save the government from a crisis which would otherwise seem inevitable.