AFGHANISTAN ON THE BRINK

The official rhetoric, and the reports emerging from Afghanistan reveal an air of futility, almost of hopelessness. Perhaps attempts should be made to see things as they really are, and not as they are presented in a growingly fictitious NATO scenario offered by a largely obedient international press.

It is not improbable that the current, massive military operation taking place in Afghanistan’s Helmand Valley will result in a perceptible tactical success, thus possibly giving rise to further official declarations of optimism on the ultimate demise of the Afghan insurgency.

Much of the triumphant language on the conflict with the Taliban, complete with childish catch-phrases implying that the enemy is “on the run” has recently shifted from an Afghan to a Pakistani scenario. This, unfortunately appears to lessen the concentration on the war in Afghanistan, where the Allied forces are as far from victory now as they have ever been. The situation, there, appears ever more reminiscent of past Afghan conflicts, dating back to a distant past, and certainly to the increasingly quoted British Imperial misfortunes in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries.

It has to be said, however, that some encouraging signs are emerging and there appears a new willingness, on the part of the occupying forces, to discard some of the pre-existing prejudices and to embark upon a novel and perhaps more daring analysis of the problem, seen in its entirety.

Hostile though I am to acronyms and clever abbreviations the emergence of the term “Af-Pak” seems to me rather encouraging, in spite of the danger it entails of confusing one conflict – the one in Pakistan against a specific and perhaps ultimately “defeatable” insurgent – with another, in Afghanistan which, instead, is waged more against a cultural reality than an identifiable insurgent organisation.

There are moments in which there seems to be much clearer thinking on the inside of the Military command structure in Afghanistan than on the outside, and many of the Afghan “experts” who so frequently and generously share their intelligent insights with us could soon find themselves displaced by unsuspected wisdom from the very same sources which, until yesterday, fed them all the wrong and misleadingly optimistic information which they so eagerly passed along. Anyone who has spent time in the present Afghan situation can easily identify the sources of the “information” which is blithely passed on by eminent journalists: a cup of coffee at ISAF Headquarters in Kabul, a chat with diplomatic officers – preferably British or American – or a “power-point” briefing at one of the many PRTS disseminated around the Country, plus, of course, the inevitable encounters with representatives of Afghan “Civil Society” who, by now, have learned precisely what to say to impress their foreign interviewer.

The sad result is that most of what one reads today about Afghanistan seems to range from the monotonous (victory just around the corner) to the ludicrous (e.g., the need to persuade the two Governments to “recognise the Durand Line”) with little or no attention being reserved for the realistic (Why are we there, do we intend to stay, and, if so, on what terms, and, above all what is meant by “victory”, is it at all possible and what do we do after we have “won”).

Similar questions, of course need to be asked about the impending elections, a subject which is painful to those of us who had the pleasure of monitoring the overall successful and peaceful parliamentary and local elections in the Autumn of 2005. Here, again, we should ask ourselves, with cold realism, whether it is worth the risk of going ahead with the elections even at the peril of serious disruption on the part of the insurgents – perhaps at the cost of civilian fatalities. Are these elections necessary, or even useful? Should they take place everywhere, even in the most dangerous zones?

Returning to the original queries, it has to be said that any contemplation on what we wish to achieve should be preceded by a close and pitilessly honest analysis of what we have achieved so far. The result is depressing. Areas which, until a few months ago, were relatively secure (e.g. Herat) have now become dangerous. It is no secret that the level of corruption and the lack of confidence in elected or nominated officials have reached a new high point, and rightly so, this in spite of the presence of numerous men and women of quality and good will whom we seem unable to assist. That is why the questions “why are we here” and “do we intend to stay” are far from specious.

While the reasons for invading Afghanistan were clear and, to a large extent, accepted, those given for the Allies’ need to remain there, especially in the present conditions, and indeed for constant and repeated requests for further escalation of the conflict are far from convincing. It was perhaps true up to two or three years ago that the West’s military presence, especially in the form of the “PRT’s” (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) had a stabilizing and reassuring influence at least in some parts of the Country. The very sad, indeed tragic, truth is that, at present, the Allies have lost the positive momentum and it is they, rather than the insurgents, who have a growing destabilizing effect. When, in 2005, reacting to overtures from insurgent emissaries, I ventured to suggest – from my post as Political Advisor to the PRT in Herat – that the moment was ripe to talk with the Taliban, who had indirectly approached me, my suggestion was dismissed on the doubly misleading, and contradictory, grounds that “we don’t negotiate with terrorists” and that “the Taliban don’t want to negotiate”. At that moment, from a position of greater strength, the Allies could have achieved something through negotiations, now it will be much more difficult.

Even if the Pakistani forces should achieve a victory of sorts against their own insurgency – and it is certainly not impossible – the question remains as to what could be considered a “victory” by the Allies in Afghanistan, particularly if the term is considered on purely military grounds. But even in the event of a political settlement of sorts, would it be wise to remain in Afghanistan on terms similar to those now existing, building up a growing surge of hostility against foreign troops, and by reflex, also foreign civilians?

Radical rethinking is necessary and urgent both for the short term (the August 20 elections) and for the long term, i.e. the ultimate aims of our presence in that unfortunate Country.


Carlo Ungaro