The Perception of terrorism and the need for rational responses

This Article was published by Oped News on September 17, 2012

Rome, September 12 2012

The recurrence of September 11 has unleashed a  flood of comments,  some more understandable and cogent than others, but for the greater part predictable, pugnacious  and inconclusive.  This  could therefore be a favourable moment in which   to analyze the phenomenon, in a feeble attempt to stem the  flow of totally irrational anti-Islamic feeling  which has gained a firm foothold in much of the Western world – particularly, of course, the United States.

The tragic events of Benghazi were  expertly timed, to give a further boost to the fully reasonable emotional aspect of the world’s response to what is seen as the  enduring “terrorist threat”. And yet, the greatest  threat consists precisely in an oversimplification of the problem, which  tends to ignore, or at least to gloss over, some cold, hard political facts which need to be taken into consideration.

The formal identification of yet another  “terrorist” group in Pakistan a few days ago has been accepted obediently  by the major NATO allies, and reported, with  little critical analysis by the mainstream international press.

There is a disturbing superficiality in the way terrorism is perceived and presented by the  media. The same applies to the  practically unanimous  consensus on the labelling of some groups or activities as “terrorist”, with no attempt to understand their motivations.  

The inappropriately  coined  term “war on terror” (briefly labelled “crusade” before slightly wiser counsels prevailed) has always appeared as destined primarily to domestic audiences  with the secondary, but by no means unpredictable, or unwelcome, effect of creating the impression that some religious or ethnic groups are potential terrorists, and, hence potential enemies. The resulting wave of Islamophobia, particularly  in the United States and in the United Kingdom, appears to  be growing, and no steps are visibly taken to   bring it under control, or, at least, formally to distance governing circles from  an attitude which  at times encourages mass hysteria..

It may appear otiose or redundant to point out that the term “terrorism” has been in use for well over a century and that  people in occupied or oppressed areas  have, throughout history, used  tactics, against the oppressor, which today would be labelled “terrorist”.

It is particularly important to remember that the misleading term “Islamic Terrorism” is unique to our time. The IRA, or ETA activists were never labelled “Catholic Terrorists”, and yet many of them were devout Church-goers, and probably partook of the Holy Sacraments whenever possible.

It would appear that, as the strength of nations develops, so does their feeling of insecurity, and, as a result, the militarily  stronger Countries (The United States and the United Kingdom come to mind) deeply feel the need  of identifying an “enemy” who deserves no quarter and who is out to destroy the State’s very foundations. Every Empire has its version of “Cartago Delenda Est”, and the phenomenon was  acutely analysed in Orwell's “1984”. During the Cold War, this “enemy”  was easy to identify, and anti-Communist or anti-Soviet posturing was  easy, effective,  risk-free and countered by  similar rhetoric from the other side. The rather sudden and unexpected fall of the Berlin Wall, and the dismembering  of the Soviet Union, however,  created great confusion as “the enemy” seemed to dissolve into thin air. The principal propounders of bellicose slogans and  indignantly righteous attitudes must have felt as if, walking in the dark, they had missed the last step.

The quest for a new face to label as “Public Enemy Number1” was made  easier by events  such as the Lockerbie tragedy: Here, presented, as it were, on a silver platter, was a reason to raise  hysterical reaction, as long as no mention was made of the events which, perhaps, at least partly inspired the perpetrators of this horrible crime, such as the unjustified, unexplained and, above all, unpunished   shooting down of a scheduled Iran Air civilian flight in the Persian Gulf some weeks prior to the Lockerbie event. So the attention was shifted, in the space of  very few months, from “Communists” to “Islamic Terrorists”, and, finally, to “Islam”. The necessary language adjustments were made, and the propaganda machine was in full efficiency well before  the  S.S. Cole incident, the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam, and, of course, the immense tragedy of September 11 2001.

The subsequent disasters caused by a cynically incompetent conduct of the   “war on terror” need not be stressed,  and it can suffice to say that  not only was the main objective unfulfilled, but  terrorist bases were created where none had existed before.

It would be a specious exercise to  search for historic parallels, but even  a superficial glance at more recent events makes it  easy to notice how the  quality of being a terrorist resides very much in  the perception of others. Yesterday’s terrorists often  become the heroes and inspirators of a new order, and at times end up  facing the earlier oppressors, on a footing of parity, in the course of  international negotiations.

To my knowledge,  a “war on terrorism” has never been won,  but, in the long run, wherever there have been waves of perceived “terrorism”, the conflict has been more often than not decided in favour of the cause defended by the   “terrorists” – Enough to  mention Partisan or Resistance movements in the Soviet Union, in Greece, in the Balkans, in France, in Italy,  in Libya, in Abyssinia and, in the course of time, in many other nations subject to colonial rule, domestic oppression or foreign occupation.

The words that precede are not an attempt to defend terrorism, but rather to explain the phenomenon in an historical context. In Afghanistan I was unfortunate enough to witness the birth of a “terrorist mentality” among people who, until then, had not indulged in terrorist activity, but who obviously felt that no other means  of reaction was left  to them. This very probably holds true for  many – perhaps not all – of the  allegedly “terrorist” organisations active today, just as it held true – for example – in South Africa when Nelson Mandela, now  a justly respected elder statesman, was vilified in most of the “free world” as a “Communist inspired terrorist leader”.

These are points on which serious reflection is called for, rather than  emotional, pavlovian rhetorical responses,  or, worse, retaliatory attacks which  can only drive a growing number of young people  in the arms of the targeted organizations.

Carlo Ungaro

The author of this submission, Ambassador Carlo Ungaro is a senior Italian Diplomatic Officer, now retired. He has spent many years in Central Asia and especially Afghanistan, lastly as Political Adviser to the Italian led ISAF contingent in Herat (Afghanistan)

IS ROME STILL THE "ETERNAL CITY"?

(Article Published by  Oped News on September 10, 2012)

Rome. September 10. 2012

“I hate Barocco!

 I hate Scirocco!

 I hate Rome!”.

So went a  little doggerel, very popular in Italy five or six decades ago. It was repeated, “ad nauseam” by young, heavily brilliantined, Roman boys who  thus  hoped to demonstrate their cosmopolitan nature, while, of course,   their vey parochialism was being revealed by their belief  that  they were being inscrutably clever.

There are, in fact, moments when, in the more “modern” part of Rome – i.e. the so called “Roma Barocca” of the Popes, of Borromini, Bernini, Michelangelo and of other such gigantic  figures –  that grandiose, yet wonderfully harmonious stile can appear oppressive, especially, perhaps, in the days of the hot, humid African wind called “Scirocco”.

 A short walk away is an older, perhaps even more captivating part of the City,  where the Pantheon rests, perfectly at  ease in spite of its great age, in that Fifteenth and Sixteenth century Rome  which is in many ways more enchanting, albeit less spectacular.

It is, however, precisely   the “newer” part of Rome, the reign of the “Barocco”, which brings home the fact that this, indeed, has always been and still is the “Eternal City”. The appellation of “Roma Caput Mundi” was applicable for many centuries after the Roman Empire had formally ceased to exist and even after the end of the Holy Roman Empire (1805). Being the “World's Capital” for  over twenty five centuries could not fail to leave its mark, and this  has attracted the cream of the world’s  political and cultural life  through the ages, particularly in the course of the past  five hundred years or so, down to the present day.

It is enough to spend some time at the Caffè Greco (often patronized by Hans Christian Andersen), at the beginning of Via Condotti, and to reflect that, within a radius of about a quarter of a mile there lies more history – visible, living history – than most other cities can offer in their entirety.

Keats lived in nearby Piazza di Spagna, while further up the erroneously labelled “Spanish Steps”  lies Villa Medici, site of the French Academy since 1803,  where Hector Berlioz received the greatest disappointment of his life by not being awarded the coveted “Prix de Rome”.

In the other direction, on the Via del Corso, is the apartment where Goethe spent some years of his life, and following this, which for centuries was Rome’s principal avenue, a very short walk leads to the incredibly beautiful Piazza del Popolo in which, through the  main gateway to Rome, the Porta del Popolo,  many made their triumphal entry, as conquerors, liberators or guests. Among these – as we are reminded by an inscription on the main gateway  -  was Queen Christina of Sweden,  a Catholic convert  in self imposed exile, who  was to spend the last thirty years of her  life in Rome, a popular and  equivocal figure, being at the same time a self-avowed  lesbian  and carrying on a long, tempestuous and very public affair with one of  Rome’s most prominent Cardinals..

At the other end of the avenue lies the Capitoline hill, the seat of Imperial power, ,from which Gibbon viewed  the ruins of the  Forum,  getting the inspiration to write one of the most beautiful and readable history  books ever written, “The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire”.

The rivalry between the sculptors and architects Bernini and Borromini (who hailed from Switzerland) is visible throughout, and the source of stories, some true,  others well-invented, still told with relish by those who love the city. Their works still constitute some of the most beautiful sites the city has to offer, from Piazza Navona to the majestic colonnade adorning the  access to St. Peter’s basilica.

Almost every street name in Rome evokes a slice of ancient, medieval, Renaissance or modern history: one of the main shopping avenues is named after Cola di Rienzo, a man of humble origins, whose meteoric rise to fame and leadership in the fourteenth century, seemed destined, for a while, to change the history of the entire Italian peninsula. He called himself a “Tribune” and  had  huge popular support, only to be finally  unseated and killed by those very masses who had hailed him as a saviour.

One intriguing aspect of Rome  lies in the “intimate” or “cosy” nature of its beauty. There are few of the impressive vistas offered by Paris or London, nor does one find the unique, contagious, intellectual ferment typical of Berlin.  Yet one feels that this has long been the world’s capital, or one of the world's capitals,  and its beauty lies in stupendous corners,  narrow streets, ancient ruins, the fountains and of course the enormous number of Churches and monuments.

Also the Romans, in spite of  the vast number  of new generations, appear to have retained their intriguing combination of placid indolence and fiery temperament. It is not difficult to imagine them chasing a Pope into exile,  murdering a tyrant, assassinating the Emperor’s emissaries, only to return to the warmth of the family to enjoy a steaming plate of “maccheroni  al cacio e pepe”, washed down with copious draughts of the white, deceptively light  “vino dei Castelli”.

Walking through Rome one is indeed surrounded by illustrious ghosts, and once one gets that feeling one understands that Rome is still “Caput Mundi” and, indeed, fully deserves its title as the “Eternal City”

Carlo Ungaro

Political Stability in Italy: A Contradiction in terms?

Rome, September 6, 2012

(Article published by Oped News on September 9, 2012)

If bookmakers abounded in Rome as they do in London,  bets could easily be placed on the duration of the present Italian “technical” Government, and on the probable date of the  next general elections – whether as early as November, or in the Spring, when the  Parliament’s  mandate comes to its  end.

Even the most daring of bookmakers, however,  would hesitate to hazard opening a book on the outcome of these elections, or, even more so, on Italy’s political future.

It is  believed  that William Shakespeare  got  ideas, settings and characters for  his Italian based plays in the course of one or more visits to Italy. If so, also the expression “all the world is a stage” may well have had  the same origin, for Italians, like few other people,  freely display their histrionic prowess  in all phases of everyday life,  and this trait, which could not have escaped  the Bard’s notice, is particularly evident in Italy’s political life.

Those who fail to take this into account often label Italian political events as “paradoxical”, where, in reality  they follow a totally logical  path, emphasizing  the  permanent, and widening gap  between  perceptions and reality, characteristic of   the Italian political scene.

From the immediate post war years until the end of what Italians inaccurately call “the First Republic” (circa 1994),   leading political commentators repeatedly described Italy, often in  ominous tones,  as the epitome of “political instability”. It was very difficult, at the time,  to explain that in Italy reality was then, as, indeed, it is  now, very much different from appearances, and that the much criticised political system  had a stability of its own, which, instead, has been lacking over the past twenty years or so..

It is true that,  in a period spanning just under five decades, dozens of governments were formed and fell, sometimes after only days in office, while premature elections – held  before the end of the  Constitutionally decreed parliamentary mandate - were  the rule rather than the exception.

A similar situation had obtained in France during the short-lived Fourth Republic, but General de Gaulle had had  the  strength and the charisma to put  and  end to this and the  “Fifth Republic” he bequeathed to the Nation  guaranteed  decades of political stability without sacrificing democratic principles.

An Italian version of de Gaulle has never appeared although some of the post-war  leaders  have posed as  their country’s saviours: one of these – Bettino Craxi – ended up in luxurious self-imposed exile in  Hammamet as a fugitive from justice after heading the most corrupt – but also the most “stable” – Italian Government  in the  decades between  the birth of the Republic (1948) and his political  downfall (1992).

There, in fact, lies the apparent paradox, for it was precisely in those seemingly trouble-free years that the seeds were sown for the rise of the so-called “Second Republic” the un-mourned demise of which  now seems imminent, and which has been the theatre of the greatest “instability” in the country’s recent history..  

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent, not totally unrelated,  cataclysm which shook the foundations  of the Italian Republic, brought about a dramatic ending to a system under which, after all, in spite of its perceived “instability”, the country had prospered, Democracy had  flourished, the quality of life had become one of the  most envied in Europe and Italian style and design  were known and appreciated the world over. Today’s Italy, by contrast, has known real, tangible instability and economic decay over the past two decades, even though – with some exceptions – Governments lasted out their full mandate with  large majorities  in Parliament. The instability – invisible to all but the most jaundiced eye – lay (and still lies) in the cynical, irresponsible and ultimately  dangerous infighting which took up all of the governing Parties’ energies, and the ultimate result was the last Berlusconi-led  government (his fourth stint as Prime Minister, for a  total of 3340 days in office), largely responsible for Italy’s present situation.

The timing of Italy’s  next general election is actually not as important as it could have appeared some weeks ago, and  the  political leaders, as well as the voting public will be as unprepared for them next Spring as they would be in November. Their outcome, instead will be of fundamental weight in determining the country’s destiny for the coming years.

The trend, which is being pursued rather clumsily,  with little of the classic Italian touch of subtlety, seems to indicate that, no matter what the outcome of the elections, the  more powerful political  parties  will attempt to band together into an unruly “moderate”, Catholic-led centrist coalition, which would have a very good chance of lasting out the entire Legislature.  There is even cautious talk of a role for Professor Monti, either as head of the Government or as President of the Republic.

This solution is certainly not the most desirable one, for, while it would certainly bring apparent  stability  to the Italian political scene, it  could very well  reveal itself as a severe blow to the democratic process in Italy. In this way, the endemic volatility of the system would be allowed to fester, under a  deceptive cloak of respectable solidity, and the electorate’s confidence in the political setup – including, of course, the Government – would risk growing to  a dangerous level.

Carlo Ungaro

The author of this submission, Ambassador Carlo Ungaro, is a retired Senior Italian Diplomatic Officer

NATO Forces in Afghanistan: The Final Curtain Call?

(This article was published by Oped News on Sept 2, 2012, and was written before I learned of the suspension of training procedure for new recruits)

As the U.S. and NATO approach the final curtain call in Afghanistan,  their doomed venture is gradually  fading out of the media. Meanwhile, however, scores of people, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, are still being killed, either by Drones, by military action or by “terrorist attacks”. We are invariably told that all those killed by NATO actions were “militants”, or, perhaps, “suspected militants”, but never “civilians”, for even the term “collateral damage” is no longer being used. The fact that also a small but steady number of allied military personnel  are still dying is more or less ignored, apart from brief emotional outbursts in the  opinion of their respective native country. It is seldom pointed out that most of these deaths indicate the existence of staggering gaps in the preparation of a credible Afghan security apparatus, which ostensibly should  take over only a few months from now. Some publicity – but rather subdued in tone – was given to the fact that the number of U.S, dead has reached 2000, while  no body counts regarding the   enemy  seem to be available.

A small number of  commentators were quick to point out the initial  errors committed in a hastily prepared, strategically flawed and morally indefensible operation meant  essentially to impress   domestic audiences. As time went on, the sequence of strategic, political and psychological errors became  increasingly evident even to some of the traditionally “obedient” mainstream international media, while those who had the dubious  privilege of being physically close to the events could easily observe how the leaders of the operation themselves were swiftly becoming victims of their own propaganda.

As the drumbeat of wilfully misleading slogans rolled on, and words of advice were either scorned or ignored, the inevitability of disaster loomed ever closer, and yet no concrete, credible steps were taken to modify  the situation and to give – albeit belatedly – an aura of credibility and legitimacy  to the foreign presence on Afghan soil.

At this stage Afghanistan’s future appears to be a matter of contention among three different entities, none of which offer great hope.

One the one hand, of course,  the  foreign military forces are still on the scene, and in considerable numbers. There has never, however, been a coherent political agenda  for them, and now all energies  appear directed at hastening  their departure. These are the forces,  it has to be remembered, who repeatedly assured world public opinion that the enemy was “on the run”.

In the course of the long occupation –  perhaps the longest in post-colonial history – one of the most important tasks  for the NATO forces and their civilian  collaborators was to have been “reconstruction” (hence the creation of several “PRT’s” or “Provincial Reconstruction Teams”,  sagely distributed throughout the Afghan territory). There have been  some very modest, yet  encouraging successes on a local level, but  the formation and training of Afghan  military, police and security forces  has  had lamentable  results, and there will lie the  core of most future problems.

The Afghan Government certainly has  a vital role to fulfil, and there can be no doubt of the fact that a number of Afghans – men and women – have rallied in good faith to serve their country, either in Parliament or in public positions which have often put them at risk. Legitimate doubts can be expressed, however, on the  capacity, the competence or even the real political will of Afghan ruling political forces to undertake  their  difficult and potentially dangerous mission, once  the foreign military presence will no longer be there to give them protection and assistance. There is ample and justified reason to worry about the safety  of those – particularly women - who have attempted to serve their Country, for they will be considered  as “collaborators” by future administrations.

The third actor, of course, is the “Insurgency”. Who the insurgents really are, whom do they represent and  what are their real numbers are all unanswerable questions. It would be much  more encouraging if a real insurgent force could be identified, with  credible leadership from whom, even at this late stage,  specific guarantees could be asked for the future.

As things appear to stand now,  the alternatives to a renewed civil war in Afghanistan are rapidly diminishing,  and  the allied efforts should  concentrate on attempts either to prevent this outcome or to limit its  deadly results, rather than on the elimination of presumed “militant” groups in Pakistan by actions which, in the long run, can only encourage the potential destabilization of what used to be an important ally.

For years, now, it has been evident that urgent, audacious solutions should have been sought in the attempt, if not to solve, at least to alleviate the epochal problems which Afghanistan will be facing in the near future. International leaders, however, never appeared willing or capable of going beyond the repetition of well-worn shibboleths about the need to guarantee  a democratic future for the country, while still remaining anchored to the  principles  espoused in a distant  Convention on Afghanistan held in Bonn in 2001. It is probably too late now – time is not “running out”, for it has “run out” years ago – but surely  it would  worth attempting  a new  approach, one that actually takes local realities, not all negative, indeed, sometimes encouraging, into due account.

Somalia's Transition: A Never Ending Story

(This article was published by Oped News on August 31, 2012

Rome, August 28, 2012

In November 2001, as newly appointed head of the Italian Diplomatic Delegation for Somalia, in Nairobi, I began a very active participation in a Peace Conference which was designed to complete Somalia’s transition to stable, credible and internationally recognized  Government. 

This lengthy and complicated peace progress, which lasted well into the year 2004, was fatally marred, in my view, by some hasty decisions taken at its very conclusion. These took little account of the lengthy and patient  negotiations which  had preceded them and  possibly were dictated by  funding problems, as well as strong pressure by the Ethiopian Government, eager to reach a conclusion  seen as favourable to Ethiopian interests. The  end result, therefore, appeared to me, already then, as fundamentally flawed, and unlikely to bring more than a temporary respite to the political turmoil in Somalia.

Even so, it is disheartening to realise that all those months of  careful, finely-balanced talks, with their dramatic and at times highly emotional interludes, would end up with the current  situation, in which, eight years on, little significant  political progress is visible.

 Most commentators, quite commendably, are attempting  to put a brave, optimistic face on this latest  act in the Somali drama, but grounds for optimism appear scant and weak, and it is difficult to see what  this  new “Transitional Federal Government” will be able to achieve, outside of the  areas it  can control.  It is certainly worth considering the eloquent  fact that the  election of the new President, by a carefully balanced Parliament  takes place in the Mogadishu airport, under heavy guard  by foreign troops, and not, as would be expected, in the beleaguered Capital itself.

When the Nairobi Conference began,   Somalia already had  a “Transitional National Government”, the result of intense previous negotiations in neighbouring Djibouti, which, however, was viewed with suspicion and hostility by  some powers and was therefore unable to gain the international recognition it aspired to.

Somalia has traditionally been a difficult land, hard to govern because of its  clan structure. Italian and British explorers found this in the course of their colonial experience there, and, in their dealings with Abdullah Hassan, known as the “Mad Mullah”, in the early years of the last century. It is interesting to note that a memorial to the “Mad Mullah” exists in Mogadishu.

The recent, unexpected, death of Ethiopian Prime Minster Meles Zenawi will certainly further complicate the situation. The negative developments within Somalia, in the past  two decades, owed a lot to Zenawi’s obsessive  interest in being the prime mover of events there. He was among the first  of the U.S. (and the “West’s”) “client” leaders to understand that the path to continued support no longer lay  in raising the spectre of Communism, but rather the spectre of “Islamic extremism”. And it is certain that the tragic events of September 11, 2001, helped him a great deal in his endeavour to  sow an atmosphere of  unreasoning panic directed against  Somali leaders,  many of whom, in spite of their past as “war-lords”, appeared to be involved in an effort to  create, if not peaceful unity, at least  a non violent coexistence among clans and power structures. His close ties with the Americans continued to this day, and some of the “drones” used against Islamic groups in Somalia are stationed in Ethiopia. It is probably no coincidence that the “electoral process” in Mogadishu  seemed to stop in its tracks at the news of  the Ethiopian leader’s  death.

It is not without  a strong feeling of regret that one feels compelled to view  potential future developments in Somalia – and in the Horn of Africa – with some pessimism and apprehension. Large sectors of Somali civil society – and particularly the women of Somalia – have  put a great deal of effort and enthusiasm, sometimes very bravely,  in the endeavour to  find a solution, but the country appears destined to remain a pawn in the hands of outside interests.

The basic questions,  that needs to be considered both by the more responsible Somalis and by those foreigners who have the country’s welfare at heart, concerns the  realistic possibility of  actually finding a  solution in Somalia along the lines proposed up to now. The examples of  neighbouring Somaliland and, to a large extent, of the very autonomous state of Puntland, appear to indicate that, perhaps, greater consideration should be given to the fact that “self government” in Somalia seems to work best in more reduced geographic areas, where the predominance of one clan can ensure acceptance of a  leader who can then, on a footing of parity, establish working relationships with other leaders in what is, perhaps mistakenly, considered a necessarily unified  geo-political entity, or a potential “Nation State”.

The vast majority of Somalis, whether in their own land of abroad, show a deep love and loyalty to their country, and this is an element  that has to be kept into account: Somalia  is, perhaps rightly, seen as the quintessential example of a “Failed State”, but  its people deserve  better, and fresh, unprejudiced thought needs to be dedicated to the problem..