(Article published by “Open Democracy”)
These days the military intervention in Afghanistan has surpassed Viet Nam to become the longest lasting war effort in US history. It does not look like a coincidence that particularly deadly attacks are being carried out by the Taleban, while the repeated threats of an “all out attack” on Kandahar underlines the Sisyphean nature of NATO’s efforts.
These circumstances do not bode well for the success of the recently convened “Peace Jirgah”, and yet the idea deserves close scrutiny and should not be dismissed, out of hand, as yet another failed attempt by The Afghan Government .- with the support of its allies – to embark upon a political path instead of relying mainly on a military venture which shows no signs of imminent success.
My first memory of an Afghan Jirgah dates back to the years of World War II, when, as a child, I was living in Kabul with my parents: the British had issued strong demands that Afghanistan deport all Axis citizens, and close their Diplomatic Missions. A “Loya Jirgah” was convened and, after many days of debate, declared – to our great relief – that this would contravene Afghanistan’s laws of hospitality. A fundamentally important decision had been taken which would guarantee Afghanistan’s neutrality until the Soviet invasion of 1979.
The Jirgah has traditionally been an institute of primary importance in the Pathan tribal areas of Pakistan and the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. Although, traditionally, it gathered only Pashtun tribal elders, in modern times it has been extended also to include representatives of all the other areas.
It can be argued, as, indeed it has been argued, that this form of representation is much more suited to the Afghan political reality than a western-style Parliament, no matter how correct the electoral process. Afghanistan, as, indeed, Pakistan’s North-West, is, basically, a tribal society and peaceful coexistence among the tribes cannot be guaranteed by political processes which do not take this reality into account.
With the passage of time, the term “democracy” has acquired a rather dogmatic aspect, and is associated with certain particular rituals which have evolved, in the course of centuries, in some western societies, and which have then been applied, with success, also outside Europe and North America. An analysis, even a superficial one, of local interpretations of democracy would be completely out of context in an attempt to examine the Afghan situation, which is of grave and understandable concern, but serious thought ought to be given on how it would be possible to reconcile the need for stability in such a volatile and strategically important area with social and political realities which long predate the current insurgency, and all this without further eroding basic liberties.
It is, of course, probable that the Jirgah called by president Karzai will not have immediate, appreciable repercussions in the desired direction, mainly because, rightly or wrongly, the President no longer has the massive backing of the Afghan people, not even in his own tribal area. At the same time, his support among the leading international actors in Afghanistan has also sensibly declined. These circumstances, unfortunately, lend credibility to the accusations that this Jirgah is rigged and that it has been packed with Karzai supporters, thereby depriving it of the dignity essential to its success.
A future scenario could, however, be envisaged in which enhanced local autonomy would allow the application of “our” democratic rules in Towns and Provinces ready freely to choose such a solution (Herat comes to mind), while others could choose more traditional methods of local rule. The central Government, instead, with a role more of guidance and coordination rather than dominance or rule, would be more in tune with the traditions of the land. This arrangement has worked in the past, and could be an indication – with the necessary variations – of a way forward.
The calling of Jirgahs, and their composition and competences should not be left to the arbitrary will of the Head of State, but rather be regulated in a new, bold and imaginative attempt to reconcile respected and valid Afghan traditions to the country’s aspirations to be part of the modern family of nations.
Of course, the principal obstacle to any durable, credible negotiated settlement remains the massive and bellicose foreign military presence, whose support of the government is distasteful to many strata of Afghan opinion. The possibility of solutions along the lines suggested by the Jirgah would be greatly enhanced if agreements in that sense would coincide with a publicized, credible and accepted timetable for the withdrawal of the bulk of foreign troops.
As things stand, there are few alternative suitable solutions, and recourse to the Jirgah as a convincing instrument of negotiation should not be discarded..
sabato 26 giugno 2010
The Central Asian Quandary
Rome, June 22 2010
The Central Asia quandary
In a recent article, published last April (See “Open Democracy”, April 27), I attempted to draw attention to a situation which, by and large, had been ignored by the mainstream media, i.e. that the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia, far from being havens of security, were actually more like volcanoes, once dormant and now smouldering and that, as a consequence, the then incipient troubles in Kirghizstan should not be viewed as an isolated episode but as part of a more general, and somewhat troubling, picture.
The rapid and dramatic – though by no means unexpected – escalation of the violence in Kirgizstan is forcing other players in the area (particularly Russia and Uzbekistan) if not to take action, at least publicly to assume a position. This is something they studiously avoided at the onset of the Kirghiz crisis.
For their part “Western” Governments, and with them the world’s mainstream media, have turned a blind eye to events – and potential developments – in Central Asia, and even the recent anniversary of the massacre of civilians in Andijan (Uzbekistan) by Government troops has been largely disregarded.
Such indifference is no longer really possible. The timing of the disclosure of the recent “discovery” (in reality known or suspected for some time) of mineral riches in remote frontier regions of Afghanistan adds an intriguing tassel to a scenario which, never simple, is becoming ever more complex.
The increasingly dangerous situation in Central Asia can perhaps be better understood by considering some basic facts which, then must be pieced together and properly analysed both from a political and an historical point of view.
The formal collapse of the Soviet Union caused less turmoil and bloodshed in Central Asia than would have been expected. With the exception of Tajikistan, which followed a more complex path, the remaining four republics remained more or less stagnant for many years, and even the unexpected demise of Turkmenistan’s “Turkmenbashi”, the object of an absolutely ludicrous personality cult, at first viewed with some concern (or some hope), caused scarcely a ripple.
In spite of growing human rights violations, these four republics are normally considered as valuable and, above all, reliable allies principally because their apparent internal calm and economic progress tend to lull outside observers into a mistaken sense of confidence and security.
When the extremely violent Andijan incidents broke out, the “West”, which by now relied on Uzbekistan in its Afghan military effort, after some hesitation and extremely mild remonstrations, accepted the Uzbek claim that the uprising had been the work of Islamic fundamentalist extremists. The fact that there may well have been some truth in a fundamentalist presence actually enhances the potential danger of the situation and also explains Uzbekistan’s reluctance to accept the massive influx of Uzbek refugees fleeing from the violence in Kirghizstan.
These regimes give an illusion of ruthless strength and lasting stability. This impression, however, covers a fragile and volatile reality, a weakness enhanced by the passage of time with the ageing Nomenklatura obviously on its way out. Historical reality has shown that nepotism and cronyism do not necessarily guarantee continuity, and while the death of one dictator (Turkmenistan) brought no change, it is difficult to imagine what the consequences will be of, for example, Islam Karimov’s eventual departure from the Uzbek scene.
There is, therefore a potential for chaos and uncertainty on the very border with Afghanistan. In ordinary circumstances this would be a situation which all interested parties and nearby powers would try to neutralise and bring under control, but the timing of the announcement of the “discovery” of “a trillion Dollars worth” of valuable minerals in the very regions of Afghanistan closest to this potential new area of conflict could bring about a change of attitude in all the parties concerned. The existence of these mineral deposits have been an open secret, but the official disclosure - possibly decided for an eventual justification of a prolonged Western military presence in Afghanistan - means that, from now on, “the gloves are off”, and even Iran – which has kept its distance from the Afghan conflict - could display an understandable interest.
Of course, no exploitation or even deeper exploration of the area will be possible unless the country and the region are pacified, and this could mean an intensification of the war effort by the sides engaged in the conflict, and a hand in muddying the waters on the part of those who would prefer not to see such riches fall exclusively into Western (i.e. American) hands. The Russians, in spite of having been badly burned in Afghanistan, have always considered that country as part of their sphere of influence (shades of the “Great Game”), and the Chinese have been quietly enhancing their presence in the area.
The real losers will most probably be the Afghan people.
Carlo Ungaro
Via Campagnano 51
00060 Sacrofano (Italy)
+39 06 9086098
+39 320 778 3160
carloungaro@gmail.com
(The author is a former – now retired – senior Italian diplomatic officer. He has spent twenty years in Central Asia – also as Italy’s first Ambassador to Uzbekistan – sixteen of which in Afghanistan)
The Central Asia quandary
In a recent article, published last April (See “Open Democracy”, April 27), I attempted to draw attention to a situation which, by and large, had been ignored by the mainstream media, i.e. that the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia, far from being havens of security, were actually more like volcanoes, once dormant and now smouldering and that, as a consequence, the then incipient troubles in Kirghizstan should not be viewed as an isolated episode but as part of a more general, and somewhat troubling, picture.
The rapid and dramatic – though by no means unexpected – escalation of the violence in Kirgizstan is forcing other players in the area (particularly Russia and Uzbekistan) if not to take action, at least publicly to assume a position. This is something they studiously avoided at the onset of the Kirghiz crisis.
For their part “Western” Governments, and with them the world’s mainstream media, have turned a blind eye to events – and potential developments – in Central Asia, and even the recent anniversary of the massacre of civilians in Andijan (Uzbekistan) by Government troops has been largely disregarded.
Such indifference is no longer really possible. The timing of the disclosure of the recent “discovery” (in reality known or suspected for some time) of mineral riches in remote frontier regions of Afghanistan adds an intriguing tassel to a scenario which, never simple, is becoming ever more complex.
The increasingly dangerous situation in Central Asia can perhaps be better understood by considering some basic facts which, then must be pieced together and properly analysed both from a political and an historical point of view.
The formal collapse of the Soviet Union caused less turmoil and bloodshed in Central Asia than would have been expected. With the exception of Tajikistan, which followed a more complex path, the remaining four republics remained more or less stagnant for many years, and even the unexpected demise of Turkmenistan’s “Turkmenbashi”, the object of an absolutely ludicrous personality cult, at first viewed with some concern (or some hope), caused scarcely a ripple.
In spite of growing human rights violations, these four republics are normally considered as valuable and, above all, reliable allies principally because their apparent internal calm and economic progress tend to lull outside observers into a mistaken sense of confidence and security.
When the extremely violent Andijan incidents broke out, the “West”, which by now relied on Uzbekistan in its Afghan military effort, after some hesitation and extremely mild remonstrations, accepted the Uzbek claim that the uprising had been the work of Islamic fundamentalist extremists. The fact that there may well have been some truth in a fundamentalist presence actually enhances the potential danger of the situation and also explains Uzbekistan’s reluctance to accept the massive influx of Uzbek refugees fleeing from the violence in Kirghizstan.
These regimes give an illusion of ruthless strength and lasting stability. This impression, however, covers a fragile and volatile reality, a weakness enhanced by the passage of time with the ageing Nomenklatura obviously on its way out. Historical reality has shown that nepotism and cronyism do not necessarily guarantee continuity, and while the death of one dictator (Turkmenistan) brought no change, it is difficult to imagine what the consequences will be of, for example, Islam Karimov’s eventual departure from the Uzbek scene.
There is, therefore a potential for chaos and uncertainty on the very border with Afghanistan. In ordinary circumstances this would be a situation which all interested parties and nearby powers would try to neutralise and bring under control, but the timing of the announcement of the “discovery” of “a trillion Dollars worth” of valuable minerals in the very regions of Afghanistan closest to this potential new area of conflict could bring about a change of attitude in all the parties concerned. The existence of these mineral deposits have been an open secret, but the official disclosure - possibly decided for an eventual justification of a prolonged Western military presence in Afghanistan - means that, from now on, “the gloves are off”, and even Iran – which has kept its distance from the Afghan conflict - could display an understandable interest.
Of course, no exploitation or even deeper exploration of the area will be possible unless the country and the region are pacified, and this could mean an intensification of the war effort by the sides engaged in the conflict, and a hand in muddying the waters on the part of those who would prefer not to see such riches fall exclusively into Western (i.e. American) hands. The Russians, in spite of having been badly burned in Afghanistan, have always considered that country as part of their sphere of influence (shades of the “Great Game”), and the Chinese have been quietly enhancing their presence in the area.
The real losers will most probably be the Afghan people.
Carlo Ungaro
Via Campagnano 51
00060 Sacrofano (Italy)
+39 06 9086098
+39 320 778 3160
carloungaro@gmail.com
(The author is a former – now retired – senior Italian diplomatic officer. He has spent twenty years in Central Asia – also as Italy’s first Ambassador to Uzbekistan – sixteen of which in Afghanistan)
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