A glance, however cursory, at most of the world’s press gives the chilling sensation that the situation has gone out of hand and that Governments are no longer fully in control, no matter how determined and well-intentioned. The prime example comes to us from the United States, and I express my doubts not in a critical “anti-American”, or even “anti-establishment” frame of mind, but rather with the anguished thought that if president Obama, with the support enjoyed by him at this time, gives an impression of impotency in the path of an advancing juggernaut, what hope do weaker, less prosperous and less efficient Governments have?
Some – and the Italian Government is among them – appear to be seeking alternative strategies, which, in the light of historical precedent, are potentially dangerous and rather frightening. The idea is simple and not at all novel, for it has been used in the distant and recent past. It consists of building up an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, convincing the people that only a “strong” government, untrammelled by the inevitable intricacies associated with the Rule of Law, can bring about the country’s salvation. Around 100 B.C. this tactic was successfully used by Sulla, who thus contributed in the destruction of centuries of Roman republican rule and opened the door for the Empire and absolutism. It has been repeated, with variations, on many occasions and in many different societies, including the United States (the McCarthy years, the “terrorist threat, etc.), and, of course, in Italy and Germany in the twentieth century, paving the way for Fascist and Nazi rule.
If I concentrate attention on the Italian situation it is simply because Italy has had a historical tendency to act as a leader in many trends both positive (the Renaissance, architecture) and negative (Fascism, organised crime).
The current Italian Government is headed by Mr. Silvio Berlusconi, who is the owner of all the private TV networks which have a strong nation-wide appeal (there is only one exception, and it is being strongly discriminated against). As head of the Government he of course also has some say in the running of the very drab, predominantly idiotic, but much followed public TV networks. It is not surprising, therefore, that an atmosphere of subdued panic has so skilfully been created, particular care being taken – after staunch denials of either xenophobia or racism – to ensure that, in the public eye, the principal responsibility for the current atmosphere of insecurity lies with the immigrant community.
Many legislative and administrative measures have either been passed or are planned, which will do much to transform the very nature of democracy and of Italian society, usually considered rather open and permissive. Here are some examples, out of dozens:
- Medical staff, even in emergency wards, will have the obligation to report “illegal foreigners” who require treatment;
- children born of foreigners without residence permits will not be registered and will therefore not get a birth certificate;
- bands or posses of “unarmed volunteers” will be formed to patrol towns and cities by night in defence of “public order”;
These are just a few of a growing number of projected measures most of which will probably pass thanks to the current Government’s overpowering majority in both Houses of Parliament.
Italy has thus become the country of prohibitions, some of which are mind-boggling or bordering on the ridiculou: in some public parks it is forbidden to form groups of more than three people (“sedition”), in others anyone sitting on a park bench will have to prove either that he (or she) is an invalid or over the age of seventy (park benches have traditionally been used as resting places by the jobless or homeless, ergo, in today’s Italy, by “foreigners”).
The media are quick and eager to contribute to the image that the responsibility for all this “insecurity”, lies squarely and exclusively on the shoulders of foreigners living in Italy – at this time particularly Romanians. This is giving rise to an ever increasing number of xenophobic or racist incidents, some of which are extremely violent (an Indian homeless person was almost burned alive and an Eritrean youth was brutally beaten) and which do not meet much public disapproval.
In all this the Catholic Church, which, in Italy, has practically unlimited access to the media, plays an unpleasantly populist waiting game, occasionally rapping the Government’s knuckles over some perceived minor “misdeeds” against immigrants or the poor, but this only to gain support among the Catholic members of the hapless opposition Democratic Party, thus transforming it into a passive accomplice in the creation of a growing climate of repressive legislation. As a result Laws will be approved in the near future denying a terminally ill patient the liberty to refuse artificial life support.
A note of hope, however, can be sounded. This “Nouvelle Vague” of Italian neo-fascism is not the result of a deeply thought-out plot, and there is no sinister hidden figure pulling the strings. The very transformation of Italy’s society into a new “regime” would have to overcome a fundamental obstacle in the legendary inefficiency of the Government apparatus and of all endeavours which rely on Government support. Therefore, just as the Italian Banking system was saved from major disaster mainly because of its inefficient, slow moving and ponderous inability to react, so it can be hoped that the creation of a frightening police state will be held back by bureaucratic obstacles and the incurable Italian attachment to improvised solutions..
giovedì 19 marzo 2009
martedì 3 marzo 2009
AFGHANISTAN: THE INEVITABILITY OF A GREEK TRAGEDY?
Summary
Afghanistan’s ancient history has Grecian - Macedonian elements, and some of its greatest cities (e.g. Herat) have been founded by Alexander the Great. Slight shifts in NATO and US policy seemed to offer a glimmer of hope, but recent developments paint a dark picture.
Text
Afghanistan keeps returning to the forefront of international attention, its prospects darker than ever. There can be no miracle cure and there will be no miracle worker, with the power and the ability of bringing about an appreciable change in a reasonably short term. The appointment of Richard Holbrooke does, however, justify some optimism, not only for his proven qualities as a tough negotiator, but also because of the backing he receives from an Administration whose utterances on the issue have been more pragmatic and less ideological than what we have been used to hearing. Further grounds for a more positive evaluation are the Afghan-Pakistani talks in Washington, even though the internal political situation in Pakistan gives little reason for excessive hope.
I met Ambassador Holbrooke in Afghanistan, some years ago, when I certainly had no idea that he would shortly be playing such an important role in the country. I was, at the time, very impressed at the idea of meeting him because I had spent six months in Bosnia from the beginning of January 1996: much of the Dayton agreement can and has been criticised, and the situation in Bosnia is certainly not solved, but, nevertheless, it was impressive to see people civilly seated round a table, who only a few weeks earlier had literally been at one another’s throats.
Ambassador Holbrooke has very probably understood that the first step in the attempt to find a solution to Afghanistan’s problems should, of course consist in trying to define what is meant by a “solution”, since a credible and realistic political plan, a “Nation Building” plan for Afghanistan, has never existed, certainly not since the unfortunate Soviet attempt to transform it into a Socialist Republic. At this stage it would seem much to late to implement one. The only plan left is to salvage what can be salvaged, in the attempt to put in place a structure which could somehow contain the activity of the Taliban, albeit without excluding them from the future power structure.
There are many pitfalls in this complex matter, and the greatest mistake of all would be to draw too many parallels between Iraq and Afghanistan: two totally different historical, political and military realities. It is a cause of particular apprehension that, citing the “success” (a debatable term, at best) of the “surge” in Iraq, some seem to persist in the belief that the numerical increase of the troops on the ground in Afghanistan by a few thousand units would actually help bring about a solution of the problem. In reality, this measure will probably only enhance US isolation, also in the eyes of the NATO partners who have shown no eagerness to contribute further combat units.
There, again, numbers do not tell the entire story. Many NATO countries justify their reluctance by pointing out that they already have a large number of troops on the ground, but, in reality, most of these are not combat troops, but basically units which serve as a security cover for civilian activities (The so-called “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” or PRT’s), and are seldom, if ever, by their own volition engaged in military confrontation with the insurgents.
Despite the insistence on the enhancement of the military presence, there seems to be, however, a growing consensus, both in the international media and among the principal world leaders, that a military solution in Afghanistan is practically impossible.
This is where strong international political leadership and guidance are greatly needed, because the situation, cannot be tackled without taking into urgent and serious consideration the following:
- Afghanistan is not a monolithic bloc but a very complex ethnic and tribal reality: this has to be kept in mind especially in matters concerning the future role of the Taliban, who are detested and feared in some areas (e.g. Herat and most of the North) and, instead, considered as rather representative in the East, in the neighborhood of the Pakistan border. In one way or another, however, they will have to be included in any political design for the future of Afghanistan.
- If it is true that the situation in Afghanistan depends very much on Pakistan’s ability to keep its own tribal areas in check, but the reverse is also true: Pakistan will not be able to maintain internal political stability unless the border issues with Afghanistan are finally tackled, to the point of always keeping in mind the question as to whether Pakistan can continue to exist as a Nation State within its present borders unless its is governed by a strong military dictatorship (which has been the case for most of Pakistan’s existence).
- The United States and NATO will not be able to solve the Afghan question without the cooperation of other interested parties. Should wider and stronger International involvement be called for, it would be sheer folly to exclude Iran, who is a major player – and not necessarily a negative player – on the Afghan scene. We must not forget that Persian – in a slightly modified version known as Dari – is one of Afghanistan’s two official languages.
- It will also be essential to tackle the problem of corruption with the greatest possible energy, because the level of corruption in today’s Afghanistan is actually creating a sense of nostalgia for the Taliban regime, which, though indubitably authoritarian and restrictive, had a reputation of incorruptibility.
Many other major problems - the Narcotics trade, just to mention one – remain on the table, but these cannot be taken into practical consideration until a decision is taken, and implemented, on the future status and position of Afghanistan.
These would be the words of advice that I would take the liberty of giving to Ambassador Holbrooke in the very unlikely event of meeting him again.
Afghanistan’s ancient history has Grecian - Macedonian elements, and some of its greatest cities (e.g. Herat) have been founded by Alexander the Great. Slight shifts in NATO and US policy seemed to offer a glimmer of hope, but recent developments paint a dark picture.
Text
Afghanistan keeps returning to the forefront of international attention, its prospects darker than ever. There can be no miracle cure and there will be no miracle worker, with the power and the ability of bringing about an appreciable change in a reasonably short term. The appointment of Richard Holbrooke does, however, justify some optimism, not only for his proven qualities as a tough negotiator, but also because of the backing he receives from an Administration whose utterances on the issue have been more pragmatic and less ideological than what we have been used to hearing. Further grounds for a more positive evaluation are the Afghan-Pakistani talks in Washington, even though the internal political situation in Pakistan gives little reason for excessive hope.
I met Ambassador Holbrooke in Afghanistan, some years ago, when I certainly had no idea that he would shortly be playing such an important role in the country. I was, at the time, very impressed at the idea of meeting him because I had spent six months in Bosnia from the beginning of January 1996: much of the Dayton agreement can and has been criticised, and the situation in Bosnia is certainly not solved, but, nevertheless, it was impressive to see people civilly seated round a table, who only a few weeks earlier had literally been at one another’s throats.
Ambassador Holbrooke has very probably understood that the first step in the attempt to find a solution to Afghanistan’s problems should, of course consist in trying to define what is meant by a “solution”, since a credible and realistic political plan, a “Nation Building” plan for Afghanistan, has never existed, certainly not since the unfortunate Soviet attempt to transform it into a Socialist Republic. At this stage it would seem much to late to implement one. The only plan left is to salvage what can be salvaged, in the attempt to put in place a structure which could somehow contain the activity of the Taliban, albeit without excluding them from the future power structure.
There are many pitfalls in this complex matter, and the greatest mistake of all would be to draw too many parallels between Iraq and Afghanistan: two totally different historical, political and military realities. It is a cause of particular apprehension that, citing the “success” (a debatable term, at best) of the “surge” in Iraq, some seem to persist in the belief that the numerical increase of the troops on the ground in Afghanistan by a few thousand units would actually help bring about a solution of the problem. In reality, this measure will probably only enhance US isolation, also in the eyes of the NATO partners who have shown no eagerness to contribute further combat units.
There, again, numbers do not tell the entire story. Many NATO countries justify their reluctance by pointing out that they already have a large number of troops on the ground, but, in reality, most of these are not combat troops, but basically units which serve as a security cover for civilian activities (The so-called “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” or PRT’s), and are seldom, if ever, by their own volition engaged in military confrontation with the insurgents.
Despite the insistence on the enhancement of the military presence, there seems to be, however, a growing consensus, both in the international media and among the principal world leaders, that a military solution in Afghanistan is practically impossible.
This is where strong international political leadership and guidance are greatly needed, because the situation, cannot be tackled without taking into urgent and serious consideration the following:
- Afghanistan is not a monolithic bloc but a very complex ethnic and tribal reality: this has to be kept in mind especially in matters concerning the future role of the Taliban, who are detested and feared in some areas (e.g. Herat and most of the North) and, instead, considered as rather representative in the East, in the neighborhood of the Pakistan border. In one way or another, however, they will have to be included in any political design for the future of Afghanistan.
- If it is true that the situation in Afghanistan depends very much on Pakistan’s ability to keep its own tribal areas in check, but the reverse is also true: Pakistan will not be able to maintain internal political stability unless the border issues with Afghanistan are finally tackled, to the point of always keeping in mind the question as to whether Pakistan can continue to exist as a Nation State within its present borders unless its is governed by a strong military dictatorship (which has been the case for most of Pakistan’s existence).
- The United States and NATO will not be able to solve the Afghan question without the cooperation of other interested parties. Should wider and stronger International involvement be called for, it would be sheer folly to exclude Iran, who is a major player – and not necessarily a negative player – on the Afghan scene. We must not forget that Persian – in a slightly modified version known as Dari – is one of Afghanistan’s two official languages.
- It will also be essential to tackle the problem of corruption with the greatest possible energy, because the level of corruption in today’s Afghanistan is actually creating a sense of nostalgia for the Taliban regime, which, though indubitably authoritarian and restrictive, had a reputation of incorruptibility.
Many other major problems - the Narcotics trade, just to mention one – remain on the table, but these cannot be taken into practical consideration until a decision is taken, and implemented, on the future status and position of Afghanistan.
These would be the words of advice that I would take the liberty of giving to Ambassador Holbrooke in the very unlikely event of meeting him again.
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